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“Print and Performance in American Abolitionism, 1829-1865” examines the relationship 
between the printed and performed work of Frederick Douglass, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and 
Abraham Lincoln. It argues that each kind of work contributed to the other’s creation and 
presentation. The failure of their early efforts showed once and for all that the abolitionists would 
not have access to a system that allowed for the disembodied distribution of texts. Even if they 
continued to use the medium of print to publish their message, there would be immediate 
demands on their bodies for its circulation. They would need texts that could be easily 
distributed, but that could also elicit more distribution. These texts would instruct the reader how 
to perform them and how to get others to do the same. The proliferation of abolitionist literature 
is generally understood to have been a product of reprinting. In fact, reprinting worked in 
cooperation with reenacting. To date, studies of slavery and abolition have considered one 
medium or another. “Print and Performance in American Abolitionism, 1829-1865” investigates 
the coordination of material process and embodied practice that distinguished the abolitionist 
movement.
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Introduction 
Bodies and Texts in Motion in Walker’s Appeal  
 
In 1835, the American Anti-Slavery Society launched a mailing campaign that took full 
advantage of the era’s technological advances in communication and travel. Bankrolled by 
Arthur Tappan, the wealthy New York philanthropist, and planned by his brother, Lewis, the 
two-year-old organization mailed hundreds of thousands of pieces of abolitionist literature 
throughout the southern United States. The goal was reach 20,000 citizens who had an influence 
on the slavery debate. But for all of the stream driven presses and trains behind them, few of the 
publications reached their destinations. The mails were intercepted in the South by mobs, often 
with the explicit consent of government officials. Agents found with the documents in their 
possession were beaten. The Tappans, hundreds of miles away from where they were burned in 
effigy, feared for their lives. They had been targeted the year before by antiabolitionist rioters in 
New York City. 
The failure of the mailing campaign showed once and for all that the abolitionists would 
not have access to a system that allowed for the disembodied distribution of texts. Even if they 
continued to use the medium of print to publish their message, there would be immediate 
demands on their bodies for its circulation. They would need texts that could be easily 
distributed, but that could also elicit more distribution. These texts would instruct the reader how 
to perform it and how to get others to. The proliferation of abolitionist literature is generally 
understood to have been the product of reprinting. Reprinting worked in cooperation with 
reenacting. “Print and Performance in American Abolitionism, 1829-1865” argues, then, that the 
printed and performed work of abolition contributed to each other’s creation and presentation. 
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Recent studies of abolitionism portray performance as the exception to the rule of print. 
Performance is either the work of minor figures or the minor work of major figures. I argue that 
performance drove the whole movement, its printed work especially. The titles of the first and 
last texts of my study illustrate how vital performance was to the production of printed texts. 
David Walker’s Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World and Abraham Lincoln’s 
Emancipation Proclamation both have celebrated, if unknown, publication histories. Both of their 
names—appeal, proclamation—announce the way that they were circulated. Both authors, that 
is, planned for their texts to have a corporeal component, to be performed. These same studies 
that focus on the role of new technologies—namely, steam power—in the abolitionist movement 
tend to overlook the changes, in demography and strategy, that marked the decades-old 
movement’s radical turn in the 1820s. In highlighting mass print campaigns made possible by 
innovations in communication and large amounts of capital, these studies see a continuity 
between the earlier movement that was dominated by powerful white men and the later 
movement that included a much broader coalition of free born and formerly enslaved black men 
and women and white men and women. They also neglect the fact that, as the nineteenth century 
progressed, abolitionists of both races were increasingly denied access to these print networks of 
publication and distribution.  
 
The organized abolition movement, like the United States, began in the 1770s in 
Philadelphia. The Pennsylvania Abolition Society, formed in 1775, included Thomas Paine and 
Benjamin Franklin in its all white, all male membership. In its fifty years of operation, it 
concentrated its efforts on suing for the freedom of individual slaves in the courts and petitioning 
for the freedom of all slaves in the legislature. There were other societies in the early republican 
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era, but they were all located in the Northern states. The New York Manumission Society, 
founded in 1785, included John Jay and Alexander Hamilton as members. Like the Pennsylvania 
Abolition Society, the New York Manumission Society pursued political means for the abolition 
of slavery. It also organized boycotts of businesses that profited from the slave trade. Black 
societies existed, as well, though they worked separate from the white ones. The Free African 
Society, led by Richard Allen and Absalom Jones and formed in Philadelphia in 1787, operated 
as a mutual aid society for the city’s free black population. Abolitionism was transformed in the 
Jacksonian period. The radical abolition movement of the 1830s was characterized for its 
renovated tactics and by the makeup of its ranks. Black men and black and white women were 
allowed to participate for the first time in mainstream organizations. Strategy changed with the 
new demographic. Abolitionists would no longer appeal to authority (the church, the state) if 
those authorities would not listen. They would appeal directly to the people. The cause had 
gained a new urgency with the establishment of the American Colonization Society in 1816, 
which promoted the repatriation of free (and freed) African Americans in Africa.1 
Scholars of literature tend to portray the activities of radical abolitionists as following one 
of two models: a performance model or a print model. In the performance model, abolitionists 
work mainly as lecturers. In the print model, which is often represented as superseding the 
performance model, they work mainly as editors and novelists. The long history of depicting 
Frederick Douglass’s career as moving from the former to the latter is an example of the inability 
to imagine both models coexisting, even within the work of a single figure.2 The unprecedented 
                                                
1 This condensed history of abolitionism in the United States is drawn from Mayer and Richard 
S. Newman. 
2 See, for example, Fishkin and Peterson, and DeLombard. 
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success of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin would also seem to support this notion, 
despite the fact that the unauthorized dramatizations may have reached more people.3 
The problem with the print model is that it emphasizes actions like the mailing campaign. 
The problem with emphasizing the mailing campaign is that it necessarily focuses our attention 
on the rich, white men who funded and organized them. In the early history of the radical 
abolitionist movement especially, it was rare to see women and African Americans occupy 
leadership positions. Even when they did, they rarely had the same influence as an Arthur 
Tappan. Though the actions of the radical abolitionists differ from those that came before, the 
actors are the same. The print model unintentionally downplays the role of women, blacks, and 
the poor in radical abolitionism. The people who were responsible for the changes in the 
movement, in other words, do not get credit for their contributions. The other problem with the 
print model is that these large campaigns did not work. The mailing campaign was a failure 
never to be repeated. A similar campaign, which sought to send Bibles to the slaves, was tried 
over the course of two decades, with even less success.4  
The performance model did not offer a solution to the situation either. After 1835, 
abolitionist activities were limited to the “free” states, though, even there, they were limited by 
legislative and mob action. Abolitionists wrote and signed thousands of petitions to Congress. 
John Quincy Adams, Representative of Massachusetts, would present them to the House. The 
Gag Rule, first passed in 1836, required that all antislavery petitions be tabled without 
comment.5 That the American Anti-Slavery Society repeated the Hundred Conventions 
campaign, which sent multiple lecturers throughout New York State and New England at the 
                                                
3 See Gossett. 
4 See Nord for more on this campaign. 
5 See William Lee Miller. 
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same time, might seem to indicate that they went away from the print model after these early 
setbacks.6 But throughout the movement’s first decade in particular, abolitionist speakers were 
attacked, their meeting spaces destroyed.7 I propose that abolitionists drew on both the print and 
performance models to do their work. The premiere example of this kind of activity is that of 
David Walker, who attempted it in the years before the foundation of radical abolitionism. I 
begin with Walker because his hybrid strategy of printing texts that would circulate through the 
actions of individuals anticipated how emancipation would work three decades later. 
Walker was born in North Carolina to a free mother and an enslaved father. He lived in 
South Carolina and Pennsylvania before moving to Massachusetts. There, he joined the Prince 
Hall Freemasons, helped found the Massachusetts General Colored Assembly, and wrote, and 
acted as an agent, for Freedom’s Journal. In 1829, he published his Appeal, which addressed “the 
coloured citizens of the world, but in particular, and very expressly, … those of the United States 
of America.” In four articles, he described “our wretchedness in consequence of slavery,” 
“ignorance,” “the preachers of the religion of Jesus Christ,” and “the colonizing plan.” The 
Appeal circulated in the North and the South. Walker employed sailors and laborers as agents. It 
is, of course, difficult to give a perfect account of the Appeal’s circulation, though Peter Hinks 
suggests that it was “understandably much broader than we can document” (160). The practice of 
black literacy and mobility were necessarily untraceable. What can be documented was enough 
to strike fear in interested whites (Hinks 151). Walker’s agents took the Appeal to Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana. Walker gave written instructions to 
each agent, explaining how, and to whom, they were to be distributed (Hinks 138). At each place 
it was discovered, local and state governments took action to limit its circulation. People found 
                                                
6 See Lampe for more on this campaign. 
7 See Richards. 
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with it in their possession were arrested. They were charge with breaking new laws against 
seditious literature. Black sailors were quarantined. The movements of free black laborers were 
controlled. Slave literacy was banned. 
 Walker used the same tactics that free and enslaved African Americans had employed for 
their organization (Hinks 172). Agents for the black press acted as representatives for the areas in 
which they worked (Levine 93). The representativeness of Walker’s agents is what made them so 
threatening. Every black man with a copy of the Appeal was another Walker. Scholars tend to 
call the text David Walker’s Appeal, when, in fact, the title that appeared on the title page was 
Walker’s Appeal. Walker is both a proper and a common noun, a specific man and a mobile one. 
In composing the Appeal, Walker called for black solidarity. In circulating the Appeal, these 
men enacted it. In a prefatory note to the third edition, Walker stated that “it is expected that all 
coloured men, women and children, of every nation, language and tongue under heaven, will try 
to procure a copy of this Appeal and read it, or get some one to read it to them, for it is designed 
more particularly for them” (n.p.). This instruction, like those given to Walker’s agents, 
supplemented the explicit and implicit instructions that Walker fashioned into his text. His mode 
of address—the second person—as well as his typography—which emphasized important 
passages, or indicated changes in tone—all taught his readers how to teach the text to others.8 
Walker used all of these strategies when he addressed the “[m]en of colour, who are also of 
sense”: “I call upon you … to cast your eyes upon the wretchedness of your brethren, and to do 
your utmost to enlighten them—go to work and enlighten your brethren!” (28). These once 
“ignorant brethren” would then, upon reading the Appeal themselves, teach it to others. 
Education, as well as violence, counts as resistance, as “[t]he bare name of educating the 
                                                
8 See Dinius. 
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coloured people, scares our cruel oppressors almost to death” (32). Walker even demonstrates 
reprinting, in his discussion of various newspapers and texts, and in his repetition of the 
Declaration of Independence.   
 
 
Figure 1. David Walker. Appeal. 1830. 
 
Marcy Dinius points out that, through his typography, Walker “rewrite[s] the declaration, even as 
he quotes it word for word” (67). But it’s also important to note that he reprints it. When he asks 
“Why do they search vessels, &c. when entering the harbours of tyrannical States, to see if any 
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of my Books can be found, for fear that my brethren will get them to read,” he answers that, 
“perhaps the Americans do their very best to keep my Brethren from receiving and reading my 
‘Appeal’ for fear that they will find in it an extract which I made from their Declaration of 
Independence, which says, ‘we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal,’ &c. &c. &c.” (72). The typography of the extract he quotes matches that of his initial 
quotation (all men are created equal), not his revision (ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL). The 
plain text alone would have been enough to agitate his readers. 
 
 My method combines theory and practice from book history and performance studies. 
From book history, I take an interest in the material processes through which a text is written, 
printed, and distributed. From performance studies, I take an interest in the embodied practices 
through which a performance is enacted. Both print and performance had a role in Walker’s 
work. I analyze the words that make up the Appeal as well as the paper on which it appears, the 
people who are tasked with delivering it, and what use it was put to by its readers. I use the word 
production to indicate the composition, publication, and circulation of the texts and performances 
I study. Production can refer to the creation or the presentation of a text or performance. 
 Let me say more about my use of the word “performance.” As Marvin Carlson has 
observed it is a term that has become widely used, and so can mean many things (70). I take my 
basic definition of performance from Susan Manning. She defines performance as “a mode of 
cultural production composed of events bound in time and framed in space” (777). At first 
glance, this definition of a circumscribed action may seem to foreclose a relationship with 
documents that can circulate beyond the time and place of their creation. Indeed, most 
performance theory views writing and performing as two separate, even opposing, enterprises. 
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Peggy Phelan has influentially argued that “performance’s only life is in the present. 
Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation 
of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than 
performance” (146). This is because, she argues, “performance in a strict ontological sense is 
nonreproductive” (148). A reenactment of a performance can “reactivate” that performance, but 
it cannot “reproduce” it (Taylor 32). The notion of reactivation, though, could apply equally well 
to texts as it does to performances. A newspaper printing and a volume printing of Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin may have the same words—just as a reenactment of a performance may have the same 
gestures—but they are not the same things. Phelan’s discussion of the “attempt to write about the 
undocumentable event of performance” rejects the possibility that a written document may be 
part of that performed event (148). Her idea of writing as something that “seeks to preserve, 
record, and remember” does not take into account the other uses to which writing can be put 
(24). Diana Taylor addresses the issue of the preservation of text and performance. She proposes 
we think of them as an interaction between the archive and the repertoire. Though she includes in 
her inventory of archival materials “texts, documents, buildings, bones,” once again, her focus is 
on writing (19). “Writing,” she argues, “has served as a strategy for repudiating and foreclosing 
the very embodiedness it claims to describe” (36). The benefit of the work of Robin Bernstein is 
that she can see the archive and the repertoire working, even existing, together. She views 
archival materials as things that script behavior. These things are vehicles of potentiality, not 
preservation. They prompt, they do not record, performance. 
 Another use for language rather than description is enactment. J. L. Austin wrote about 
the performative uses of language: Language, in other words, that performs the action it 
describes. This idea has had a profound influence on scholars interested in identity. This usage 
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has popularized performance more than any other in literary studies. Although performativity, 
following Judith Butler, deals with bodily behavior, it has had the effect of disembodying 
performance. Dwight Conquergood once asked, “What are the consequences of thinking about 
performance and textuality as fluid, exchangeable, and assimilable terms? What is at stake in the 
desire to blur the edges, dissolve the boundary, dismantle the opposition, and close the space 
between text and performance? What are the costs of dematerializing texts as textuality and 
disembodying performance as performativity, and then making these abstractions 
interchangeable concepts?” (25). My emphasis is on maintaining awareness of the materiality of 
these texts and the embodiment of these performances while not conflating them. They 
complement each other. 
 As Taylor and others have explained, text-centered methods don’t account for nonliterate 
cultures. Texts have often been the instruments to disempower, or dehumanize, certain groups. 
So Conquergood wrote about the “intextuation” of slaves, the complex of texts (like bills of sale, 
advertisements) that effect and maintain their subjection. Still, as Saidiya Hartman has so 
forcefully explained, performance could have the same effects. The coercion to act the part of the 
happy slave—on the auction block and on the plantation—shows how African American culture 
could be appropriated to deny self-expression. “Print and Performance in American 
Abolitionism, 1829-1865” is especially concerned with showing how black abolitionists 
managed the restrictions that were placed on them. It is especially important to keep in mind the 
differences of experience that different abolitionists faced. Even if white activists had their 
freedoms and their persons assaulted, these assaults still differed in kind and degree from what 
black activists suffered. William Lloyd Garrison might be mobbed for speaking, but he was not 
attacked, as Frederick Douglass was, for traveling to speak.  
 11 
 
 The two most recent studies of race, slavery, and abolition show the payoff to my 
approach. Robert Fanuzzi’s Abolition’s Public Sphere investigates the role that print played in 
the creation of an abolitionist counterpublic. But it figures that counterpublic as abstract, 
disembodied—unless it’s talking about Douglass. By examining only the embodied experience 
of black abolitionists, Fanuzzi fails to consider how those like Douglass emphasized white 
abolitionists’ own embodied experience in and through his texts. Heather Nathans’ Slavery and 
Sentiment on the American Stage surveys the performances that took up these issues, but 
because it’s limited to the theatrical, it doesn’t address major abolitionists, for whom the theater 
seemed to be the one arena of culture they did not participate in.  
 
 “Print and Performance in American Abolitionism, 1829-1865” contributes to the fields 
of American Studies and African American Studies. To the latter, it helps recover the early 
history of black performance. To the former, it more fully accounts for the work of central 
figures like Douglass, Stowe, and Abraham Lincoln. It combines traditional concerns in form 
and history with the methodologies of book history and performance studies. It shows how the 
two can be put into conversation with another. Meredith McGill’s usage of the concept of format 
is an example of the kind of work this project does. In bibliography, format “describes a relation 
between paper size and number of pages.” Different formats were chosen for different reasons: a 
volume has a different cost and different uses than a broadside. Format “directs our attention to 
the set of choices printers and publishers make in publishing a work, with the potential field of a 
book’s reception very much in mind” (55). McGill uses the pamphlet as an example of the 
priorities of abolitionist print culture. Pamphlets were cheap to produce and easy to transport. 
The pamphlet format was often chosen for hymnals and songsters—that is, for texts intended for 
 12 
 
group performance. Walker’s decision to print his Appeal as a pamphlet, then, was done for 
practical reasons, but also for the associations that format would have had with collective action. 
 “Print and Performance in American Abolitionism, 1829-1865” begins with the advent of 
radical abolition in the late 1820s and early 1830s and ends with the conclusion of the Civil War 
in the middle 1860s. It considers the two principal genres of antislavery writing—sentimental 
fiction and the slave narrative—and the laws that they helped create. A review of the subject of 
my first chapter, a dramatization of Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, called the play “abolition 
dramatized.” Dramatization could be a way to describe my own critical practice. I put texts back 
into their performance contexts. 
 The first part of this dissertation examines popular revisions of abolitionist texts and 
abolitionist responses to those revisions. Most discussions of Uncle Tom’s Cabin and 
performance culture concentrate on influence and adaptation. Stowe was influenced by blackface 
minstrelsy, which, in turn, was influenced by her novel. Even with this influence, scholars tend 
to think of the novel and the tomitudes as occurring in a sequence. The further the story moved 
away from its initial publication, the less it had of Stowe’s politics. In fact, many of the 
criticisms made of the play applied to the novel. Moreover, the play was aware of the peculiar 
challenges that melodramatic representation made for the kind of critique Stowe was after. The 
first chapter reads the tomitudes, including George Aiken’s popular theatrical adaptation and 
Frances Ellen Watkins’s “Eliza Harris,” for what they can tell us about the novel. Uncle Tom 
Mania brought the novel and the theater to new audiences. Abolitionists talked about wanting to 
abolitionize Americans. Uncle Tom’s Cabin on stage and in verse dramatized abolition.  
 Just as Stowe’s second novel lets us see the changes in her stance on various issues, so 
did the dramatizations of it. The productions of Dred that ran in the same theaters as proslavery 
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productions of Uncle Tom’s Cabin can tell us something about the changing fortunes of the more 
aggressive antislavery critique that characterized the later 1850s. Blackface minstrelsy, which 
played a large part in the Tom plays, as well as the whole of antebellum performance culture, 
featured ambivalent representations of raced characters. Comic minstrelsy had been associated 
with insensitivity to the welfare of enslaved people. The second chapter examines the use of 
comic minstrelsy to create identification with its working class audiences. Labor abolitionism 
was still a fraught enterprise in the later 1850s, but Dred demonstrated new possibilities for 
solidarity. Martin Delany’s Blake features a scene in which the originary violence of blackface 
minstrelsy is restaged. Though texts like Dred show a willingness to trouble blackface 
minstrelsy’s comedy, even by suggesting the violence that went into creating it, Blake goes even 
further to suggest that all blackface minstrel performances depended upon the violence 
perpetrated on black bodies. Blackface minstrel culture was not the product of borrowing or 
theft, but of torture. 
The second part of this dissertation adopts a case study approach. Each chapter examines 
a text that reproduced itself through performance, and vice versa. The antebellum career of 
Frederick Douglass demonstrates the connection between abolitionism’s printed and performed 
work. Timelines of Douglass’s life measure it in texts. An alternative timeline could consist 
entirely of performances. Yet another could concentrate on his editorial work. Each of these 
alone would give an incomplete account of his career. And yet most scholarship on Douglass 
restricts itself to one of these kinds of work. This scholarship portrays Douglass’s work as 
transitioning from performance to print, despite the coproduction of each form. This, the third, 
chapter focuses on Douglass’s “Letter to His Old Master, Thomas Auld,” published in 1848 in 
The North Star and republished in 1855 as part of the appendix to My Bondage and My 
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Freedom. Of the seven texts that make up the appendix, the letter is the only one that was not a 
speech. Douglass saw the letter as part of a performance, one, in this case, that aimed to involve 
a hostile audience. 
Harriet Beecher Stowe was involved with supporting two African American women 
artists. Elizabeth Greenfield, a singer, and Mary Webb, an actress, filled their performances with 
a wide selection of materials from antebellum culture, some of which were Stowe’s. These 
women have mostly been neglected because of the apparent conservatism of their performances. 
Most of their material, like their self-presentations, was genteel. The fourth chapter examines 
where these women toured and how their performances circulated in the popular press. Both 
challenged the culture’s notion of what was allowable and the ways that they were represented. 
Reviews reproduced the disruptive routines, so that their effects could be felt outside the homes 
and halls where they were performed. 
 Abraham Lincoln was not an abolitionist; he was antislavery. He was a longtime 
proponent of gradual emancipation with compensation. He did not think that the Constitution 
gave him the power to abolish slavery. He prosecuted the first year of the war for reunion. In 
1862, he began to advocate gradual emancipation with confiscation. The Emancipation 
Proclamation indicated that the war would now be for liberation as well. The fifth and final 
chapter argues that the Proclamation was composed to circulate with the same kind of procedure 
as Walker’s Appeal.  
The 1863 presidential act, the last in my chronology, revisits the material processes and 
embodied practices that have preoccupied the rest of my study. It builds on the fourth chapter’s 
interest in authorized substitution. It builds on the third and second chapters’ interest in 
sympathetic and nonsympathetic audiences. It builds on the first chapter’s interest in stages of 
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composition and realization. It builds, finally, on this introduction’s interest in the circulation of 
texts through the movement of bodies.  
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Chapter One 
Melodrama and Time in Aiken’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Watkins’s “Eliza Harris” 
 
A history of Uncle Tom’s Cabin is necessarily a history of its escalating materializations. 
The novel gained a wide readership as a serial publication in The National Era (1852-53), and 
had sold 10,000 copies within its first days—and 300,000 within a year—of being published as a 
book (Gossett 164). Each succeeding edition featured more illustrations. Eventually, fifty people 
would see a stage version of Uncle Tom’s Cabin for every one who read it (Gossett 260). 
George Aiken’s critics tend to fault the play, as well as Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin (1851-52), for its lack of a unified political vision. In criticism of both the novel 
and the play, critics disparage the divide between a critique of a society for the wrongs of slavery 
on the one hand, and, on the other, the tendency either (in Stowe’s case) to advocate individual 
responsibility for the redress of those wrongs or (in Aiken’s case) to represent individuals as 
responsible for those wrongs. Of the novel, Bruce McConachie writes that “Uncle Tom’s Cabin 
uses an ‘individual appeal for anti-individualist ends,’ and the resulting contradiction harms her 
politics” (7).9 Of the play, he concludes that even though Aiken “retained much of [Stowe’s] 
sentimental abolitionism,” he “softened Stowe’s objections to slavery as an institution” (5). 
Critics lay as much blame on the generic framework in which Aiken was working as they 
do on the playwright. David Grimsted judges that “the specific limitations of the play vis-à-vis 
the novel tend to be ones endemic to the stage rather than those of gross distortion” (236). Sarah 
Meer writes “that melodrama’s ‘substructure’ was conservative, since it tended to individualize 
issues and reduce them to matters of private choice. Where suffering or a social problem could 
be blamed on the villainy of a single character, there was little room to denounce an oppressive 
                                                
9 McConachie’s quote is from White 113. 
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class or institution” (Meer 109).10 Jeffrey Mason suggests that “Aiken authorized his audience to 
disapprove of the specific abuses that he represented on stage, but he excused them from doing 
anything about the reality beyond the stage door” (119). The result of Aiken’s treatment is that 
“Uncle Tom’s Cabin becomes a self-contained world, resolving its own momentary 
inconsistencies and offering no correlation to the genuine issues it purports to address. Stowe 
traced the quest for human value within the destructive oppression of slavery, while Aiken 
followed the stylized mumming of simplified characters within the neat limits of melodrama” 
(Mason 124-25). 
What if the limits, I want to ask, aren’t always so neat? What if the melodrama isn’t as 
self-contained as Mason claims? Does Uncle Tom’s Cabin resolve its “momentary 
inconsistencies,” and if so, how? Mason’s totalizing account ignores the moments in which the 
play offers something like a social critique. Though the play contains both tendencies (to blame 
the wrongs of slavery on a society or on an individual), and though I feel that it finally attempts 
to contain them both (or, as I’ll argue, one in the other), the play can be read as an indictment of 
society over the individual, society through (and in) the individual. The play, in fact, dramatizes 
the very problem of responsibility that so many critics take up. The first half presents a model of 
social culpability, the second individual. We have here, to quote Harry Birdoff’s account of the 
play’s “spontaneous[] subtitle[],” something like “Abolition Dramatized” (77). 
Over the course of the play we can see a transition from one model to the other. We can 
read the second half of the play as an allegory of the first. Melodrama, like allegory, presents a 
“represented world” that “is […] being used metaphorically, as sign of something else” (Brooks 
Melodramatic 11). Aiken’s 1852 version of the play allegorizes the problem of slavery as it 
                                                
10 Meer’s quote is from Mason 12. 
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illustrates the process by which the stuff of life is turned into melodrama. If reality, according to 
Peter Brooks, is “the scene of drama and mask of the true drama that lies behind,” we can think 
of the first half of the play as a mask, and the second half as “pressuring the surface of reality 
[…] in order to make it yield the full, true terms of [its] story,” an “intense, excessive 
representation[] of life which strip[s] the facade of manners to reveal the essential conflicts at 
work—moments of symbolic confrontation which fully articulate the terms of the drama” 
(Melodramatic 2, 1, 3). 
Just as the play is not consistent with its source’s message (which critics find is not 
consistent either), it does not consistently undermine that message. Grimsted notes a transition 
that takes place between the two halves of the play: “In his first effort, which later became the 
first section of the play, Aiken followed Mrs. Stowe in incident and theme closely; in the sequel, 
and second half of the final play, he compromised much more for ‘theatrical effect,’ to fulfill the 
preconceptions of his actors and audiences. Here … the emphasis on personal villainy impeded 
the aesthetic and moral thrust of the play most seriously” (244). Though I agree that a shift in 
mode occurs in the play, I do not agree that it necessarily impedes the “aesthetic and moral thrust 
of the play.” 
 
In the first half of the play there is no single villain in which the culpability for the 
outrages of slavery is collected. What we have instead are vague notions of dark, abstract forces 
at work in the world. If, as Brooks asserts, “in the clash of virtue and villainy, it is the latter that 
constitutes the active force and motor of plot,” slavery is here present only to the extent that we 
see its effects (Melodramatic 34). Its first act is to break up the domestic space. In “‘classical’ 
melodrama,” “the play typically opens with a presentation of virtue and innocence, or perhaps 
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more accurately, virtue as innocence. We see this virtue, momentarily, in a state of taking 
pleasure in itself, aided by those who recognize and support it” (Brooks Melodramatic 28-29). 
Though “there swiftly supervenes a threat to virtue, a situation … to cast its very survival into 
question,” Uncle Tom’s Cabin, on the contrary, begins in a “Plain Chamber,” with the advent of 
conflict. There is no representation of virtue free from persecution (Brooks Melodramatic 29). 
Our first impression is of a “fragile and fleeting space[] of innocence and freedom embedded 
within larger corrupt social orders” (Williams 28). 
Eliza greets her husband happily until, noticing that he “regards her mournfully,” she is 
moved to ask him, “Why don’t you smile, and ask after Harry?” Eliza is under the impression 
that this is a “space of innocence” (Brooks Melodramatic 30). George answers, “bitterly,” “I 
wish he’d never been born! I wish I’d never been born myself! … Oh! how I wish you had never 
seen me—you might have been happy!” Eliza, nervous, asks, “What dreadful thing has 
happened, or is going to happen? I’m sure we’ve been very happy till lately,” as surely they had 
been until the raising of the curtain (375). Eliza—ignorant of the cause of his apprehension—
tries to comfort George, telling him to “trust in heaven and try to do right.” If in melodrama 
“nothing is understood, all is overstated,” we are clearly not there yet (Brooks Melodramatic 41; 
his emphasis). Drawing out her suspense, George tells his wife: “You couldn’t, in my place, you 
can’t now, if I tell you all I’ve got to say; you don’t know the whole yet” (376). His original 
utterance did not say enough; it must be supplemented. He tells her that their master intends to 
sell him and their son, and concludes: “That is why I wish I’d never seen you—it would have 
been better for us both—it would have been better for our poor child if he had never been born” 
(377). 
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As vague as George’s delivery of the news of the crisis is, so are the reasons for the crisis 
itself. Mason writes of Tom’s first owner: “Shelby’s situation is a melodramatic cliché; Stowe 
reveals nothing about the nature or cause of his embarrassment and so makes him seem like a 
helpless victim of Business as an impersonal and mysterious force” (92). Shelby tells the slave 
trader Haley that, “it’s only hard necessity makes me willing to sell at all. I don’t like parting 
with any of my hands, that’s a fact” (378). In the end, Shelby can’t help it. He complains to the 
audience: “If anybody had ever told me that I should tell Tom to those rascally traders, I should 
never have believed it. […] So much for being in debt, heigho! The fellow sees his advantage 
and means to push it” (380). The only other mention of Shelby’s crisis is an exchange between 
Chloe and Eliza. Chloe, unable to believe what’s happened, asks Eliza “what he has done that 
master should sell him?” Eliza responds: “He hasn’t done anything—it isn’t for that. Master 
don’t want to sell, and mistress—she’s always good. I heard her plead and beg for us, but he told 
her ‘twas no use—that he was in this man’s debt, and he had got the power over him, and that if 
he did not pay him off clear, it would end in his having to sell the place and all the people and 
move off” (380). 
The implication of Shelby’s crisis is clear: “If ownership corrupts, then so does the trade 
itself” (Mason 92). Indeed, the tradesman (Haley), perhaps because of his closer proximity to the 
slave trade, comes off as guiltier than the well-meaning Shelby. The slave system creates people 
like Haley, puts people like Shelby in these positions. Slavery not only demeans everyone 
involved, it also sets everyone up to be exploited. Shelby pleads with Haley to let Tom “cover 
the whole balance of the debt, and you would, Haley, if you had any conscience.” Haley replies, 
with the cool air of a pragmatist: “I’ve got just as much conscience as any man in business can 
afford to keep, just a little, you know, to swear by, as ‘twere” (378). The play is peppered with 
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other avowals of bad faith. When Phineas Fletcher tells Marks the lawyer that he freed his slaves 
to appease his Quaker mistress, Marks tells him that that was “very noble, I dare say; but rather 
expensive” (384). Swearing himself to be a principled man, Gumption Cute tells Marks that “my 
principles are to keep a sharp lookout for No. 1” (415). Profit from the slave trade is also what 
drives Haley, Marks and Loker to hunt Eliza and her son. Marks proposes that once they catch 
them they will give the boy “to Mr. Haley—[then] we takes the gal to Orleans to speculate on. 
Ain’t it beautiful?” (285). 
There are, in this half of the play, no explicit signs of violence—of the power that slavery 
gives to the masters of slaves—beyond the violence done to the domestic space. There are, again, 
only minor signs that gesture toward a powerful undercurrent of evil. In the scene where Shelby 
sells Tom and Harry to Haley, the latter is seen to drink copious amounts of alcohol. We learn 
from the stage directions that he “drinks,” “fills [his] glass,” “fills [his] glass again,” and, 
finally, “drinks and smacks his lips” during his conversation with Shelby (377, 378, 379). Any 
audience member familiar with temperance drama would see this as a sign of intemperance 
broadly construed. The stage direction notes, quite casually, that as he leaves Haley “rises and 
puts on his overcoat, which hangs on a chair.—Takes hat and whip” (379; emphasis mine). This 
sign of violence, placed in the text so subtly, and in the hands of an inebriate, intimates the more 
overt violence that will occur in the second half of the play. 
 
Brooks calls melodrama “an expressionistic form. Its characters repeatedly say their 
moral and emotional states and conditions, their intentions and motives, their badness and 
goodness. The play typically seeks total articulation of the moral problems with which it is 
dealing; it is indeed about making the terms of these problems clear and stark” (Melodramatic 
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56). Melodrama, Linda Williams writes, pursues its goal “to make visible occulted moral 
distinctions through acts and gestures that are felt by audiences to be the emotional truths of 
individual, but not too individualized, personalities” (40-41). Melodrama, with its “desire to 
express all,” tends to “exteriorize[] conflict” (Brooks Melodramatic 4, 35). Grimsted complains 
that Uncle Tom’s Cabin is not “complexly suggestive.” The drama is “stripped of its intellectual 
counterpoint.” Stowe’s message “that slavery as system makes hapless victims of even moral 
paragons and victimizers of the best-intentioned of masters” is weakened because of the lack of 
abstract discussions about slavery. All this is to say that Aiken chooses “action” over “idea,” 
“includ[ing] action-packed scenes showing thematically insignificant incidents” while “sh[ying] 
away from major passages where the action consists in the interplay of ideas” (238). Like 
pantomime, melodrama is “basically a language of action and presence. It is emphatically 
incapable of expressing abstractions, hypotheses, preferential or optative situations” (Brooks 
Melodramatic 69). Nor can melodrama express abstract political discourse. Rather than discuss 
things absent or unrepresentable on its stage, it manifests them in its characters and in the visible 
movements of the world around them. 
Grimsted writes that in adapting Stowe’s novel, “Aiken’s method was simple; he selected 
the major incidents in the novel and transcribed Mrs. Stowe’s dialogue often intact, but more 
frequently with some condensation” (236; emphasis mine). Condensation, not of narration alone, 
occurs throughout Aiken’s play. Brooks writes that there are times when it is “necessary” to have 
“a further register of the message […] furnished by visible emblems and symbols” 
(Melodramatic 63). On the banks of the Ohio River, running from her potential captors, Eliza 
exclaims: 
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Powers of mercy, protect me! How shall I escape these human bloodhounds? Ah! 
the window – the river of ice! That dark stream lies between me and liberty! 
Surely the ice will bear my trifling weight. It is my only chance of escape – better 
sink beneath the cold waters, with my child locked in my arms, than have him 
torn from me and sold into bondage. He sleeps upon my breast -- Heaven, I put 
my trust in thee!” (385) 
How could the severity of her situation be any clearer? Though not present in the original, actual 
bloodhounds became a staple in later productions of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. The image of Eliza 
running across the Ohio with bloodhounds chasing her became one of the images that was most 
often associated with the play. The shift from “human bloodhounds” to bloodhounds proper 
represents part of the melodramatic impulse. (Frances Ellen Watkins will include bloodhounds in 
her poem, “Eliza Harris.”) A metaphor is too subtle—why not get what is actually being referred 
to? The second half of the play condenses, in a similar way, elements of the first half. What is 
particularly allegorized over the course of the play are the basic elements of melodrama, the lines 
along which the melodramatic imagination draws the world: good and evil. The more the 
melodrama is heightened, the more “theatrical,” to use Grimsted’s phrase, the play becomes. Not 
only is personal villainy stressed, so too is the power of good. As the play continues, it includes 
more songs, more tableaux, more, in a word, melodrama. Things that before were left in the 
abstract, things that were only seen in their effects are now made explicit, are now given full 
expression. 
Melodrama employs “polarization … not only [as] a dramatic principle but [as] the very 
means by which integral ethical conditions are identified and shaped, made clear and operative” 
(Brooks Melodramatic 36). Its purpose is to work “toward revealing” the “presence and 
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operation” of good and evil “as real forces in the world” (Brooks Melodramatic 13). This 
polarization, which represents the condensation of good or evil traits in characters, “is both 
horizontal and vertical: characters represent extremes, and they undergo extremes, passing from 
heights to depths, or the reverse, almost instantaneously” (ibid). Meer finds that in his 
characterization of Tom and Eva, Aiken “distill[s] the novel’s many virtuous characters …, the 
script intensifies Tom’s and Eva’s roles and charges the slave and the sick child with a 
superhuman religiosity” (114; emphasis mine). In a sign of this religiosity, both Tom and Eva 
see the world allegorically, and can be read allegorically themselves. 
Tom’s characterization is as intense as Eva’s. We hear “music” the first time we see 
Uncle Tom’s cabin. (Other, later recourses to music will recall the memory of this first home.) 
The stage, “dark,” forebodes the tragedy that approaches its inhabitants, as well as shows its 
murkiness, that even though we see it on stage, it’s already going away (380). Tom’s first act is 
to “hold[] [a] light towards Eliza” and to say “Lord bless you!” Tom is indeed bringing light to 
the benighted, and not to the black characters alone. When he says that “the Lord's given me a 
work among these yer poor souls, and I'll stay with 'em and bear my cross with 'em till the end,” 
these “poor souls” could refer either to the black or the white characters (381). 
Tom’s saintliness increases in the second half, even before his Passion-like death. Tom, 
of course, quotes the Bible throughout the play. Most times, though, he indicates that that’s what 
he’s doing. So in the scene where Tom admonishes St. Clare about his drinking, Tom says: “The 
good book says ‘it biteth like a serpent and stingeth like an adder,’ my dear mas'r” (406). While 
Tom and Ophelia wait for Eva’s death, Tom tells Ophelia that “You know it says in Scripture, 
‘At midnight there was a great cry made, behold, the bridegroom cometh!’” (411). When they 
speak after Eva’s death, St. Clare expresses to Tom his continuing spiritual doubt: 
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ST. CLARE: Ah, Tom! I do look up; but the trouble is, I don't see anything when 
I do. I wish I could. It seems to be given to children and poor, honest fellows like 
you, to see what we cannot. How comes it? 
TOM: “Thou hast hid from the wise and prudent, and revealed unto babes; even 
so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight.” (415) 
This is taken from the Book of Matthew (11:25-26); Jesus speaks the words. Jeffrey 
Richards’ edition of the play has quotation marks around Tom’s speech; others do not.11 As the 
play was being performed and not read, this should not make a difference. But, as I’ve already 
shown, whenever Tom had previously quoted scripture, he set it off in his speech by indicating 
that he was quoting it. Here Tom is speaking the words of Christ as if they were his own. 
Punctuation aside, this adds to the process of divination that Tom undergoes during the second 
half of the play, which will of course culminate in his own death. Tom, who had earlier remarked 
his similarity to a scene in the Bible, ends up giving it body through his speech and his actions. 
That scene opened with a tableau of Tom and Eva sitting together, reading the Bible, a 
tableau whose motive is to give “the spectator the opportunity to see meanings represented, 
emotions and moral states rendered in clear visible signs” (Brooks Melodramatic 62): “A 
Garden. Tom discovered, seated on a bank, with Eva on his knee – his buttonholes are filled with 
flowers, and Eva is hanging a wreath around his neck. Music at opening of scene. Enter St. 
Clare and Ophelia, observing.” St. Clare and Ophelia, in an example where the audience’s role 
as voyeur is doubled by a character on stage, look on. Tom puts Eva down, turns to them and 
says: “Look yer, I'm like the ox, mentioned in the good book, dressed for the sacrifice” (389). 
                                                
11 Gerould’s edition, for example, does not have quotation marks (110). Moody’s edition does 
(381). Unfortunately, none of these editors give detailed information about their source texts. 
Samuel French’s acting edition does not have quotation marks there. 
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Tom himself can see the potential to allegorize the scene, can easily see how “the creation of 
drama” can be affected “from the banal stuff of reality” (Brooks Melodramatic 2). The effects of 
Tom’s and Eva’s comments are not only to show us what’s happening (in their eyes), but to tell 
us how to interpret what we’re seeing. 
Of a similar instance of commentary, Grimsted complains that, however “true to the 
character and emotions” of the scene it may be, “its verbalization, especially in such trite 
phrases, cheapens the impact of the event” (236-37).12 Speeches like this one illustrate, for 
Grimsted, “one of the central weaknesses of nineteenth-century drama: its tendency to substitute 
for expressions of feeling explanations of it” (237). “The dramatic soliloquy,” he concludes, 
“came to be used in the nineteenth century not to increase the intellectual and emotive 
complexity of the situation, but to make everything obvious to the audience” (ibid). These 
characters, to put it another way, say too much, just as characters in a melodrama usually “tend 
to say, directly and explicitly, their moral judgments of the world” (Brooks Melodramatic 36). 
There are utterances in this play, however, that both express and explain an affect. When Ophelia 
tells Tom and Topsy that St. Clare is dying, Topsy cries, “Oh dear! what's to become of de poor 
darkies now?” (419). That cry both expresses her own despair, and asks the question—if they 
had not already thought of it—that must be on the audience’s mind. Similarly, Chloe tells Tom, 
unnecessarily, what happens to slaves who are sent South, when she tells him to run away: “Will 
you wait to be toted down the river, where they kill niggers with hard work and starving?” (381). 
This is being said for the audience’s benefit. 
Mason realizes the purpose of this kind of simplification: “Aiken is employing exegetical 
representation, … choosing allegorical images to accentuate the message that action and 
                                                
12 Stowe’s narrator had also “perform[ed] for the reader melodrama’s interpretive work, 
explicitly drawing out the text’s moral meanings” (Merish 197). 
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dialogue have conveyed. The very purpose of [this kind of] speech … is to communicate directly 
to the audience, to involve them, and to teach them, explicitly, the meaning of the staged 
incident” (120). This is what Brooks means when he calls the melodramatic mode “radically 
democratic,” in that it “striv[es] to make its representations clear and legible to everyone” (15). 
Contrary to what Grimsted may think, Mason asserts that “this does not mean that the play 
lacked subtlety or that the audience was unduly dense; it means, rather, that the form [i.e., 
melodrama] placed ideas and their delineation in the foreground, rather than attempting to imply 
them in a more delicate fashion” (120-21).13 The play, in other words, can show and tell. All of 
these signs “have a depth of symbolic meaning. We are not, however, asked to meditate upon 
their connotations, to plumb their depths. On the stage they are used virtually as pure signifiers, 
in that it is their spectacular, their visual, interaction that counts” (Brooks Melodramatic 28). If 
“mute gesture,” then, like melodrama, “can then perhaps most pertinently be considered as a 
trope and analyzed on the plane of rhetoric. It is a sign for a sign, demanding a translatio 
between the two signs. It hence resembles metaphor, the transference or displacement of 
meaning,” then we can interpret the exegetical impulse as manifesting the text’s attempt to 
supply its own translatio, combining Uncle Tom’s Cabin and its Key (Brooks Melodramatic 71-
72). 
Much of the exegesis, then, is concerned with illuminating just how good—or bad—a 
character is. The following scene is the last before Eva’s death. Eva and Tom sit and read on the 
banks of Lake Pontchartrain. Eva points to the lake, beginning the following exchange: 
TOM: What, Miss Eva? 
                                                
13 This kind of representation is so important because it helps counteract a problem that arises 
“when sentimentality meets politics[:] it uses personal stories to tell us of structural effects, but 
in so doing it risks thwarting its very attempt to perform rhetorically a scene of pain that must be 
soothed politically” (Berlant 641). 
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EVA: Don’t you see there? There’s “a sea of glass, mingled with fire.” (408) 
Tom sees the justness of her observation: 
TOM: True enough, Miss Eva. [Sings.] 
Oh, had I the wings of the morning, 
I’d fly away to Canaan’s shore; 
Bright angels should convey me home, 
To the New Jersusalem. (408-409) 
Eva responds as if his song were a usual part of the conversation: 
EVA: Where do you suppose New Jersusalem is, Uncle Tom? 
TOM: Oh, up in the clouds, Miss Eva. 
EVA: Then I think I see it. Look in those clouds; they look like great gates of 
pearl; and you can see beyond them—far, far off—it’s all gold! Tom, sing about 
“spirits bright.” (409) 
Eva had earlier told Topsy about them during Eva’s conversion of Topsy: “Only think of it, 
Topsy—you can be one of those spirits bright Uncle Tom sings about!” (400) 
TOM: [Sings.] I see a band of spirits bright, 
That taste the glories there; 
They are all robed in spotless white, 
And conquering palms they bear. 
Eva, again responding to Tom’s verses as in a conversation, swears, “Uncle Tom, I’ve seen 
them” (409; emphasis in the original). Tom’s response heightens the element of vision in the 
scene, taking her literal reading of the song even more literally: 
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TOM: To be sure you have; you are one of them yourself. You are the brightest 
spirit I ever saw. 
EVA: They come to me sometimes in my sleep—those spirits bright— 
After repeating the last two lines of Tom’s song, she continues, in speech that rhymes with the 
last line she sang (“And conquering palms they bear,” a rhyme that crosses the divide between 
song and speech): “Uncle Tom, I’m going there.” 
TOM: Where, Miss Eva? 
EVA: [Pointing to the sky.] I’m going there, to the spirits bright, Tom; I’m going 
before long. (409; emphasis in the original) 
Before they come forward, leaving the Bible by the lake, Tom turns toward the audience and 
says: “It’s jest no use tryin’ to keep Miss Eva here; I’ve allays said so. She’s got the Lord’s mark 
on her forehead. She wasn’t never like a child that’s to live—there was always something deep 
in her eyes” (409). Of Tom’s aside Mason observes: “Tom has stepped out of the story to address 
the audience, but not in the manner of the standard aside, and Eva sits next to him, an icon, the 
Bible in her lap, her finger pointing up to heaven; because he speaks as though she is not there at 
all, Tom reminds us of Eva’s symbolic value. Aiken has, in essence, staged a religious tract, and 
the moment offers a hint of the tableau that will close the play” (121). 
St. Clare interrupts Tom and Eva’s Bible lesson. If the significance of Eva’s life (and 
death) had not yet been made clear to us, St. Clare, after Tom and Eva finally leave, “gaz[es] 
mournfully after” them, and asks the audience, in almost the identical terms of Tom’s aside: 
Has there ever been a child like Eva? Yes, there has been; but their names are 
always on grave-stones, and their sweet smiles, their heavenly eyes, their singular 
words and ways, are among the buried treasures of yearning hearts. It is as if 
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heaven had an especial band of angels, whose office it is to sojourn for a season 
here, and endear to them the wayward human heart, that they might bear it 
upward with them in their homeward flight. When you see that deep, spiritual 
light in the eye when the little soul reveals itself in words sweeter and wiser than 
the ordinary words of children, hope not to retain that child; for the seal of heaven 
is on it, and the light of immortality looks out from its eyes! (410)14 
The significance of this scene is charged by a song that Eva sings right before St. Clare’s 
aside. The song begins: 
When your little Eva's there, 
Rob'd like those in spotless white; 
And the conquering palm I bear, 
Bless'd with love and Heaven's light, 
Shall poor Uncle Tom be free? 
Papa promise this to me. 
Lines 2-3, of course, repeat (with a difference) verses from Tom’s earlier song: “They are all 
robed in spotless white, / And conquering palms they bear.” Her imminent departure from this 
world to the next is marked here in the change of pronoun. In each succeeding verse she moves 
from referring to herself in the third person to the first person, mirroring the larger movement 
marked in the changed lyrics. The plot is condensed into this song—Little Eva alive (though 
always already dead), and then dead, a martyr of her own love. 
                                                
14 This speech is spoken by the narrator in the novel. Here we have another example where the 
omniscience of the narrator is devolved onto the characters. As those same characters are our 
surrogates, we share in that omniscience. The play, like the novel, gives us the power to read its 
representations. 
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Eva’s influence does not end with her death, however. Brooks remarks that “children, as 
living representations of innocence and purity, serve as catalysts for virtuous or vicious actions. 
Through their very definition of unfallen humanity, they can guide virtue through perils and 
upset the machinations of evil, in ways denied to the more worldly. Their actions, as their very 
existence, take on an aura of the providential” (34). Eva’s goodness is distilled into the personal 
effects that she leaves behind. They have the power of holy relics. The first time Tom is shown 
on Legree’s plantation, he says: “My heart sinks at times and feels just like a big lump of lead. 
Den it gits up in my throat and chokes me till de tears roll out of my eyes; den I take out dis curl 
of little Miss Eva's hair, and the sight of it brings calm to my mind and I feels strong again. 
[Kisses the curl and puts it in his breast...]” (426). He takes comfort while fondling one of her 
possessions. It has the power to soothe him, even in his darkest hour. 
It also has the power to baffle the villain. Tom had already been beaten twice when 
Sambo comes to Legree with “a witch thing”—“something that niggers gits from witches. Keep 
‘em from feeling when they’re flogged. He [Tom] had it tied round his neck with a black string” 
(436). Legree “takes the paper and opens it.— … a long curl of light hair twines around his 
finger.” “Damnation,” he cries, “stamping and writhing, as if the hair burned him” (ibid). Cassy 
confirms to Legree that “that golden tress was charmed; each hair had in it a spell of terror and 
remorse for thee, and was used by a mightier power to bind thy cruel hands from inflicting 
uttermost evil on the helpless!” (438). McConachie writes that the point of this scene is to 
“demonstrate[] Legree’s guilt by having a long curl of Eva’s hair, reminiscent to the villain of his 
mother’s golden locks, twine around his finger” (19). Legree’s mother’s goodness, then, and the 
wrong he did her is tied up with Eva, as if in this moment Eva is hindering Legree’s evil designs 
from beyond the grave. At the same time, this scene looks backward, as if Legree was somehow 
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involved with what happened to Eva. The confusion of the two parties,—Legree, “Where did he 
get that hair? It couldn’t have been that! I burn’d that up, I know I did! It would be a joke if hair 
could rise from the dead!”—the way the two are collapsed, is another manner in which Legree is 
equated with slavery (438). 
The two are tied even closer together when we reflect on the causes of Eva’s and Tom’s 
deaths. The structural parallelism of the deaths—what Williams calls “black-and-white mirror 
reversals”—indicates their similar causes (48). The play’s “first three acts—depicting the flight 
of Eliza and the death of Little Eva—were paralleled in the second three by the more audacious 
suffering and death of Uncle Tom,” a structure that “retains the fundamental mirror relation 
between white racial suffering recognized by blacks and black racial suffering recognized by 
whites” (Williams 81). Here as elsewhere, the religious resonances of the play resemble biblical 
typology. “White readers are effectively ‘set up’ in the first half of the novel,”—and the same is 
true for the play—“by the more conventional display of docile African grief for the death of Eva, 
for the (then) much more revolutionary display of white sympathy for virtuous black victims in 
the second half” (Williams 48). All of the first half, and Eva’s death, is a ‘set up’ for what the 
audience will see in the second half, and Tom’s death. For all the conviction we have that Legree 
is responsible for Tom’s death, matched only by the amount of bewilderment we feel when we 
think about Eva’s, it turns out that they’re linked. 
What killed Little Eva? There are a few moments when other characters express anxiety 
over her health, so that we assume she has tuberculosis. But as we see her wasting away, she 
shows no obvious symptoms. Meer feels that “while Legree’s persecution of Tom translates 
easily into the tradition of the stage villain, it is difficult to fit Eva’s death with that pattern, since 
it involves no human agency” (114). But, as Williams stresses, Little Eva’s “suffering becomes 
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newly powerful once it becomes clear that tuberculosis is simply the outward symptom of a 
much deeper ailment: the wrongs of slavery that the young girl takes to heart. Each time Eva 
learns more of the sufferings of slaves, she sickens a little more (47-48). “I feel sad for our poor 
people,” she says, “they love me dearly, and they are all good and kind to me. I wish, papa, they 
were all free!” (410). Eva is able to see beneath the surface of things; her ailing health worsens 
when she sees what ails her. So Eva in her speech and song expresses her worry over the fate of 
the slaves, but particularly of Tom. She makes an affective contract with her father: she gives her 
life for (or frames the end of it in such a way to make its final meaning attached to) Tom. Their 
fates are linked. Then, finally, when we reach the final allegorical tableau, the three deaths are 
bonded together in the audience’s mind. The final “‘picture’ effectively duplicated all three 
deaths in the text” (Meer 114). It is the final gesture of the play, the final connection it is trying 
to make. 
And Tom? Who killed him? If, as Mason proposes, “to kill Legree is to abolish slavery,” 
then we must say that slavery too, killed Tom (124). Hence my disagreement with critics like 
McConachie who believe that “unlike Stowe’s character, … the Legree of Aiken … is not the 
embodiment of a social institution that systematically exploits other people” (15). To say that 
“Legree’s evil is reduced to his personality,” that “Legree dies for his personal sins, not for his 
role in perpetuating a system that exploits and degrades others,” is to overlook the structural, as 
well as thematic, similarities that the play draws between Legree and slavery (McConachie 15, 
16). 
The biggest problem critics have with the play, as I remarked earlier, is with the 
characterization of Legree. Meer summarizes the problem: “Poetic justice kills off” Legree, an 
act that “potentially dulls the antislavery outrage of the plays. If the problem is solved with 
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Legree’s death, then there is no larger social question to worry about” (112). Mason writes that 
“melodrama itself is a means to incarnate and expiate its audience’s fears; ‘evil’ is the name of 
those fears, and the villain is its agent. The villain must die to lay fear to rest, and virtue must 
triumph to affirm the world view that melodrama’s audience cherishes and to restore the moral 
order” (125). Mason fails to consider that “betrayal is a personal version of evil,” and that “the 
force of evil in melodrama derives from its personalized menace, its swift execution of its 
declaration of intent, its reduction of innocence to powerlessness. Evil is treachery in that it 
appears to unleash a cosmic betrayal of the moral order and puts all appearances into question” 
(Brooks Melodramatic 33, 34). Legree must first personify that evil before he can be driven out. 
In the latter acts of the play evil becomes more visible. Cassy, at one point, tells Legree: 
“I’d rather, ten thousand times, live in the dirtiest hole in the quarters, than be under your hoof!” 
(436). She later tells Tom that “You had the right on your side; but it’s all in vain for you to 
struggle. You are in the Devil’s hands: he is the strongest, and you must give up” (433). Simon 
Legree first appears at the beginning of Act 5, the auction scene. His first acts are to spit on one 
of the slaves, and then to manhandle Tom: “Holloa, you! [To TOM.] Let’s see your teeth. [Seizes 
TOM by the jaw and opens his mouth.] Strip up your sleeve and show your muscle. [TOM does 
so]” (421). Previous to this scene, slaves had never had violent hands laid upon them by their 
masters. Here we see Slavery (to me interchangeable with “Legree”) manipulating its victims, 
dehumanizing them. Tom is being treated like an animal, and is utterly powerlessness to resist. 
The malevolence of the transaction is increased with Skeggs’s, the auctioneer, subtle 
hints that Emmeline is being sold to be a concubine: “Gentlemen, I now offer a prime article—
the quadroon girl, Emmeline, only fifteen years of age, warranted in every respect. [Business as 
before. EMMELINE is sold to LEGREE for one thousand dollars]” (421; emphasis mine). 
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Legree then buys Tom and says, again unnecessarily for our understanding (we know Tom and 
Emmeline have just been sold to Legree), but important to the melodramatic impulse to 
overstate, “Now look here, you two belong to me” (421). “Melodrama tends toward total theatre, 
its signs projected, sequentially or simultaneously, on several planes. One of the most important 
of these planes or registers is that of stage setting, conceived to support the rhetoric of moral 
recognition” (Brooks Melodramatic 46). This is because “words, however unrepressed and pure, 
however transparent as vehicles for the expression of basic relations and verities, appear to be 
not wholly adequate to the representations of meanings, and the melodramatic message must be 
formulated through other registers of the sign” (Brooks Melodramatic 56). In tableau, Brooks 
reminds us, “we grasp melodrama’s primordial concern to make its signs clear, unambiguous and 
impressive” (Melodramatic 48). Such a tableau ends the scene: “TOM: Heaven help us, then! 
[Music.—LEGREE stands over them exulting. Picture]” (422). This is one of many scenes where 
power is staged in terms of the placement of the actors’ bodies over and against each other. If 
“melodrama handles its feelings and ideas virtually as plastic entities, visual and tactile models 
held out for all to see and to handle,” then we can perceive an extra level of explanation in 
Legree’s position over Tom and Emmeline (who, I assume from Legree’s standing “over them 
exultingly,” have fallen to their knees). They are totally within his power, as this image illustrates 
(Brooks Melodramatic 41). 
Slavery had earlier ruined the homes of the Harris’ and the St. Clares’. Once Tom is sold 
to Simon Legree, it (embodied in Legree) breaks up Tom’s home song. If melodramas usually 
begin in a ‘space of innocence,’ with innocence in the act of ‘enjoying itself,’ Aiken’s Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, as I’ve already discussed, does not follow this tradition. The play began with the 
domestic space already broken up, though we, like Eliza, are initially unaware of the fact. 
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Similarly, when we first see Tom (and his cabin) we see a home about to be broken apart. 
Nevertheless, “melodrama is fueled by nostalgia for a lost home” (Williams 58). Williams writes 
that “even if this space is not literally represented, and the narrative cannot begin there, even if it 
has never been possessed, the most enduring forms of the mode are often suffused with nostalgia 
for a virtuous place that we like to think we once possessed, whether in childhood or in the 
distant past of the nation” (28). “This home,” then, “constituted a particularly poignant and 
elusive ‘space of innocence’” (Williams 58). When we first see Tom on Legree’s plantation, he 
sings a home song that seeks to (re)establish the home that, in the world of the play at least, 
never was. Brooks writes that “music seems to have been called upon whenever the dramatist 
wanted to strike a particular emotional pitch or coloring and lead the audience into a change or 
heightening of mood” (Melodramatic 48-49): “A Rude Chamber. TOM is discovered, in old 
clothes,”—at St. Clare’s he had been “nicely dressed” (387)—“seated on a stool. He holds in his 
hand a paper containing a curl of EVA'S hair. The scene opens to the symphony of "Old Folks at 
Home” (426). With the Stephen Foster original playing in the background, Tom moans: “I have 
come to de dark places; I’s going through the vale of shadows” (426). At the end of the speech, 
we have the stage direction, “SONG—“Old Folks at Home” (426). Though the script does not 
include any of the lyrics, or indicates that Tom sings, a playbill for the 1852 Howard-Aiken 
production at the National Theater lists—in the section that announces that “the Play is 
beautifully interspersed with Singing and Dancing”—“Old Folks at Home” as the first song, 
and ascribes its performance to “Tom.” The song runs for nine stanzas. It begins: 
Way down upon de Swanee ribber, 
Far, far away, 
Dere's wha my heart is turning ebber, 
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Dere's wha de old folks stay. 
 
All up and down de whole creation, 
Sadly I roam, 
Still longing for de old plantation, 
And for de old folks at home. 
 
All de world am sad and dreary, 
Ebry where I roam, 
Oh! darkeys how my heart grows weary, 
Far from de old folks at home. 
Again, because the stage directions fail to indicate exactly when the song starts, and how much 
of it is sang, I’m forced to speculate. No matter if Tom sang the whole song or not, Legree’s 
words on entering the stage are forceful: “Shut up, you black cuss! Did you think I wanted any of 
your infernal howling?” (426). He, in effect, breaks up the (recreated) space of innocence, as 
“the violation and spoliation of the space of innocence stands as a recurrent representation of the 
dilemma confronting innocence” (Brooks Melodramatic 30). 
Legree’s villainy is nowhere more pronounced than in his murder of Tom. “Grimly 
confronting TOM,” he says, “Well, Tom, do you know I’ve made up my mind to kill you?” 
(441). Tom, of course, faces him with courage, and forgiveness. Legree expresses the basic, 
violent logic of slavery when he tells Tom that “I’ll conquer ye or kill ye! one or t’other (442). 
“Tableau was used theatrically as a silent, bodily expression of what words could not fully say” 
(Williams 30). Birdoff details the extreme tableau the actors struck before “LEGREE strikes 
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TOM down with the butt of his whip” (442): “When Legree raised his whip to strike Tom, he 
stood over him for a fully sixty seconds; the respite taken out for gloating made his crime the 
more heinous” (50-51). After Sambo and Quimbo carry Tom off, Legree reflects, “I believe he’s 
done for finally. Well, his mouth is shut up at last—that’s one comfort” (442). Legree believes 
that he’s accomplished the principal goal of the melodramatic villain: to silence the virtuous once 
and for all, to block his way to recognition. 
For all of Legree’s incredibly stylized evilness, however, there are still reminders of 
something larger than “mere personal villainy” behind the later events of the play (Grimsted 
241). When Cassy tells Tom that there is no point for him to be kind, that all of the slaves for 
whom he suffers “would turn against you the first time they get a chance,” Tom asks her: “What 
made 'em cruel? If I give out I shall get used to it and grow, little by little, just like 'em” (433-
34). Cassy and Tom are referring to Legree’s slaves, of course, so Tom could have asked her, 
“Who made them cruel?” but he doesn’t. By emphasizing the what, the acts that made these 
slaves cruel, Tom suggests that Legree behaved as any other slave owner might, thus tying the 
play’s message back to a larger, social critique. In the same way, Legree’s exclamation “I hate 
him—I hate him! And isn’t he mine? Can’t I do what I like with him? Who’s to hinder, I 
wonder?” both reflects personal viciousness and a system that allows the exercise of personal 
viciousness (441). 
Just as the play changes over the course of its six acts, the Aiken version of Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin was altered considerably over the course of the decades it was produced. As early as 
1854—two years after the six act version of the play debuted in upstate New York—“the play at 
the National Theatre had been revised so much … that it hardly resembled the one compiled in 
Troy. [C. W.] Taylor,” who was responsible for the very first dramatization of the novel, also 
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performed at the National Theatre, “added so much new material, that George L. Aiken protested 
vigorously” (Birdoff 101). By the time the standard 1852 text (published in 1858) had been in 
print it had already undergone a number of changes. There were Aiken’s earlier two plays of four 
acts each that were combined into this six-act form, which was first performed in Troy. This 
publication clearly shows revisions that would have been made sometime during its performance 
in New York City (see the allusion in V.2 to P. T. Barnum’s competing production at the 
American Museum). Later changes to the script radically affect the way we understand, and 
audiences would have understood, the play. A scene that Richard Moody reprints from a 
promptbook at the New York Public Library shows how St. Clare receives his otherwise 
ambiguous “death wound” (420).15 There we see Legree stab St. Clare, an act that augments his 
villainy, even if it was an accident (St. Clare was “attempt[ing] to separate” Cute and Legree). 
Later changes eliminated the productive dissimilarity of the representation of responsibility in 
the two halves of the play that I’ve been tracking. In an 1869 promptbook version of the play, 
“Legree is brought into the story and onto the stage almost from the start, and is involved in the 
(fraudulent) sale of Tom to St. Clare. … This version adds a scene (4, 3) in the barroom where he 
is mortally wounded, only now it is Legree who kills him (in part to cover up the earlier 
fraud).”16 With these changes Legree better conforms to Brooks’ account of the traditional 
melodramatic villain: “Opposed to virtue and innocence stands the active, concerted denial of 
them in the person of evil, known traditionally as le traître, no doubt because he dissimulates, 
but also because he betrays and undoes the moral order” (Melodramatic 33). This Legree would 
not been, “as in Stowe, the inevitable symptom of a vicious institution” (Meer 112). 
 
                                                
15 See Richards’ note (16) on 511, and a reprinting of the incomplete scene in Moody 383. 
16 See http://utc.iath.virginia.edu/onstage/scripts/69prompthp.html for more information. 
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In 1853, the actor G. C. Germon initially turned down the part of Uncle Tom because he 
thought he was being asked to play a Jim Crow role. He worried that his “very make-up as a 
Negro means burlesque, and Uncle Tom will make everybody laugh” (qtd. in Birdoff 42). 
Producer George Howard’s assurances to the contrary, the first time Germon walked on to the 
National Theatre’s stage in character he was met with laughter. This in itself was not surprising. 
The black body of minstrelsy had been made to be an object of ridicule for New York City 
audiences at least since Dan Emmett’s Virginia Minstrels performed their first show at the 
Bowery Theatre a decade before. 
Blackface minstrelsy was, to some extent, the way that whites in U.S. antebellum culture 
represented African American characters.17 Appropriating it caused problems for abolitionists, 
and for those who sought to profit from adaptations of their popular works. Melodrama—which 
was active in abolitionist fiction and the popular theater alike—was a mode concerned with the 
welfare of virtuous characters, and with the establishment of a comprehensive and 
comprehensible moral order. It was a drama of recognition, in which the imaginary and real 
worlds recognized a character to be virtuous. The inclusion of elements of blackface minstrelsy 
raised the possibility, however, that a virtuous character like Tom could be misrecognized, as 
Germon feared. The playwright George Aiken, as well as the novelist Harriet Beecher Stowe, 
then, had to find a way to gain sympathy for characters the sight and sound of whom had come to 
invite derision. 
Minstrelsy reveled in disorder and instability, and yet both it and melodrama imposed 
order on their subjects in a similar way, if for dissimilar ends, and to dissimilar effect. 
                                                
17 When Harriet Beecher Stowe explained in her preface that the object of Uncle Tom’s Cabin 
was “to awaken sympathy and feeling for the African race, as they exist among us,” she may 
have recognized that, for many white Americans living in the North, the “African race” was what 
one could have seen and heard at a minstrel show (xiii; emphasis added). 
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Melodrama identified virtue through the threat or enactment of violence, much the same way as 
melodrama determined the racial statuses of ambiguously raced characters. The chapter to this 
point has asserted that melodrama attempted to counteract the tendencies that later scholars have 
criticized it for. It has, in other words, considered how melodrama may have actually aided the 
creation of an abolitionist critique that was capable of placing blame on self and society. The 
remainder of this chapter and part of the next one will be spent examining the use of blackface 
minstrelsy in melodrama of the later 1850s and the ways that it used misrecognition to the 
benefit of the abolitionist cause. 
Melodrama, as Daphne Brooks has observed, “operated as an instrument designed to 
impart order and stability” (Bodies 36). In blackface minstrelsy, “the corporeal enactment of 
blackness [was] a pained one” (Hartman 27). Indeed, the same is true for the corporeal 
enactment of virtue in melodrama: “The convergences between the bodily politics of minstrelsy 
and those of melodrama might be said to center on the redemptive and recreational use of 
violence” (Hartman 29). In fact, “blows caused the virtuous black body of melodrama to be 
esteemed and humiliated the grotesque black body of minstrelsy” (Hartman 26). For a moment, 
we could interpret Saidiya Hartman as stating that the melodramatic body is both “esteemed and 
humiliated.” That is, of course, until we realize that “humiliated” refers to the minstrel body. My 
misreading makes my point: The black body of minstrelized melodrama is esteemed as virtuous 
because it is humiliated. Hartman’s opposition—that “whippings were to minstrelsy what tears 
were to melodrama” (30)—is a false one, because melodrama featured both. In both modes 
“blows invested [the body] with meaning” (Hartman 30). Though Hartman’s comment is about 
minstrelsy, it applies equally well to melodrama. Violence in minstrelsy does not so much invest 
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the body with meaning as arrest the play of signification of the racialized body.18 Melodrama 
invested the black body with a new meaning. 
 Peter Brooks writes that “the bodies of the virtuous victims are typically subjected to 
physical”—or some other kind of—“restraint.” The body is thus “unable to assert its innocence.” 
Melodrama, he continues, cannot “reach its denouement until the virtuous bodies have been 
freed, and explicitly recognized as bearing the sign of innocence” (“Melodrama” 18). It is my 
claim that this restraint, or any other related impediment, is the sign of virtue. The villain writes 
the sign of virtue on the hero’s body. The moment of victimization and recognition are one. The 
classic moment of this articulation of good and evil in Uncle Tom’s Cabin is Simon Legree’s 
whipping of Uncle Tom. 
But first, it’s worth discussing what many have argued to be the moment of recognition in 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin. In her discussion of film melodrama, Williams gives two examples in which 
“the victim-hero’s virtue is initially misrecognized,” or, in other words, who are temporarily 
believed to be vicious (48). This is not the case for either of the two examples she gives from 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin: Tom’s witnessing of Little Eva’s death, and George Shelby, Jr.’s witnessing 
of Tom’s. In neither case does the witness misrecognize the sufferer’s virtue. In fact, in neither 
scene is the sufferer’s virtue first recognized. By this point in the action, their virtue has already 
been proved.  
 Aiken’s play recreates the scene of Tom’s death from the novel almost verbatim:  
George. Oh! dear Uncle Tom! do wake—do speak once more! look up! Here's 
Master George—your own little Master George. Don't you know me?  
                                                
18 Hartman and Brooks discuss how the “racially liminal body” (Brooks Bodies 37) of Zoe, the 
tragic mulatta heroine of Dion Boucicault’s The Octoroon, “becomes legible as a black one by 
virtue of the violence that threatens it” (Hartman 210 n. 24). 
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Tom. [Opening his eyes and speaking in a feeble tone.] Mas'r George! Bless de 
Lord! it's all I wanted! They hav'n't forgot me! It warms my soul; it does my old 
heart good! Now I shall die content!  
George. You shan't die! you mustn't die, nor think of it. I have come to buy you, 
and take you home.  
Tom. Oh, Mas'r George, you're too late. The Lord has bought me, and is going to 
take me home.  
George. Oh! don't die. It will kill me—it will break my heart to think what you 
have suffered, poor, poor fellow!  
Tom. Don't call me, poor fellow! I have been a poor fellow; but that's all past and 
gone now. I'm right in the door, going into glory! Oh, Mas'r George! Heaven has 
come! I've got the victory, the Lord has given it to me! Glory be to His name! 
[Dies.] (443) 
This scene, like that of Eva’s death, is about the admiration of virtue rather than the recognition 
of it.19 Shelby’s recognition of Tom’s virtue comes too late for that recognition to be anything 
new. “The victory” was never in doubt. The only real threat to it was not Legree’s machinations 
or Shelby’s late arrival, but to the method of racial representation that made Tom representable 
as “black” in the first place. The possibility that Tom could be misread had been overcome “the 
moment Simon Legree’s whip first lent Uncle Tom a paradoxical visibility and dignity as a 
suffering, and thus worthy, human being” (Williams 43). 
                                                
19 If anything, we recognize young Shelby’s virtue in coming to rescue Tom. (In the novel, but 
not the play, he had promised to bring Tom back home.) He arrives just in time to see Tom, but 
too late to save him. We have, of course, already recognized Tom’s virtue. Furthermore, if we 
agree with Rosemarie Bank that “George Shelby … remains unredeemed by an unsuccessful 
eleventh-hour attempt to rescue Tom that leaves Shelby still a slaveowner,” then it becomes even 
more clear that Shelby is not a “recognizer” on the level of Eva or Tom (149). 
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 Williams asserts that “the key function of victimization is to orchestrate the moral 
legibility crucial to the mode, for if virtue is not obvious, suffering—often depicted as the literal 
suffering of an agonized body—is” (29). In Uncle Tom’s Cabin, suffering is not merely a sign of 
virtue—it is the enactment of virtue. Williams states that “even happy-ending melodramas are 
heavily invested in displays of bodily suffering as the means to the recognition of virtue.” 
“Indeed,” she continues, “the reward of virtue … is only a secondary manifestation of the more 
important recognition of virtue in a world in which such recognition is not obvious” (29; her 
emphasis).20 Virtue is obvious, or becomes so, at the moment of victimization. The moment of 
victimization is the moment of recognition—at least for the audience.21 
Tom’s beating is quickly passed over in the novel. Each of Tom’s whippings by Legree 
gets one short sentence: “‘D—n you!’ said Legree, as with one blow of his fist he felled Tom to 
the earth” (330) and “Legree, foaming with rage, smote his victim to the ground” (358). Stowe 
spends much more time apologizing for her “lack of graphic description” than on description 
itself (Williams 52): “Scenes of blood and cruelty are shocking to our ear and heart. What man 
has nerve to do, man has not nerve to hear. What brother-man and brother-Christian must suffer, 
                                                
20 Here Williams is echoing Brooks: “The reward of virtue […] is only a secondary 
manifestation of the recognition of virtue” (Melodramatic 27; his emphasis). 
21 Hartman almost agrees with my reading of victimization and the recognition of virtue, but she 
focuses exclusively on the interrelated ideas of racial and moral misrecognition. In her examples, 
she finds that “the disparity between identity and appearance contributed to the hero’s or 
heroine’s affliction and his or her usually tragic end. In these moral dramas, the battle of good 
and evil was waged at the site of the tortured and chaste black body; suffering announced virtue” 
(28). Her example is Zoe. But unlike The Octoroon, racial status does not play a part in Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin—at least not with Tom. 
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cannot be told us, even in our secret chamber, it so harrows the soul” (358).22 The scene in the 
play appears to be equally brief:  
Legree. Well, Tom, do you know I've made up my mind to kill you?  
Tom. It's very likely, Mas'r. 
Legree. I—have—done—just—that—thing, Tom, unless you'll tell me what do 
you know about these yer gals? [TOM is silent.] D'ye hear? Speak!  
Tom. I han't got anything to tell, mas'r. 
Legree. Do you dare to tell me, you old black rascal, you don't know? Speak! Do 
you know anything?  
Tom. I know, mas'r; but I can't tell anything. I can die!  
Legree. Hark ye, Tom! ye think, 'cause I have let you off before, I don't mean 
what I say; but, this time, I have made up my mind, and counted the cost. You've 
always stood it out agin me; now, I'll conquer ye or kill ye! one or t'other. I'll 
count every drop of blood there is in you, and take 'em, one by one, 'till ye give 
up!  
Tom. Mas'r, if you was sick, or in trouble, or dying, and I could save you, I'd give 
you my heart's blood; and, if taking every drop of blood in this poor old body 
would save your precious soul, I'd give 'em freely. Do the worst you can, my 
troubles will be over soon; but if you don't repent yours won't never end.  
[LEGREE strikes TOM down with the butt of his whip.] (441-42; emphasis in the 
original) 
                                                
22 Williams also points out that Hammatt Billings, Stowe’s first illustrator, only showed Tom 
being beaten by Sambo and Quimbo—and that only in the second illustrated edition of 1853 
(50). 
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As a matter of fact, this scenes features what may be the longest tableau in the play: As I stated 
earlier, “when Legree raised his whip to strike Tom, he stood over him for a full sixty seconds” 
(Birdoff 50). Stowe inserted a similar pause in the novel. After Tom tells Legree to “Do the 
worst you can, my troubles’ll be over soon; but if ye don’t repent, yours won’t never end!”:  
Like a strange snatch of heavenly music, heard in the lull of a tempest, this burst 
of feeling made a moment's blank pause. Legree stood aghast, and looked at Tom; 
and there was such a silence, that the tick of the old clock could be heard, 
measuring, with silent touch, the last moments of mercy and probation to that 
hardened heart. 
It was but a moment. There was one hesitating pause,—one irresolute, relenting 
thrill,—and the spirit of evil came back, with seven-fold vehemence; and Legree, 
foaming with rage, smote his victim to the ground. (358)23 
Both in the newspaper publication (18 Mar. 1852 in The National Era) and first volume edition 
(273), a row of asterisks were inserted between these paragraphs and Stowe’s apology. It closes 
the scene like a curtain drop. Stowe then steps forward to apologize for what she had just shown. 
Legree pauses to ready himself. The novel pauses so the narrator can apologize. What, then, 
happens on stage and in the audience in the sixty seconds of silence and static between the rise 
and fall of Legree’s whip? 
 
                                                
23 Also, the chapter in which this scene appeared was split into two issues of The National Era, 
so that scene was paused for its original readers. 
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Figure 2. Harriet Beecher Stowe. “The Strategem.” The National Era. March 18, 1852. 
Some may consider this a moment when the audience would feel the most helpless. Marc 
Robinson, on the contrary, sees in tableau a moment of possibility: “After stopping a narrative 
episode before the climax happens … the playwrights ask us to consider, in the silence that the 
tableau creates, some of the possible alternatives to an event that would otherwise seem 
inevitable. Just the fact that other routes through such a crisis exist, this theater implies, is 
important to recognize, even if this narrative and these particular characters aren’t going to take 
them” (35). This tableau opens up a space for reform, for conversion, for action. Aiken’s Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin shows us that Tom dies, but did not have to. Williams writes that melodrama’s 
“recognition of virtue involves a dialectic of pathos and action—a give and take of ‘too late’ and 
‘in the nick of time’” (30). Christine Gledhill writes that melodrama contrasts the world as it is 
and as it should be (21). In this moment, Legree’s villainy, and Tom’s virtue, are about-to-be 
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completed. Standing between the two contrasting moments in these temporalities is an instant in 
which the spectator can imagine his or her interruption of the event being staged. Time is 
working differently here than in Williams’ examples that deal with suspense. There, time is felt 
in two contradictory ways: individual actions feel fast, and yet the ultimate duration of all those 
combined actions feel slowed down (Williams 33). Those deferrals, while augmenting the 
suspense of the scene, are also supposed to have the effect of assuring us of their positive 
outcomes. While this model of eventual success may fit with George Shelby’s nick-of-time 
arrival before Tom’s death, it does not affect Tom’s fate. And yet there is a logic behind this 
tableau: It is because Tom is about-to-be made a martyr that the audience can sympathize with 
him. If he were not threatened, they would not recognize his virtue. If he were already dead, their 
sympathy would be worthless. Many argue that the only widespread reaction to Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin’s melodrama was crying, that the audience thus lost themselves, and the play’s argument, 
in their own feelings. In the end, melodrama moves us to tears—and little else.  
 
In the December 16, 1853 issue of The Liberator appeared “Eliza Harris,” a poem by 
Frances Ellen Watkins.24 A subtitle, which did not appear in Watkins’s Poems on Miscellaneous 
Subjects, unnecessarily tells us that the title character is “from ‘Uncle Tom’s Cabin.’” I say 
“unnecessarily” because Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel would have been familiar to most 
Americans, and most likely to all of those who subscribed to William Lloyd Garrison’s paper.25 
And yet, neither The Liberator nor Poems on Miscellaneous Subjects identify the author whose 
work inspired Watkins. An editorial introduction to the Frederick Douglass’ Paper run of the 
                                                
24 Watkins did not become Harper until her marriage to Fenton Harper in 1860. 
25 See, for example, the following issues of The Liberator for mentions of Stowe and/or her 
novel: 3/26/1852, 4/2/1852, and 6/11/1852. 
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poem, which appeared there a week after it did in The Liberator, tells us that “the following 
effusion … from the pen of a young lady of color … speaks for itself.” It is my contention that 
Watkins’ poem does not speak for itself, but rather speaks to the “mania,” to use Sarah Meer’s 
phrase, of cultural productions that surrounded Stowe’s novel. The influence of these earlier 
versions on Watkins’ poem manifests itself not just in the poem’s content, but in its form as well. 
Watkins’s poem, in other words, synthesizes the novelistic and melodramatic modes.  
Watkins’s adaptation of Eliza Harris’s flight to freedom has a different goal. Eliza, “a 
young quadroon woman,” runs away to save her child, Harry, whom her hapless master has sold 
to settle a debt (Stowe 3-4). She is on her way North when she notices Haley, the slave trader 
that has purchased her son, begin to close in on her. (She had reached the Ohio River, but had 
been unable to obtain passage on a ship across it because the river was frozen.) In a moment in 
which “a thousand lives seemed to be concentrated in that one moment to Eliza,” she grabs her 
child, and runs to the river. Stowe charges the moment with an extreme intensity. Time, in the 
form of a thousand lives (of other runaways slaves—Eliza is functioning as a type here) is felt to 
weigh especially heavily on this moment, this woman. Eliza herself seems to defy laws of time 
and space in her flight: “In that dizzy moment her feet to her scarce seemed to touch the ground, 
and a moment brought her to the water's edge.” Finally, “nerved with strength such as God gives 
only to the desperate, with one wild cry and flying leap, she vaulted sheer over the turbid current 
by the shore, on to the raft of ice beyond.” Eliza’s pursuers, seeing his hopeless act, react as a 
sympathetic audience would: “It was a desperate leap—impossible to anything but madness and 
despair; and Haley, Sam, and Andy, instinctively cried out, and lifted up their hands, as she did 
it.” With great energy, Stowe represents Eliza’s crossing: “The huge green fragment of ice on 
which she alighted pitched and creaked as her weight came on it, but she staid there not a 
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moment. With wild cries and desperate energy she leaped to another and still another cake;—
stumbling—leaping—slipping—springing upwards again!” These dashes, like the one in the 
preceding quotation, recreate on the page Eliza’s awkward and frantic movements across the ice. 
Stowe adds to the immediacy of the scene by shifting into the present tense: “Her shoes are 
gone—her stockings cut from her feet—while blood marked every step; but she saw nothing, felt 
nothing, till dimly, as in a dream, she saw the Ohio side, and a man helping her up the bank” 
(52). The zeugma in the last sentence makes it seem as if Eliza sees herself being helped up. 
Both her and her pursuers are taken in by what they see. 
When Watkins’s Eliza “was nearing the river—in reaching the brink, / She heeded no 
danger, she paused not to think!” (5-6) The speaker then tells us what she would have thought if 
she had had the time to pause: “For she is a mother—her child is a slave— / And she’ll give him 
his freedom, or find him a grave!” (7-8) The speaker, in fact, recalls Aiken’s Eliza’s words 
before she takes her leap: “Courage, my child!—we will be free—or perish!” (386) Like Aiken, 
Watkins makes the terms of the event explicit. Stowe’s narrator “pause[s] not to think,” but is, 
like Eliza and her pursuers, swept up in the events being narrated. Though Eliza or Stowe’s 
narrator do not pause to think, Watkins’s narrator forces her reader to do just that. The narrator 
continues to set up Eliza’s crossing in the fourth stanza: “She was nerved by despair, and 
strengthen’d by woe, / As she leap’d o’er the chasms that yawn’d from below; / Death howl’d in 
the tempest, and rav’d in the blast, / But she heard not the sound till the danger was past” (13-
16). As in the second stanza, Eliza is still unaware of the full significance of her situation. And 
just in case Watkins’ audience is similarly in danger of losing sight of the political reality that 
frames the action, Watkins arrests it: The reader is anxious to learn of Eliza’s fate, but the 
speaker defers telling it for two stanzas:  
 51 
 
            Oh! how shall I speak of my proud country’s shame?  
            Of the stains on her glory, how give them their name?  
            How say that her banner in mockery waves—  
            Her ‘star-spangled banner’—o’er millions of slaves?  
 
            How say that the lawless may torture and chase  
            A woman whose crime is the hue of her face?  
            How the depths of the forest may echo around  
            With the shrieks of despair, and the bay of the hound? (17-24)  
This aside recalls the kind of denunciation Stowe’s narrator usually engages in. Though a 
melodrama’s exegetical representation usually tells the audience the immediate, if less than 
obvious, significance of an event—what happens to slaves that are sent South, for example—it 
rarely takes the long view seen here. 
 This delay, absent from Stowe’s text, while it displays an omniscience characteristic of a 
novelistic narrator, nevertheless has the effect of reproducing a specifically melodramatic 
temporality. Stowe represented the speed of Eliza’s crossing with dashes. Watkins uses anapests. 
And yet Eliza’s escape is delayed by the narrator’s digression. Just as Eliza “hear[s] not the 
sound” of Death’s howlings—that is, she doesn’t recognize “the true stakes of the drama” 
(Brooks Melodramatic 19)—“till the danger is past,” so is the reader not allowed to breathe a 
sigh of relief until the speaker’s exclamation draws the connection between this individual act 
and the national abomination of slavery. And when Eliza reaches the opposite shore, her 
achievement is stressed in terms of its larger significance: “With her step on the ice, and her arm 
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on her child, / The danger was fearful, the pathway was wild; / But, aided by Heaven, she gained 
a free shore, / Where the friends of humanity open’d their door” (25-28). 
 The confused temporality continues in the next section, which documents Eliza’s fear, 
even though she has, by this time, reached safety: “So fragile and lovely, so fearfully pale, / Like 
a lily that bends to the breath of the gale, / Save the heave of her breast, and the sway of her hair, 
/ You’d have thought her a statue of fear and despair” (29-32). The aestheticization that occurs 
when Watkins calls Eliza a statue—an aestheticization that stands as a microcosm for the whole 
poetic project and that of all other representations of Eliza—would be better expressed as a 
theatrical tableau, which stops time in order to render more legible Eliza’s emotions, or, in Peter 
Brooks’s account of the function of tableau, provides “a visual summary of the emotional 
situation” (Melodramatic 48). 
 This arrested affect carries over into the next stanza: “In agony close to her bosom she 
press’d / The life of her heart, the child of her breast:— / Oh! love from its tenderness gathering 
might, / Had strengthen’d her soul for the dangers of flight” (33-36). The poem’s general use of 
the past tense could imply that this is a belated description of Eliza’s feelings before her escape, 
but the succeeding lines have to remind us that she is, in fact, on the free side of the Ohio: “But 
she’s free!—yes, free from the land where the slave / From the hand of oppression must rest in 
the grave; / Where bondage and torture, where scourges and chains / Have plac’d on our banner 
indelible stains” (37-40). This reassurance also gives Watkins another opportunity to link Eliza’s 
story with a political issue, expressed, as before, in the desecrated flag, lest her readership, 
overwhelmed with sympathy for Eliza, and made complacent at the relief they feel now that she 
is safe, forget the other slave mothers of which she is a type. Watkins manipulates the situation 
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in such a way as to combine the audience’s desire for affective release with political 
enlightenment. 
 Two stanzas follow that appear only in the original newspaper publications: “Did a fever 
e’er burning through bosom and brain, / Send a lava-like flood through every vein, / Till it 
suddenly cooled ‘neath a healing spell, / And you knew, oh! the joy! you knew you were well? // 
So felt this young mother, as a sense of the rest / Stole gently and sweetly o’er her weary breast, / 
As her boy looked up, and, wondering, smiled / On the mother whose love had freed her child” 
(41-48). These lines make the first direct appeal to the reader, and so recall some of Stowe’s 
comments in her “Concluding Remarks” to Uncle Tom’s Cabin.26 Unlike Stowe’s famous appeal 
to white Northern women’s experience of infant mortality to win their sympathy for slave 
mothers’ losses, Watkins locates this sickness within her readers’ own “bosom and brain.” The 
danger to the mother’s life is given precedence here. Eliza is then cured by her son’s smile, a 
smile made possible by her love and sacrifice. In this way, the saved child recognizes the virtue 
of his own mother. Initially, we are told that Eliza “was nerved by despair, and strengthen’d by 
woe” (13). Later, we learn that “love from its tenderness gathering might, / Had strengthen’d her 
soul from the dangers of flight” (35-36). The change in motivation, from fear of death to love of 
family, makes sense when we remember that, in melodrama, the role that children like Harry (or 
Eva) play. The confused agency in this reciprocal-blessing is exemplified by the word 
“wondering,” which could either indicate that Harry causes, or shows, wonder. The exclusion of 
these two stanzas in Poems on Miscellaneous Subjects denies Eliza recognition of her virtue 
within the poem—that is, it denies her recognition from one of the other characters, a common 
                                                
26 Compare, for example: “By the sick hour of your child; by those dying eyes, which you can 
never forget; by those last cries, that wrung your heart when you could neither help nor save; by 
the desolation of that empty cradle, that silent nursery,—I beseech you, pity those mothers that 
are constantly made childless by the American slave-trade!” (384) 
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feature of melodrama. And this happy ending involves, as Williams recognizes with melodrama 
more generally, includes the “display[] of bodily suffering as the means to the recognition of 
virtue” (29). The child can only cure his mother with a smile after she is struck with a fearful 
fever. 
 The poem’s penultimate stanza casts a glance back across the river: “The bloodhounds 
have miss’d the scent of her way; / The hunter is rifled and foil’d of his prey” (49-50). Watkins 
again likens the hunters and their dogs, both in their identical grammatical positioning, and in the 
metaphorical use of “foil’d,” which is used to describe a hunting dog’s tendency “to spoil his 
own scent” (OED). The hunters are further unmanned by one of Watkins few substantive 
revisions to the poem in Poems on Miscellaneous Subjects. In the later version, the next two 
lines read: “Fierce jargon and cursing, with clanking of chains, / Make sounds of strange discord 
on Liberty’s plains” (51-52). In the earlier newspaper versions, the first line reads: “The cursing 
of men and clanking of chains.” The omission of the word “men” adds to their dehumanization, 
as does the word “jargon,” “a term of contempt for something the speaker does not understand,” 
which, in representing their speech as incomprehensible as the sound of shackles, ends in 
denying them the faculty of speech altogether (OED). 
 Watkins concludes by turning again to the mother and child: “With the rapture of love 
and fullness of bliss, / She plac’d on his brow a mother’s fond kiss:— / Oh! poverty, danger and 
death she can brave, / For the child of her love is no longer a slave!” (53-56) As in Aiken’s play, 
Eliza drops out of the picture once she’s free, and yet the assurance that “she can brave” 
whatever may come next gestures toward the residual plot of the novel. That the poem ends not 
with the contradiction of such a scene occurring “on Liberty’s plains,” but with resolution and 
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resolve does not guarantee that Watkins does not fall into the problem she had been trying to 
avoid of losing sight of social issues in an individual’s story. 
 
 The task of resignifying blackness was not accomplished in one run. As Brooks writes of 
the recognition of “true moral identities,” so it was with the creation of the sympathetic slave: Its 
success was “never finally assured; that is why it must be repeatedly dramatized” (Melodramatic 
53). Just as Billings’ sole illustration of Tom’s beating “condenses separate moments in the 
novel” (Williams 50-52), we can think of Legree’s beating of Tom as representing a culmination 
of a series of acts that interpollate Tom as virtuous victim. We first become aware of Tom’s 
virtue—and placement in the social order—through slavery’s assaults on the domestic space, 
either in the breaking up of the cabin, or Legree’s later interrupting Tom when he sings a home 
song. Just as Tom’s victimization must be repeated over the course of many performances, he is 
repeatedly victimized within each performance as well. Similarly, abolitionists had to repeatedly 
stress the connection between the personalized narratives they told and the larger structures that 
shaped them. 
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Chapter Two 
Blackface Minstrelsy and Violence in Conway’s Dred and Delany’s Blake 
 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin was reworked considerably after the Civil War. Legree’s villainy, as 
has been noted, was remarkably worse. But even before the war, the play, along with its 
audience, underwent significant change. The politics staged in P. T. Barnum’s American 
Museum had changed considerably over the course of four years. The Lecture Room’s first 
dramatization of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, adapted by H. J. Conway in 1852 
and produced by Barnum a year later, took a much different political stance on slavery than 
Stowe had.27 That play ended with Uncle Tom freed by George Shelby and reunited with his 
family. Barnum, defending a revision that weakened Stowe’s attack on the slave system, wrote 
that Conway had “wisely consulted dramatic taste by having Virtue triumphant at last, and after 
all its unjust sufferings, miseries and deprivations, conducted to happiness by the hand of Him 
who watches over all” (qtd. in Birdoff 89). To those—including Stowe—upset with the new 
ending, a reviewer for the New York Morning Express responded that there was “no good reason 
why Uncle Tom should be whipped to death by a brute in a moral drama, because from the 
popular character of the drama itself, such closing triumph for vice and defeat of virtue would 
leave a most pernicious impression upon the general mind” (qtd. in Birdoff 89-90). An audience 
familiar with melodrama, this reviewer argued, would reject Uncle Tom’s murder by Simon 
Legree. Though, in other adaptations, Legree was punished, having the hero die was not 
acceptable. Within the polarized ethical world of melodrama, justice must be done. If melodrama 
is nostalgic for, and seeks the reestablishment of, a lost home, having Tom restored to his family 
                                                
27 See Adams (129-39) for an account of the play’s complicated “Compromise politics.” 
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is a fitting end (Williams 28). Barnum and Conway, and their critics, had very different ideas 
about moral drama. 
Barnum claimed that his production was “the only just and sensible dramatic version of 
Mrs. Stowe’s book that has ever been put upon the stage.” He contended that the play 
represented “Southern Negro SLAVERY AS IT IS embracing all its abhorrent deformities, its 
cruelties, and barbarities,” that it “deal[t] with FACTS, INSTEAD OF FICTION.” Barnum 
criticized the other great New York City production of Stowe’s first novel. In a veiled reference 
to the George Howard-George Aiken production at the National Theatre, he wrote that his 
production “exhibit[ed] a true picture of negro life in the South, instead of absurdly representing 
the ignorant slave as possessed of all the polish of the drawing room, and the refinement of the 
educated whites.” Even though he claimed that Conway’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin “appeal[ed] to 
reason instead of the passions,” and that his work would “be more salutary than those of any 
piece based upon fanaticism without reason, and zeal without knowledge,” he would later come 
to produce the adaptation that William Lloyd Garrison felt instilled “the strongest and the 
sublimest anti-slavery sentiments!” (qtd. in Birdoff 89, 77). Something must have changed, then, 
for Barnum to adopt Aiken’s script for his Lecture Room productions.28 
Eric Lott writes that the rivalry between the Barnum-Conway and Howard-Aiken 
productions revealed deep political divisions within the antebellum northern working class. 
These “struggles over [Stowe’s] text mediated struggles over sectional allegiance” (Lott 224). In 
what Lott characterizes as a fusion of “theatrical taste and political devotion,” those who 
preferred Aiken’s version were thought to hold Northern, antislavery views, while those who 
preferred Conway’s were thought to hold Southern, proslavery views. The two plays, Lott 
                                                
28 See Adams 139. 
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continues, “introduc[ed] sectional controversy into the theater … by foregrounding and even 
thematizing the vagaries of racial representation”: “Aiken and Conway each took up one of the 
minstrel show’s contradictory representational strategies in regard to blacks—Conway its hard-
edged ridicule, Aiken its sentimentalism” (219-20). In foregrounding a formalized sectionalism, 
the plays made “visible the antagonism between America’s two modes of production” (Lott 221). 
The agrarian South became associated with “the minstrel show’s racial meanness” and the 
industrial North with “a [Stephen] Fosteresque pathos” (Lott 220). Debates over the two Uncle 
Tom plays showed that “the comic and the sentimental, the cornerstones of minstrelsy,” and, by 
extension, Northern and Southern modes of production, “no longer seemed entirely compatible” 
(Lott 226). 
In 1852, then, a production’s representational strategies determined, and its sectional 
allegiances were indicated by, the extent to which its “particular iconography did or did not 
suggest an irreverence for the plight of slaves”  (Lott 220). That the political lines of racial 
representation had shifted by 1856 can be seen as much by the fact that Barnum began producing 
Aiken’s Uncle Tom as by the content of Conway’s follow-up, Dred, based on Stowe’s sequel to 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Dred recounts the fate of the people of two Southern plantations: the 
Gordons and the Claytons. Tom Gordon terrorizes his sister, Nina, and his secret half brother, 
Harry, who is a slave. The novel follows the efforts of Harry, Edward Clayton (Nina’s fiancé), 
and Dred (the leader of a fugitive slave community in the Dismal Swamp) to frustrate Tom’s evil 
plans. If “the Uncle Tom’s Cabin plays did not at all mark something so unequivocal as a turn in 
working-class racial perspective,” neither did Conway’s Dred (Lott 231). But if the former plays 
showed there to be a split between “‘northern’ and ‘southern’ portions of the northern popular 
classes,” a split indicated and instituted by the rift between the comic and the sentimental modes 
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of racial melodrama, the latter play forces us to rethink the applicability to the late 1850s of 
Lott’s paradigm of sectionalized racial representation, which he theorized in relation to the early 
1850s. Though the sentimental, antislavery mode remained current (thanks to the continued 
popularity of Aiken’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin), Conway’s Dred promoted a comic vision of the slave 
south while still insisting on the ultimate abolition of slavery. If comic racial representation had 
previously denied the cross-racial sympathy that was indispensable to the success of labor 
abolitionism, it now reaffirmed it through a figure who crossed racial boundaries and with whom 
the audience was invited to sympathize. The next chapter will examine the abolitionist practice 
of forcing interracial sympathy. This chapter starts by looking at popular representations of 
accidental sympathy between working class whites and enslaved blacks. 
Conway suggests the relevance of the plight of slaves to the working classes by creating a 
working class character that is constantly mistaken for a slave. Conway bases this alliance 
between slave and worker on a shared legacy of revolution and education. The role of this 
alliance in the play is to rid the South of its most pernicious elements—the racist, proslavery 
mob that threatens to replace the rule of law with lynch law. The play’s support for labor 
abolitionism is tentative, insofar that the movement has a short, though powerful, life within the 
play. The alliance is so successful that, in the end, it becomes unnecessary to the welfare of the 
state. The three most powerful figures of the movement—Dred, Harry, and Cipher Cute—are 
either sacrificed for the safety of that society, in the case of the first, or are absorbed into the 
dominant culture, in the case of the latter two. While labor abolitionism is struck down almost as 
quickly as it was brought up, the play is still remarkable for its movement beyond the Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin plays toward envisioning a significant partnership between black slave and white 
worker. 
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Cipher is an addition to Stowe’s text, drawn from the stage tradition of the Yankee 
character. His most immediate ancestors are Gumption Cute, from Aiken’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, 
and Penetrate Partyside, from Conway’s. As his name suggests, he is “a person who fills a place, 
but is of no importance or worth, a nonentity, a ‘mere nothing.’” But just as a zero is “of no 
value by itself,” Cipher “increases or decreases the value of other figures according to [his] 
position.” This “acute, clever, keen-witted, sharp, shrewd” character goes south “to calculate, 
cast in the mind, think out” the slave system (OED). In the process, he is placed in relation to 
other characters in order to prove their value. 
Harry introduces Cipher to Uncle John and company as “a gentleman [who] has been 
thrown from his horse. … I assisted him out of the swamp, sir, and directed some of the people 
to show him this way to the house” (11). Cipher is associated, like Dred, with the swamp. He 
brings it with him to the Canema plantation: “He is muddied all over, his hat crushed” (12). 
Cipher appears, that is, in a sort of full-body blackface. He explains how he came to look this 
way: 
Just as I came reound the turn at the eend of the big swamp you told me of, where 
the niggers run away and hide in; wal, just as I turned the corner, eout jumps a big 
buck nigger, black as the ace of spades, in a red flannel shirt, his neck like a 
bull’s, and his arms naked; he throws ‘em high in the air, and yells eout, ‘Beware! 
Return to thine own people! Listen not to him who would teach thee; justice is 
only for the white man!’ Then he gin a yell like the bull of Bashan; you might 
have heard it from Maine to Georgy, and vanished intew the swamp head-first, 
and my tarnal crittur of a horse vamoosed in tew, tail first. (11) 
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Though it appears that Cipher fell into the swamp at the end of Dred’s rant, Dred’s warning 
seems to take Cipher’s current, muddied appearance into account. With “thine own people,” 
Dred seems to be registering the difference between himself and Cipher, though along what lines 
it’s unclear (whites? Northerners?). His statement that “justice is only for the white man” makes 
less sense, unless Dred does not consider him to be white. Dred may be making a greater 
distinction than race: justice is for the white aristocrat, and as Cipher is not the latter, he may as 
well not be the former. 
 Dred enters the swamp “head-first,” Cipher “tail first,” but they both enter it. Cipher’s 
initial association with Dred may have been fortuitous, but their histories soon substantiate the 
link. Jekyl says that Dred is “a true son of his father, Denmark Vesey, who headed a bloody 
insurrection of the niggers in South Carolina.” Cipher prides himself on his own revolutionary 
background. He introduces himself as belonging to “the Cutes of Connecticut, formerly of 
Messachusetts, and hull soul’d right deown patriots. Helped tew plant the tree of liberty in 
Bosting, and start all the tea in tew the river” (12). Before Harry can draw on the legacy of 
American rebellion to justify slave insurrection (30), the close introduction of both Dred and 
Cipher connect the two traditions. Cipher does so more explicitly. Jekyl tells his nephew that 
Dred has been outlawed “for running away from his master, and for aiding and abetting other 
slaves to do the same; and now, it’s pretty well known, endeavoring to stir up other slaves to 
revolt.” Cipher: “Re-volt! That’s tew syllables of our revolution. Want tew know if the men that 
stirred up our revolution was educated or ignorant? Seems tew me, Uncle Judas, if I’m studying 
law in order tew meet eout justice, ‘tis but right I should cipher this eout” (12; emphasis in the 
original). Cipher then questions Jekyl: 
  Neow, I want tew know what you call educated niggers? 
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  MR. JEKYL. Those that are taught to read and write; that always makes them  
dangerous. 
  CIPHER. Heow so? 
  MR. JEKYL. Why, don’t you see what dangerous weapons you put into their  
hands. They spread their knowledge; bright smart niggers will pick it up; for, the 
very fellows who are most dangerous are the very ones who’ll be sure to learn. 
  CIPHER. Jist so; and what harm if they do? (12-13) 
An exasperated Jekyl tries to close off the discussion: “What harm? You are yet a stranger to this 
part of the country, or you wouldn’t ask such a question” (13). Cipher, heretofore unaware of 
such sectional distinctions, is outraged: 
This part of the country! Isn’t all this country the United States? Isn’t the same 
Heaven over this part of the country as over any other part of the country? Don’t 
the stars and stripes float over this part of the country and over all ‘The land of the 
free and the home of the brave?’ Want tew know. 
  HARRY. (Aside.) The question, the question; ‘my heart asks it.’ (13) 
Cipher, unbeknownst to himself, has become a spokesman for emancipation. 
 Uncle John reads Cipher’s asectionalism as working class ideology. He advises Jekyl that 
“the first portion of your nephew’s studies should be to obtain a thorough knowledge of our 
Southern institutions, and then he would understand his subject better, and talk in a very different 
strain. He is a little too democratic for us.” “Democrat!” Cipher responds, “Guess I be. I’m one 
of the people, one of the working class” (13).29 It turns out that John is against education for 
                                                
29 Cipher’s professions of working class identity are as much results of interpolation—Uncle 
John had previously, in an aside, called Cipher a “low fellow,” and other characters like Dakin 
and Tom Tit call him “trash”—as they are of self-originating affirmation. He identifies himself 
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slaves and laborers: “What do working-men want with education? Education ruins ‘em, sir, ruins 
‘em. … It raises them above their station” (13). Uncle John repeats his command to Jekyl “to 
school this person that he may not introduce any of his Northern fanatical notions, subversive of 
order, peace and Southern liberty” (13). (Now we realize the import of the other part of Dred’s 
warning, “Listen not to him who would teach thee.”) It appears that an educated working class is 
as threatening to southern society as educated slaves. Jekyl suspects Harry of the same kind of 
subversive behavior with which John charges Cipher: Dred “is in communication with other 
educated niggers on plantations not a hundred miles from here. (Looks at Harry.)” (12; emphasis 
in the original). 
 Jekyl ends the conversation by telling Cipher that, if he intends to earn any money in the 
South, he’ll need to “learn the difference between Southern and Northern liberty, and black and 
white. Till then, keep your mouth shut” (13). Cipher intends to do no such thing. He turns to 
Harry, who “helped me out of the swamp,” and who, he hopes, “can help me to cipher this 
eout—What’s right North’s wrong South, eh?” Harry responds that he “may have an opinion, but 
it would not become a slave to express it” (14). Cipher is surprised that this “next to white” man 
who “knows more than any free man” (John’s words) could be a slave. He asks Harry if he can 
read and write, to which Harry replies in the affirmative. 
CIPHER. And what does your reading teach you? Speak eout. I’m a man, so are 
you. So, man tew man, and eout with it. 
HARRY. Sir, you are a stranger to me, but the free expression of your own 
sentiments but now, emboldens me to utter mine. I will speak the truth, and only 
                                                                                                                                                       
against some, that is, as well as with others. In this way Cipher’s class identify is formulated in 
much the same way as his racial identity. 
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the truth; and if that is wrong, and brings punishment on me, why ‘tis the will of 
Heaven, and I submit. Then, sir, I will trouble you with— 
(Distant shouts outside.) 
Hark! that shout announces the arrival of Miss Nina, my dear young mistress. 
Another time, sir; I must now hasten to meet her. (14) 
Just as Dred inspired Cipher to interrogate Southern society, Cipher enables Harry to speak 
against it. This overture to black empowerment is interrupted by the arrival of Nina, and with 
her, the courtship plot. 
Cipher’s second experience with racial passing exploits even more the potentially 
terrifying hilarity (or hilarious terror) of being (mistaken for) a slave. Ben Dakin and Bige 
Skinflint are on the trail of Jem, one of Tom’s runaway slaves. It’s a rainy night, and Cipher, 
without an umbrella, comes onstage in “a very long skirted old homespun cover coat” which Jem 
had dropped in his escape (24). Cipher, unknowingly taking up the coat of a slave, takes on the 
issue of slavery:  
I begin to cipher out prutty smart that I darn’t make my stay very long in this 
Southern country. There’s nothing about it, don’t hitch with my ideas. No doubt 
property’s property, and all on us humans has, more or less, a kinder hankering 
arter acquiring on it. But darn it, it somehow seems to me niggers shouldn’t be 
any body’s property, any how; if they be, they’re a dreadful skeany property. (24) 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “skean” as “a form of knife or dagger,” and in this 
situation slavery cuts both ways. On his way to deliver the document that will reenslave Tiff, 
Cipher comments that he would “sooner belong to the old boy [i.e., the Devil] than to him” (24). 
There is instantly the sound of “distant shouts, horn, and baying of dogs” and Cipher realizes 
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that “they be hunting me down” (25). Out of nowhere, Dred appears to meet Dakin “with levelled 
rifle,” and cries: “Back, human hell hounds; back, back. (BEN backs out. DRED, with wild 
laugh.) For the swamp! for the swamp.” Dred temporarily saves Cipher, and calls him to the 
sanctuary of slaves, as well, now, of a white man who, temporarily, occupied the position of one. 
(Dred may even mistake Cipher for Jem. If that’s so, it may not be the first time he thought 
Cipher was black.) 
 Later, when Tom tells the Canema residents that he owns Tiff, and that if he tries to run 
away to the swamp he will set Dakin and his dogs “on his heels, as they now are on Jem’s,” Tom 
is interrupted by “noise outside, of follow! follow! and barking of dogs. CIPHER rushes over 
balcony, through windows, with only the upper part of the old overcoat on—all the skirts, up to 
the armpits, entirely torn off” (30). Cipher is, once again, helped by a black character. Harry 
orders Dakin to retreat, threatening to shoot his dogs if he doesn’t. Cipher tells him to “shoot 
‘em, darn ‘em; and if you can make a miss, and hit the fellow that owns ‘em, you’ll shoot a 
bigger hound than either of the dogs”—Cipher, in other words, is authorizing black violence. In 
response to Clayton and Uncle Tom’s obtusely asking “What’s the matter?” Cipher answers: 
“The matter is, I’ve been taken for property, and hunted down with dogs.” His choice of verb is 
apt. “Taken” connotes “mistaken” while drawing attention to the possession of human property. 
The effect of these scenes of mistaken identity is to show the mutability of the concept of race, of 
the false distinctions between the white and black underclasses. Any white man can be mistaken 
for, can be taken as, a black man. The uneasy comedy of these scenes suggests the tense 
recognition of this fact. It is meant to disarm what must have been for Barnum’s audience a 
frightening proposition. 
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 Race, then, like class, is not an essential attribute. (Though the play’s is a sectionally-
inflected notion of class.) Hoping to buy the already free Tiff from Dakin, Cipher comes 
“disguised in overcoat and slouched hat, and heavy whip—belt under overcoat, with two very 
long pistols in it” (36). His disguise is first tested by Tom Tit, who “eyes him from head to foot 
with supreme disgust” (26) and calls him “common” and “white trash!” (37). So far, so good; 
Cipher looks like he could be one of Dakin’s associates. The real test comes when Cipher meets 
the kind of character he’s attempting to counterfeit. Cipher tells Dakin he needs a cook. Dakin 
recommends Tiff. Cipher offers to “buy that nigger, and give you my note for him.” Cipher has 
violated protocol, it seems, and is forced to identify himself: 
  BEN. Your note! And who are you, any how? Where from—North or South? 
CIPHER. Well, North, I guess. 
BEN. I thought so. Its [sic] only such trash talks about giving notes. 
CIPHER. Who do you call trash? 
BEN. You, and every cussed Yankee like you. (40; emphasis in the original) 
Dakin’s similar, if not lower, class status is misleading here. In the play’s organization of class, 
sectional loyalty trumps occupation or relative wealth. Dakin’s definition of “trash” differs from 
Tom Tit’s in that it includes a sectional element. Tom Tit, who, according to himself, “ain’t a 
common nigger,” (6) means any non-refined person, black or white; Dakin means Northerners.30 
 If Cipher and Tom personify North and South, Northern and Southern arguments about 
slavery are condensed into objects. Dakin “draws a long bowie knife” on Cipher, who “coolly 
                                                
30 Cipher’s characterization of Southerners likewise conflates class with sectional identity, at 
least as far as those who are not liberal slaveholders, like Clayton, are concerned. Cipher calls 
Dakin Tom’s “friend,” and when Tom resents this, Cipher replies, “Birds of a feather, you 
know” (30). 
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rises—goes up to the knife—brings his eye down to the handle, and then lets it travel up to the 
point slowly.” 
BEN. That’s what I call a particeler Southern argument agin Northern abolition. 
CIPHER. Shouldn’t wonder. How long will such an argument reach? 
BEN. About arm’s length—it’s mighty cutting. (Stretches out his arm.) 
CIPHER. Jest so. (Deliberately draws a very long pistol from his inside belt, and 
levels it at BEN.) And this is a popping rejoinder. ‘Tis but fair tew meet men with 
their own arguments. (40) 
Cipher is willing to match violence with violence, unlike the white protagonists of Stowe’s 
novel, who are opposed to it.31 In place of a principled, but pacifist, notion of white masculinity 
that values self-control, Cipher “sets a masculine tone by drinking, fighting, and boasting about 
his manhood” (Adams 146). Cipher’s hyper-masculinity wins the drunken Dakin over. Over a 
drink, Dakin “admiringly” tells him, “You’re a man, any how—so am I” (40). These 
competitions in the play always concern recognition. That both of the combatants are well 
matched proves each (and the other) character’s manhood. 
 These moments of recognition are significant when viewed in light of Cipher’s contrast 
between law and justice. Originally, he tells the audience, “I come to study law under Uncle 
Judas; but I’ve gin up, and took tew t’other side, justice” (36). Cipher later divides these two 
aims between Tom and himself: “He’s a man of action. … I am a man of action; and as he’s only 
law to back him, and I have justice on my side, we’ll see who’ll come out at the right end of the 
                                                
31 Much, if not most, of their reticence is a product of their religious beliefs. Cipher is not at all 
religious, as his few confrontations with the play’s only clergyman, Obadiah Orthodox (or 
“Shovel Hat,” as Cipher calls him), show. 
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horn” (37; emphasis in the original).32 These equations of manhood can cross race. So when 
Dakin says, “He’s a hard un, is Tom Gordon, and so’s Dred,” he’s stating that both are equal 
parties in the contest (24). In Southern law, a slave’s personhood is not recognized. (Tom is 
correct when he reminds Nina and Uncle John that “a slave not being a person in the eye of the 
law, cannot have a contract made with him!” [43].) In the realm of justice, a slave’s agency is 
operative. That’s why Dred and the other runaways in the swamp can swear vengeance against 
Tom, or Tiff can give his word to protect the Peyton children, and be bound to it. Similarly, 
Harry can challenge Tom: “Carry us to the wilderness—place us man to man! No eye to see—no 
hand to help, and let us grapple! Then the poor slave’s natural strength ‘gainst the proud white 
man’s power” (43-44). In the outlawed space of the swamp, “nature’s just laws,” or justice, can 
“prevail!” (44). To the extent that the swamp is extralegal, outside of the sway of the already 
unjust laws of Southern society that can be further abused, it is a place where justice can be done.  
 The recognition, on both sides, of the shared concerns of Northern laborer and Southern 
slave leads to cooperative action. Hence the numerous scenes in which Dred or Cipher appear 
with a gun to help another character’s escape. In one of the more confrontational scenes, white 
and black characters work collectively. In fact, agency is passed from the former to the latter. 
After Cipher’s close escape from Dakin’s dogs, Tom accuses him of helping Jem escape and 
with withholding the papers Jekyl sent to him. Cipher counters with: “I have heard from a good 
many that you are one of the blood-thirsty slave owners of the South, that disgrace your name 
and country; and my opinion is, if you say I helped off your nigger to the swamp, that you lie!” 
                                                
32 Later, Jekyl tells Tom that Cipher stole the fake wills that Tom meant to use to dispossess 
Nina of her property and reenslave Tiff. When Tom learns that his posse is waiting for him, he 
yells, “Then damn the papers! my will’s law enough—we’ll do without ‘em” (41). Lynch law, 
and not established law, is what actually backs Tom. 
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TOM. What, you scoundrel! (Going to strike him with the butt end of his riding-
whip. CIPHER pulls off coat.) 
NINA. Tom! Tom! (Interferes. Thunder slow through this.) 
CIPHER. Let him come on. Southern—slavery against northern liberty. I’ll tan 
his hide. 
(Again, each character embodies a section of the country.) Tom “hurls away NINA. She would 
fall, but is caught by HARRY” (30). If this is, as Adams comments, “a play in which women 
function primarily as objects of struggle between men,” it is also a play in which conflict is 
communicated through and over a woman’s body (146). Harry, unable to stand aside any longer, 
trades a series of insults and threats with Tom. Nina pleads with him to relent, but he cannot:  
My blood is up, and I must speak. The liberty of speech is one of the boasted 
pillars of your glorious Constitution. Strike me down for using it, as your Senators 
have done in Washington! Strike me down—trample on me! heap blow on blow! 
Yet shall my voice be heard ringing in your ears, liberty, liberty! I am a man; the 
same Heaven is over us—the same power that made us both, now looks down on 
us.33 (31) 
Harry speaks, and stands up, for himself. Nina had previously, and without knowing it, 
interrupted his speech; now, she—or, rather, Harry’s righteous outrage at Tom’s violence against 
her—incites it. At the end of this speech, Tom “rushes on HARRY to strike him. HARRY wrests 
whip from him, and hurls him down—he raises an arm, draws pistol, is about to fire.” But before 
Harry can commit an irrevocable act of violence, Dred breaks in to redirect the scene’s fury, just 
as he had previously arose when Harry was at his most desperate: “Thunder bolt strikes behind 
                                                
33 Part of the ambiguous power of this speech stems from the still tacit fact that Harry, Tom, and 
Nina are siblings. 
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window, with loud crash. Red fire, and DRED appears holding a bleeding negro, his throat all 
bloody in his arms. Dred. (Points to TOM.) The blood of thy slave cries vengeance! And shall 
have it, I swear!” (30). 
 Dred, finally, withdraws its support from labor abolitionism. These moments of black and 
white solidarity, elsewhere deflected and displaced, are expunged from the culture whose 
impotency at dealing with an increasingly violent mob called them into being and whose 
existence they defended. The culture contains these elements through the expulsion of some, and 
the promotion of others. Dred and Tom, who were the most threatening characters, are so equally 
matched that they cancel each other out. Harry takes his rightful place in the family. And Cipher, 
that other educated outlaw, is rewarded with a new class position. 
 Harry and Lissette escape, with the help of Cipher and Dred, to the swamp. Tom 
summons his underlings and makes chase. The stage for the showdown is set: 
Swamp by moonlight. DRED on the path, leading in HARRY and LISSETTE; 
OLD TIFF and the children, looking toward them as they reach the stage; TOM is 
seen on the path. TOM fires at DRED; DRED staggers—recovers himself—fires 
his gun; TOM, with a wild cry, elevates his arm, and falls back into the swamp. 
(44) 
Here, as with the earlier fight between Cipher, Harry, and Tom, black violence is justified to the 
extent that it is retributive. With a bullet each kills the other. But whereas Tom disappears into 
the swamp, not leaving a trace,—he “falls back,” or backward,—here it also seems as if he’s 
returning there, as if the swamp were the source of all violence, regardless of race. Dred, unlike 
Tom, gets a last word: 
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(Staggers—falls, centre.) Harry, I meant to use you in deeds of blood, to set the 
black man free; but ‘tis not so decreed—other means must work out Heaven’s 
will. Blood has been shed enough—shed no more—your greatest enemy is 
removed. Be patient, if made to suffer; Heaven will, in its own good time, set all 
free. (44) 
Dred, who at one point voiced his dependence on Harry, now claims he only meant to use him. 
Heaven, which earlier seemed to support agitation, is summoned as a justification for inaction. 
(The passive construction of “‘tis so decreed” stresses this.) And though the nature of the “other 
means” to achieve freedom is left unstated, Clayton will soon step in to repropose his plan to 
educate his slaves. “Blood has been shed” equally drains the outrage out of the situation, as it 
covers up the fact that the blood-shedding has been pretty one-sided,34 while the imperative 
“shed no more” puts future responsibility onto the former victims. In classically melodramatic 
fashion, villainy is so personalized that the destruction of “your greatest enemy”—though Dred 
is speaking to Harry, the ambiguity of the pronoun lets us imagine Dred is apostrophizing a 
larger audience (including Barnum’s) about the one he once called “the scourge of our race” 
(32)—so seemingly removes what is in Stowe a diffused, societal menace. But, again, the 
passive grammatical construction of the sentence—why does Dred fail to take credit for 
something he’s just done?—draws our attention to the fact that the other enemy to stability and 
what may have been the most worrisome aspect of the play to an audience unfamiliar with seeing 
such emphatic displays of black rage—Dred himself—is about to expire. Dred’s final words 
echo Milly’s injunction “to ben before de wind”—her resignation that “dere’s no use talkin’ 
about rights … we must all do what we ken” (33; emphasis in the original). His assertion of an 
                                                
34 In the play, Dred runs away from his master. In the novel, he kills him. The only act of black-
on-white violence in Conway’s Dred is Harry’s “hurl[ing]” Tom to the ground. 
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unspecific time of justice also prepares us for the reintroduction of the play’s gradualist agenda. 
Dred, ironically, renounces the vital significance of black agency to the practicability of such a 
policy. 
 Cipher had commented that his aim in ciphering out Southern society was not personal 
gain, or, rather, that that was not his primary objective. He had confessed to Nina and Clayton 
that “I may go back home with my pockets empty; but if my heart is full of the knowledge that I 
have defended the innocent, and succored the oppressed, I shall go home happy (37). After he’s 
foiled Tom’s plans, he reiterates this sentiment: “Though I have made nothing by law, I have a 
prouder satisfaction than slapping a full pocket. I can slap a full heart, and say I have, at least, 
done justice” (46). Nina stops him right as he is about to “put for hum”: 
Stay! Clayton: you, as my husband; and, Harry, you, as my manager; I ask, is it 
not your intention, as well as mine, to administer to all on the plantation justice? 
(HARRY and CLAYTON bow.) 
NINA. Then, if Mr. Cipher Cute will undertake that administration, as my legal 
adviser, he shall not find us unjust in our requital. 
CIPHER. ‘Nuff said. I’m located. (46) 
Judie Newman is only half correct when she remarks that, in Dred, “the white northern man wins 
a victory for his own class and ethnic group” (126). As Cipher’s choice of words indicates, his 
locatedness refers both to his new occupation and to his new sectional position. He is now firmly 
located within the Southern economic sphere, where he will work to keep up the plantation 
economy, even if he tries to do so justly. Besides losing his original sectional association, Cipher 
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achieves upward mobility. As Adams writes, “Conway invited Lecture Room patrons to adopt 
Cute’s … views by rewarding him with a trip up the class ladder” (145).35 
 The empowerment and renunciation that mark the play’s treatment of Dred and Cipher 
(and, to a lesser extent, Harry) also operate in the courtship plot that the two make possible. 
Cipher had earlier reminded Nina and Clayton of the urgency of their marriage. He excuses his 
intrusion by reminding them that there is “yet not time for ceremony”—he means in his speech, 
but it will apply to the impossibility of their having a proper wedding—and that “though you are 
not man and wife, yet, still, … you soon must be.” Nina, in short, “can’t no longer be without a 
protector, now your brother Tom’s come out in his true colors” (37). Nina concurs with Cipher’s 
assessment: “Clayton, all reserve must give way under present circumstances. I am indeed in 
need of a protector. I fear my brother; I know him to be violent and revengeful. Should he get 
this estate but for a day, deeds of blood, deeds shocking to think of, would be done.” Her 
property—she worries what will happen to Harry and Lissette—and not herself, if we can make 
that distinction,36 is what really needs protection. Her unorthodox proposal is successful: 
NINA. Give me your protection—your advice—your aid, to prevent so dreadful a 
catastrophe. 
CLAYTON. My services, my life are at your disposal. 
NINA. I accept, and will repay them. 
                                                
35 In assimilating Cipher into middle class society, the play does not erase all traces of what he 
was before. If nothing else, Adams is correct in saying that Cipher would not have been qualified 
to move up in the world if he did not have “the education most southerners lack” (145). It can 
recognize and retain certain elements of their character. Even with his education, for example, he 
maintains the dialect that distinguishes him from Clayton. In much the same way, Harry’s self-
control enables him to enter the middle class, as does his whiteness more generally, which is 
visualized emphatically: Harry appears “dressed in a complete suit of white” (11). 
36 Cipher equates the two when he tells Clayton, “You … have got the right Gordon will; and, 
what’s better, you’ve got the right Gordon gal” (46). 
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CLAYTON. With yourself! 
NINA. I will! (Giving hand.) 
CLAYTON. (Kissing her hand.) Then I have a husband’s right! (38) 
The proposal moves from her order (“Give me…”), to his offer (“at your disposal”), to her 
acceptance and promise (“accept/will repay”), to his question (“with yourself!”), to her assurance 
(“I will!”) and offer (“Giving”), and ends with his appropriation of her (and her property) and 
claim for himself (“Kissing”/“I have”). The confused play of agency between the two—who’s 
proposing to whom?—transforms an unceremonious proposal by Nina—the logical conclusion 
of “as my lord won’t court the girls, the girls all court my lord” (28)—into a traditional assertion 
of a “husband’s right!” of guardianship. Normative gender roles, already threatened by Tom’s 
machinations, are further violated in order to preserve, while reestablishing, the patriarchal order. 
 The play, then, seeks to preserve the society that Stowe saw as in imminent danger of 
succumbing to mobocracy and lynch law. The means to this end include the temporary 
empowerment of educated slaves and workingmen. The final success of the plan depends both 
on the re-placement of these groups (Dred in a grave, Cipher in the slave economy, Harry in the 
family), and the reassertion of the benign, pacifying influence of what were, in the hands of those 
groups, potentially “dangerous weapons” (13)—namely, reading and writing. The continuation 
of liberal slaveholding society requires it. Just as Tom, who blocked Clayton’s first proposal,37 
had to be killed by an educated slave, another one will be instrumental in the culmination of the 
courtship plot. 
                                                
37 CLAYTON. [To Nina.] I have thought of all you said deeply, hopefully, and I would—(takes 
her hand.)  
Tom. (Outside.) Hallo, there! Take my horse, you white nigger, take my horse.   
(CLAYTON retires up to back with UNCLE JOHN.) (29) 
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Uncle John arrives in the last scene “dressed as for a wedding, a Bouquet and white favor 
in his coat,” and announces, not exactly in good faith, that he “came to refuse my consent, and 
command Nina not to have Clayton, without he promises to give up his absurd plan of educating 
his niggers” (45). Nina refutes Uncle John’s claim that Clayton’s plan is “all humbug” (her 
Uncle’s words), by presenting “an apt illustration to the contrary,” that is, Harry: “Where would 
have been my plantation! Ruined, and myself a beggar, had it not been for Harry; and education 
fitted Harry for my manager” (45).38 
In another revision of Stowe, Conway includes in the final scene a public recognition of 
Harry and Nina’s kinship. Harry is legitimated at the same moment Nina and Clayton’s marriage 
is. He is responsible with convincing Uncle John to give his consent.  
HARRY. As Miss Nina’s happiness— 
NINA. Say your sister, Harry. 
(HARRY takes her hand.) 
HARRY. As my sister’s happiness has always been my first care and fondest 
desire, I am anxious that no cloud should mar it at this moment, and as Mr. John 
Gordon— 
UNCLE JOHN. Say uncle, Harry. 
HARRY. As Uncle John Gordon’s prejudices against education remain in a 
measure unanswered, I have prepared a little scene by which they may possibly be 
overcome—when he will consent to, and bless my sister’s union. (48) 
                                                
38 Education, Harry tells them, “properly directed,” will also teach slaves “that which is still of 
more infinite importance … how to manage ourselves” (45). Equated here is property and those 
who would not be chattels personal. 
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Here the fate of political reform and the couple’s marriage are intimately linked. Then, “TOM 
TIT waves his baton—all stand aside—when he waves it up at the curtain at back—which draws 
entirely up, disclosing,”  
GRAND TABLEAUX,  
Transparency, Lettered  
“EDUCATION” 
“LEADS TO PRESENT AMERLIORATION”  
“AND ULTIMATE”  
“LIBERTY.”  
School Children } Figure of GODDESS OF LIBERTY on Pedestal. { School 
Children. 
Uncle John, finally convinced, “joins CLAYTON’S and NINA’S hands.” After this impressive 
combination of text and allegory that ensures the continuation—indeed, the reproduction—of the 
Southern aristocracy, Harry voices his support of the tableau’s message: “When education is 
fully carried into effect, we shall need no more Dreds to protect fugitive slaves—nor read more 
tales of the great Dismal Swamp” (48; emphasis in the original).  
The drama’s moral, spoken by Harry, echoes Clayton’s words to Frank Russell in Act 2: 
“Through the blessings of education, [the slaves] will all be led to ultimate freedom” (17). This 
expression of black agency is in fact preceded, and permitted, by an earlier expression of white 
agency, a move mirrored by Dred rousing Cipher to cipher out the slave South. The final stage 
direction indicates that there is “MUSIC. / Chorus of children at back, as in 2d Act, as / 
CURTAIN DESCENDS.” The children’s earlier song, sung when Clayton first presented them to 
Russell, reads: “The blessings of edu-ca-tion, / The blessings of edu-ca-tion, / Make us happy on 
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mas’rs plan-ta-tion,39 / And carry freedom throughout a nation, / A nation, a na-tion, / And carry 
freedom throughout a nation” (17). The unchanged lyric (“Make us happy on mas’rs plan-ta-
tion”) unintentionally reminds us of the play’s political quietism. Barnum’s audience leaves the 
Lecture Room with an image of children perpetually happy on the plantation. 
Of the two competing discourses on education—Clayton’s and Uncle John’s—only one can 
prevail. Here, education is a gift of white, liberal slaveowners to their property. Dred’s system of 
education takes place off the map. Slaves learn by themselves or in groups, clandestinely. “Make 
us happy on mas’rs plan-ta-tion” has a special resonance in view of the alternative—self-taught, 
educated outlaws. Its very locatedness—on the plantation, under the benevolent gaze of Anne 
and Edward Clayton—its rootedness, that is, within the preexisting social sphere, guarantees its 
safety. Education is brought back into the center now that the outside threats of lynch law and 
rebellion have been cast out. The final scenes of Dred, finally, stage a spectacle that illustrates 
the success of labor abolitionism, while denying its role in the defense and legitimation of 
Southern society. 
 
The first part of this dissertation focused on the uses to which popular modes of 
representation were put: namely, melodrama and blackface minstrelsy. Not all within the 
movement felt that these modes were effective in promoting their cause. The chapter ends by 
detailing one abolitionist’s efforts to expose the violence that lied beneath even the most 
seemingly benign blackface performance. I argue that Martin Delany aimed to defetishize the 
blackface minstrel act by exposing the coercion that went into the supposedly voluntary 
                                                
39 Education is essential to the ultimate emancipation of slaves, though not, it seems, to their 
current contentment. The plays opens with “Plantation negroes, male and female, in their best 
attire” singing: “On Canema plantation / We all is happy and gay” (3). 
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performance of black contentment. Delany relocated the scene of blackface minstrel performance 
away from Northern cultural centers and back to the country’s margins, where the performance 
mode supposedly originated. In Blake, Delany enacts a “true Mississippi scene” that structured 
torture as a coerced performance in order to show that the real danger of spectacle was not in the 
spectator distancing himself from the scene, but in the abused becoming a spectator to his own 
subjection. In fact, a sympathetic white spectator’s intercession in the performance is unable to 
save the performer. If, according to Saidiya Hartman, the black subject’s forced display of 
pleasure masked the violence that went into the production of docile black bodies, Delany stages 
a performance that reveals the punishment that goes into every act of pleasure related to 
blackface minstrelsy. If the history of blackface minstrelsy involves a series of spatial and 
temporal removes to get from the scene of the plantation in the South to the scene of the play in 
the North, Delany condenses these times and spaces, showing that they coexist. Part One of the 
dissertation ends, then, on a skeptical note, with the suggestion that blackface minstrelsy may be 
have been politically irredeemable. 
 
Both the first and the last twenty years of the history and criticism of blackface 
minstrelsy have one thing in common: they focus almost exclusively on the white people who 
were its principal producers and consumers. When recent scholars need a representative early 
African American critic, they usually call on Frederick Douglass, who felt, not surprisingly, deep 
ambivalence toward the performance mode. Though critics have paid careful attention to the role 
people of color played in early accounts of the rise of blackface minstrelsy as whites wrote it, 
there has yet to be sustained attention devoted to early African American accounts of the mode’s 
origins. 
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 This chapter begins this critical project by considering the work of Martin Delany, 
cofounder with Frederick Douglass of The North Star, a Major in the U.S. Colored Troops 
during the Civil War, and, as he is considered by some, the “grandfather” of black nationalism. 
In his fiction, Delany responded to contemporary myths about the development of blackface 
minstrelsy. If white histories of minstrelsy removed the scene of blackface performance from the 
southern plantation to the northern stage, they also suppressed the violence that went into the 
mode’s production. In order to defetishize the blackface minstrel act, Delany historicizes 
blackface performance by staging it as a performance within the context of the slave system. 
Delany, in other words, restores blackface performance to its violent origins in the American 
South. 
 Lott finds that two kinds of white-authored narratives emerged about the origins of 
blackface minstrelsy. The first betrayed a fear of cultural, and by extension, racial, 
amalgamation. Transmission of the mode happened through “absorption”: the white man heard, 
or heard about, a black man that was “displaced and disembodied” (57-58). The second narrative 
“deni[ed] or forg[ot]” the mode’s relationship to “the material relations of chattel slavery” (Lott 
59; Hartman 21): the white man came to possess it through purchase or theft (Lott 57). 
 Hartman observes the affinities between the slave auction platform and the minstrel show 
stage. At both sites, one person’s terror was made to be another’s pleasure (33). At both locations 
were produced representations of contented slaves. On the block and in the coffle, white masters 
compelled black slaves to present themselves as happy and healthy for white spectators. 
Compulsion—in the form of threat and punishment—occurred off-stage, however. As Hartman 
notes, “the efficacity of violence was indicated precisely by its invisibility or transparency and in 
the copious display of slave agency” (25). 
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 Apologists for slavery and minstrelsy, then, both sought to conceal the violence that went 
into each mode’s production. In the sixteenth chapter of Blake, Delany details the visit of a 
northern pro-slavery judge to a southern plantation. The judge’s host tells him, “as you wish to 
become a Southerner, you must first ‘see the sights,’ as children say, and learn to get used to 
them.” The host promises to show “some rare sport; the most amusing thing I ever witnessed.” 
He chooses to withhold specifics, though he suggests that anyone “fond of Negro jokes” will 
enjoy it. The man the host likens to a “showman” affirms that he has “a queer animal” to show 
them (66). The judge and the rest of the party are escorted to the showman’s “pleasure grounds,” 
where the showman orders one of his slaves to fetch Rube, “a small black boy about eleven years 
of age, thin visage, projecting upper teeth, rather ghastly consumptive look, and emaciated 
condition” that “trembled with fear as he approached the group” (66-67).40 What follows is a 
scene that Tavia Nyong’o finds reminiscent of a scene in Uncle Tom’s Cabin in which the slave 
boy Harry dances, at his master’s command, in front of the slave trader that will attempt to 
purchase him (159). What’s being sold here is not a single slave, as in Uncle Tom’s Cabin, but 
the system of slavery itself. The spectacle, we will learn, is meant to introduce the judge to the 
true nature of the slave system. 
Stowe’s reader may miss the way Harry is being forced to participate in his own 
subjection. Delany makes an effort to ensure his readers don’t do the same. 
"Now gentlemen," said [the showman], "I'm going to show you a sight!" having 
in his hand a long whip, the cracking of which he commenced, as a ringmaster in 
the circus. 
                                                
40 The judge is the real “rube” here. 
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The child gave him a look never to be forgotten; a look beseeching mercy and 
compassion. But the decree was made, and though humanity quailed in dejected 
supplication before him, the command was imperative, with no living hand to stay 
the pending consequences. He must submit to his fate, and pass through the ordeal 
of training. 
"Wat maus gwine do wid me now? I know wat maus gwine do," said this 
miserable child, "he gwine make me see sights!" when going down on his hands 
and feet, he commenced trotting around like an animal. (67) 
Two senses of showing/seeing sight come together here. We’re familiar with the first. A local 
guides visitors through notable sites. The second pertains to the kind of experience the local is 
offering—one related to punishment. In the first chapter of his second autobiography, Frederick 
Douglass recalled that his master used this meaning when he threatened that the young Fred 
“will be made to ‘see sights’ by-and-by.” We’re to understand this, I believe, as “I’ll beat you so 
hard you’ll see things.” Given the spectacular nature of slave punishment, it makes sense that 
Delany would land on this phrase. To “show a sight” becomes a euphemism for to “mete out 
pain (in front of an audience).” Rube draws on this meaning and that one in Douglass. Rube 
could have said that his master was going to make a sight out of him, but that would not have 
fully expressed the way the Rube is so alienated from himself that it is as if he were a witness to 
his own subjection. 
 The program the showman has planned, as well as the scene’s power dynamics, is what 
leads me to call this a scene of restored blackface performance: “Now, gentleman, look!" said 
[the showman]. "He'll whistle, sing songs, hymns, pray, swear like a trooper, laugh, and cry, all 
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under the same state of feelings" (67). We can only imagine what that state of feelings is as the 
showman proceeds through each part of the performance:  
With a peculiar swing of the whip, bringing the lash down upon a certain spot on 
the exposed skin, the whole person being prepared for the purpose, the boy 
commenced to whistle almost like a thrush; another cut changed it to a song, 
another to a hymn, then a pitiful prayer, when he gave utterance to oaths which 
would make a Christian shudder, after which he laughed outright. (67)  
Rube is made to cycle through the sentimental and comic strains of antebellum minstrelsy. Each 
shift is precipitated by the same cause—the master’s whip. Then, Delany continues, “from the 
fullness of his soul [Rube] cried: ‘O maussa, I's sick! Please stop little!’ casting up gobs of 
hemorrhage” (67). At this moment, when we may worry that this final outburst is part of the 
master’s plan, Delany inserts one of the text’s few footnotes. It reads: “This is a true Mississippi 
scene” (ibid). Though it may be staged—a scene—Delany commits a rare act of editorial 
intrusion to assure us that it is still true. The text receives affirmation from the note, just as the 
interior of the slave’s body affirms the truth of the slave’s state of feelings. Rube has no agency, 
he is not content. He’s dying. The cruelty that animates the scene is exposed. The master’s final 
lack of control of the slave’s body is announced by the body itself. 
 It’s a harrowing scene. Most of the audience’s reactions are disturbingly banal. One man 
“stood looking on with unmoved muscles.” Another “stood whittling a stick.” But “when [the 
judge] saw, at every cut the flesh turn open in gashes streaming down with gore, till at last in 
agony he appealed for mercy, he involuntarily found his hand with a grasp on the whip, arresting 
its further application” (67). The first pronoun is ambiguous—who appeals, the boy or the judge? 
Even if the second pronoun is unambiguous, its referent is only a partial, if apparently 
 83 
 
efficacious, agent. The host’s response makes it clear that, at least in his mind, the judge has 
been the center of attention all along: “‘Not quite a Southerner yet Judge, if you can't stand that!’ 
said [the host] on seeing him wiping away the tears” (ibid). The “ordeal of training” has been the 
judge’s all along. 
 Despite the judge’s sympathetic response, Rube dies. Douglass had felt that blackface 
minstrelsy had the potential to be politically expedient. He believed that certain blackface 
performances could raise sympathy for the slave, and that that was better than nothing.41 Delany 
is not so sure. His history, finally, is a critique. Given its origins and continuing, if invisible, 
connection to the violence of slavery, regardless of the sympathy it could gain for the enslaved, 
blackface minstrelsy was irredeemable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
41 In the 1855 speech “The Anti-Slavery Movement,” Douglass said: “It would seem almost 
absurd to say it, considering the use that has been made of them, that we have allies in the 
Ethiopian songs; those songs that constitute our national music, and without which we have no 
national music. They are heart songs, and the finest feelings of human nature are expressed in 
them. ‘Lucy Neal,’ ‘Old Kentucky Home,’ and ‘Uncle Ned,’ can make the heart sad as well as 
merry, and can call forth a tear as well as a smile. They awaken the sympathies for the slave, in 
which antislavery principles take root, grow, and flourish.” 
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Chapter Three 
Sympathy and Douglass’s The North Star 
 
The antislavery platform was built on two texts: the Declaration of Independence and the 
New Testament. The Golden Rule—“Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should 
do to you, do ye even so to them”—alone was “Christianity,” was, indeed, “abolitionism” 
(Matthew 7:12; Clark; “A Colored Canadian” 5 May 1854). Americans needed only to “be 
TRUE” to it and they would feel and do right. Black and white activists alike agreed on the 
importance of “the self-application mode of reasoning” (The Colored American; Gerrit Smith): 
“The world is able to bear the doctrine of Christ; but nothing would convulse it so soon or so 
profoundly as this day to insist upon the utmost practical fulfilment of that doctrine” (Beecher 
Discourse 19). It required a willingness to figuratively and, if necessary, literally change places 
with another. You must first, one of them said, “be content to wear the chains of slavery 
yourself, ere you are at liberty to commend them to others” (Gerrit Smith). Then, “and then 
only,” said another, “can he, without doing violence to his moral perceptions, take advantage of 
the law, and subject his horse and his brother to the same arbitrary rule, and hold both by the title 
of ‘chattels personal, to all intents and purposes, whatsoever’” (Whittier). The demand to “treat 
colored men as you would have them to treat you, were your circumstances changed with theirs” 
was made in a radical conditional tense (The Colored American). The question, posed by a 
contributor to the first African American newspaper, “If you were a slave, what would you wish 
me to do for you?,” therefore, did not mark the start of a theoretical exercise, but a political 
practice (Freedom’s Journal). 
Matthew 7:12 was “a law so substantially general” that one might think it “impossible to 
misapply” (The North Star 20 Mar. 1851). But the author of the following did just that: “All that 
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is taught by this counsel of Christ is, that the master should treat his slaves just as he would have 
them to treat him if circumstances were reversed, and he, a negro slave to one of them. Of course 
he would have his master to treat him the very best that could be under all the circumstances” 
(Bell 317). He interpreted the text to state that masters were only “morally bound to treat their 
slaves the very best that all the circumstances would allow, by giving them good wholesome 
food sufficient for their real wants, with comfortable clothing, and never to put on them more 
than they can bear without injury, and not to injure them in any way whatsoever. When he has 
done this, he has fulfilled this law so far as the law of master and slaves is concerned” (Bell 318). 
Slave law, in other words, is the higher law. The author rejected emancipation because blacks 
were as incapable to be free as whites were to be enslaved: “The relations of men are not to be 
changed to fulfill this divine precept” (Bell 318). And why not? To the author, “master” and 
“slave” are racialized terms. When he changes places with the “negro slave,” he also changes 
races. The race of his new “master” remains unstated, as if it were too terrible, or impossible, to 
imagine an African American in a position of power. The system of ‘care’ the author deems 
essential to the “real wants” of black people—the same system that antislavery activists were 
fighting to abolish—shows just how helpless he thought they were. Those active in the 
Underground Railroad, who would “steal a man from his legal owner, … run[] him into a climate 
that is not congenial to his nature, and leave[] him there to starve and die,” were, in the author’s 
opinion, men-stealers, tyrants, and murderers (Bell 319). Among these he counted Harriet 
Tubman, who committed “a diabolical act of wickedness” toward her parents by freeing them 
(Bell 323). The author calls Tubman “wretched [and] hard-hearted” as well as “deluded” (Bell 
325, 327). He is so convinced of the lack of agency of black people that he insists that she was 
not responsible for what she did. 
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Though it may be difficult to accept, the author of the above does sympathize with the slave. He 
did so while opening himself up to a common criticism of sympathy: He is, in a certain way, too 
self-centered, not enough other-oriented. As a writer for The North Star observed, the Golden 
Rule makes “no provision … for color or degree of intellectual capacity” (2 Nov. 1849). His 
unwillingness to let go of white supremacist thinking, to leave his character behind with his 
person, leads a writer for Frederick Douglass’ Paper to conclude that “this divine and all 
comprehensive rule being no longer of any authority with them, because uncompromisingly 
oppose[d] to their prejudices, their pride, and unholy purposes, I regard them as incorrigible, and 
beyond the reach of argument” (24 June 1853). Abolitionists, then, became more willing to use 
force. But that did not mean that they abandoned persuasive tactics altogether. The author of the 
above refused to put his person in the slave’s place. The author of the following suggested that 
that might be the only way to win sympathy and converts for the cause: “I am fully persuaded 
that the only way that such men could be convinced of the enormities of slavery would be to 
apply the iron to their own limbs, and the lash to their own backs, until they could ‘remember 
those in bonds as bound with them’” (Parsons 312).42 
While I share previous critics’ disapproval of how sympathy often worked, we have for 
too long ignored the potential it might have had to work for antislavery, antiracist purposes. Just 
as political abolitionists used the nation’s founding documents according to the texts’ own 
“righteous language” and against the “unrighteous intentions” of others, they also used the 
Golden Rule in such a way that demonstrated that sympathy was a dynamic process that could 
bring about radical change (“Declaration”). 
                                                
42 He was not the only one. Responding to “a lady who observed that the time had not yet come 
for agitating the subject” of slavery, Angelina Grimké “answered: ‘I apprehend if thou wert a 
slave, toiling in the fields of Carolina, thou wouldst think the time had fully come” (qtd. in Child 
17). 
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“Slavery,” as William Wells Brown once said, “has never been represented; Slavery 
never can be represented” (“Lecture” 108). Even the slave could not speak of it, Frederick 
Douglass said, because he or she could not speak: “There comes no voice from the enslaved. We 
are left to gather his feelings by imagining what ours would be, were our souls in his stead” (My 
Bondage 423). There came no voice because they had no access to the technologies of speech 
and print that could make them audible at a distance. Former slaves like Brown and Douglass did 
not need to be reminded to remember those still in bonds. Brown could not think of slavery 
without being “carried back” to the days his mother and siblings were “carried off” (“Lecture” 
127). The act of remembering alone was enough to transport him back to those who were 
themselves transported. Douglass could not consider his current situation without having “the 
grim horrors of slavery rise in all their ghastly terror before me” (“To My Old Master”). Former 
slaves could speak to the experience of slavery because of the fellowship they felt, as Brown 
said, with the “three millions of my brethren and sisters, with some of whom I am identified by 
the dearest ties of nature, and with most of whom I am identified by the scars which I carry upon 
my back” (“Lecture” 107-8). Shared bonds and shared bondage allowed and required Brown and 
Douglass to sympathize with and agitate for the enslaved. But what they held in common could 
hold off others from identifying with them. For a free person, the experience of being enslaved 
was unimaginable. The problem was that one had no other option but to imagine it. In The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith recognized that sympathetic identification had its 
limits. Without “immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the 
manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like 
situation” (Smith Theory 13). Through sympathy, “we enter as it were into [the other’s] body, 
and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his 
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sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike 
them. … We change places in fancy,” though not in fact (Smith Theory 13-14). Because “the real 
condition of the Slave” could not be represented, those attempting to gain sympathy for the slave 
were forced to approximate (Brown “Lecture” 108). These approximations often took the form 
of a narrative with which the sympathizer was familiar, like the Bible. Or the slave’s situation 
would be made to appear more like the sympathizer’s own, as when abolitionists filled their texts 
with white slaves and appeals to ‘universal’ forms of experience. 
Given how sympathy worked in practice, it should come as no surprise that a critical 
consensus has formed over the last twenty years around the idea that sympathy has a problematic 
relationship to difference. Abolitionism’s model of sympathetic identification, according to 
Elizabeth Barnes, is a “peculiarly egocentric” one “contingent upon familiarity” (97). Following 
Glenn Hendler, Marianne Noble observes that sympathy creates a “presumption that one’s own 
subject position is the universal norm” (Masochistic 223 n. 11). Privileging the self’s necessarily 
limited experience poses a problem to the other. Requiring the other to modify his or her 
experience into a form the sympathizer will recognize puts the other in an even more precarious 
position than he or she previously occupied. Smith describes, in Julia Stern’s words, the 
“reflexive workings of human fellow feeling,” but without a reciprocal move from the self, “the 
sympathizer extends agency over the sufferer, while the latter controls only himself or herself” 
(Stern 204; Castiglia 124). In necessitating familiar models for the sympathizer, Dana Nelson 
explains, “sympathy assumes sameness in a way that can prevent an understanding of the very 
real, material differences that structure human experience in a society based upon unequal 
distribution of power” (142; her emphasis). In fact, the process reproduces that unequal 
distribution of power. As Christopher Castiglia realizes, “sympathy affectively naturalizes social 
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hierarchy” (124). African Americans are thus made dependent on white Americans. This kind of 
interaction reflected a “paternalistic ethics” that “required the strong to care for the weak,” which 
was considered, as Gregg Crane points out, “the ethical basis of slavery” (65). 
Most critiques of abolitionist uses of sympathy have been articulated in examinations of 
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Exchanges like that between Eliza Harris, Stowe’s 
light-skinned heroine, and her sympathizers have lead critics to charge acts of sympathy with 
being motivated by selfish feelings. Eliza flees North with her son, Harry, when she learns that 
he has been sold to a slave trader. In her passage through Ohio, she comes upon the home of a 
Senator Bird and his wife, moments after they were discussing the Fugitive Slave Law. Eliza 
wins Mrs. Bird over when, after noticing that she is “dressed in deep mourning,” guesses 
correctly that she has lost a child, and appeals to her as a fellow mother (72).43 The bereaved 
mother bursts into tears and pledges her aid. The senator, who had been previously unmoved by 
publicized accounts of slave experience, “had never thought that a fugitive might be a hapless 
mother, a defenceless child,—like that one which was now wearing his lost boy's little well-
known cap” (77). Seeing her in this familiar (and familial) light, the senator goes against his 
previous position on helping fugitives. 
Stowe’s narrator repeats Eliza’s appeal to her readership: “By the sick hour of your child; 
by those dying eyes, which you can never forget; by those last cries, that wrung your heart when 
you could neither help nor save; by the desolation of that empty cradle, that silent nursery,—I 
beseech you, pity those mothers that are constantly made childless by the American slave-trade!” 
(79) The latter appeal especially approaches what Saidiya Hartman calls a “narcissistic 
identification that obliterates the other,” in which the other’s suffering is forgotten, or only 
                                                
43 When Mrs. Bird answers that she has lost a child, Eliza replies, “Then you will feel for me.”  
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appreciated to the extent that it resembles one’s own (4). Like the Birds, Stowe knew too well 
the pain of losing a child. In a letter to Eliza Cabot Follen, Stowe wrote that “[i]t was at [her 
son’s] dying bed and at his grave that [she] learned what a poor slave mother may feel when her 
child is torn away from her” (qtd. in Hedrick 444).44 But separation through sickness and slavery 
were not the same. Slavery may have resembled sickness in how it spread or how it struck, but 
its causes did not. The metaphor gives the impression that we are powerless to stop slavery’s 
progress, though the novel’s free and enslaved people of color, Quakers, and other right-feeling 
whites prove otherwise. The most troubling part of this episode is the suggestion that the free 
might only be able to access feeling for the enslaved through their own feelings, that anything 
resembling true sympathy could only occur between identical subjects with the same 
experiences, that, in other words, the only pity is self-pity (Bentley 284). 
Smith anticipated the charge that sympathy is motivated by self-love rather than fellow 
feeling. He recognized that “it may be pretended, indeed, that my emotion is founded in self-
love, because it arises from bringing your case home to myself, from putting myself in your 
situation, and thence conceiving what I should feel in the like circumstances.” Still, Smith 
maintains that “sympathy is very properly said to arise from an imaginary change of situations 
with the person principally concerned, yet this imaginary change is not supposed to happen to me 
in my own person and character, but in that of the person with whom I sympathize” (373). Smith 
argues that our own limited experience of other forms of existence leads us to defer to the other. 
When I condole with you for the loss of your only son, in order to enter into your 
grief I do not consider what I, a person of such a character and profession, should 
                                                
44 In Stowe’s defense, she never claims equivalence of feeling (“may feel”) and her sorrow led 
her to act for others: “I felt that I could never be consoled for it unless this crushing of my own 
heart might enable me to work out some great good to others” (444). 
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suffer, if I had a son, and if that son was unfortunately to die: but I consider what I 
should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with you, 
but I change persons and characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your 
account, and not in the least upon my own. (373) 
It remains a possibility that the case may hit the spectator too close to home, especially when the 
two experiences, regardless of their real differences, resemble one another in some particular. 
Eliza appeals to Mrs. Bird because she too knows the reality of losing a child. Eliza appeals to 
Senator Bird because she’s a wife and a mother. In both cases, Eliza frames her suffering, or her 
suffering is framed, in terms her sympathizers can relate to. And it works—the Birds help Eliza 
and Harry on their way.45 But in the process, something of Eliza’s experience is lost. The Birds 
do not grieve entirely upon Eliza’s account, but upon their own as well. Appeals based on a 
‘universal’ quality like parenthood or bereavement elide other equally determinate aspects of 
one’s identity. It is conceivable that a person who needed sympathy but whose experience did 
not, or could not be adequately made to, resemble her sympathizers would have to do without it. 
Recent scholars elaborate early African American critiques of sympathy’s problematic 
relation to difference. In Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, for example, Harriet Jacobs 
emphatically resists facile identifications that privilege the sympathizer’s experience. After 
describing her reunion with her son after many years of forced separation, Jacobs asks her female 
readership, “O reader, can you imagine my joy? No, you cannot, unless you have been a slave 
mother” (222). Jacobs consistently denies her readers identification on the basis of partially 
shared experience. Ideally, sympathy would always involve the kind of “vacillat[ion] between 
moments of identification and distantiation” that Jacobs exercised, though more often than not 
                                                
45 Noble may be the only critic that sees this as an act of expediency on Eliza’s part. 
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this was not the case (Weinstein 192 n.5).46 However much Jacobs resists placing her white 
readers at the center of the sympathetic situation, she still has to, at least temporarily. African 
American writers especially understood the necessity of this gesture. So they insisted on the 
difference of their experience while putting whites in a situation in which they could feeling 
something like it. 
 
Douglass imagined such a confrontation in his only piece of fiction, “The Heroic Slave,” 
a fictionalized account of the life of Madison Washington, who started a slave revolt on the 
Creole in 1841. In the first three parts of the story, Washington is overheard and helped to escape 
by a white Northerner predisposed to the abolitionist cause. The uprising on ship is not 
recounted. Instead, in the fourth and final part of the story, the ship’s first mate, who is stridently 
antiabolitionist, narrates the revolt. Washington impresses the mate with his actions. Gore had 
called Douglass an “impudent rascal.” Tom Grant reports Washington’s speech upon taking over 
the Creole. Afterward, Grant inserts this comment: “I felt little disposition to reply to this 
impudent speech. By heaven, it disarmed me. The fellow loomed up before me. I forgot his 
                                                
46 Cindy Weinstein argues that abolitionist authors were more aware of the problems of 
sympathy than critics have given them credit for. I disagree with her argument as it applies to 
Stowe because, unlike Jacobs, her moments of identification and distantiation are far removed 
from each other. That being said, Stowe should perhaps be given more credit than she has. There 
are moments within the novel that she maintains the distance between the experiences of slavery 
and freedom. When Eva overhears Dinah and Aunt Ophelia speak of the death of Prue, a long-
suffering slave, “her large, mystic eyes dilated with horror, and every drop of blood [was] driven 
from her lips and cheeks.” Dinah notices her reaction, and worries out loud that Eva will faint: 
“‘I shan’t faint, Dinah,’ said the child, firmly; ‘and why shouldn’t I hear it? It ain’t so much for 
me to hear it, as for poor Prue to suffer it” (200). Eva, unlike so many of her elders, is able to 
maintain perspective. And, earlier in the novel, after Eliza first learns that her son is to be sold, 
the narrator asks: “If it were your Harry, mother, or your Willie, that were going to be torn from 
you by a brutal trader, tomorrow morning,—if you had seen the man, and heard that the papers 
were signed and delivered, and you had only from twelve o'clock till morning to make good your 
escape,—how fast could you walk?” (46) 
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blackness in the dignity of his manner, and the eloquence of his speech” (161). Washington’s 
words, and threat of violence, are enough to control Grant and the other white sailors. Gabrielle 
Foreman writes that Douglass is “more rhetorically invested in conversion than coercion” (153). 
Washington does both. Not every white man will be as predisposed to conversion as Listwell, 
who “had long desired to sound the mysterious depths of the thoughts and feelings of a slave” 
(134). Noble argues that Grant is open to transformation (“Sympathetic” 12). I argue that he is 
unwilling to change until he has no choice.47 
Noble writes that Douglass’s work “reveal[s] the need for a dialogic rather than corporeal 
notion of sympathy” (“Sympathetic” 67-68). She admits that “honor” and “respect” are, to 
Douglass, “the necessary foundation of true sympathy” (“Sympathetic” 63). But how does a 
slave win the white man’s respect?48 Noble continues: “Honorable actions draw the attention of 
an onlooker inward to character traits more true to that individual than those indicated by the 
physical body” (“Sympathetic” 63). So, with Grant, Noble claims that “Washington's speech and 
actions momentarily inspire the mate to forget about color; they make him conscious of the 
interior of a man whose blackness becomes merely superficial” (“Sympathetic” 60). She quotes 
the part of Grant’s testimony in which he admits that he forgot Washington’s “blackness,” but 
                                                
47 Furthermore, as Sale has noted, “by simultaneously considering Washington superior and 
inferior, Grant reveals the illogic of his perspective. This undermining of the mate’s perspective 
enables readers to reach their own conclusions and challenges them to agree with Douglass” 
(242-43 n. 25). 
48 This is especially a problem in a culture that believed, as Chief Justice Roger Taney would 
enunciate in the majority opinion of Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), that blacks were “beings of 
an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political 
relations, and so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”	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leaves out the detail that Washington “loomed up before” him (ibid). Washington’s “manner” 
(i.e., his physicality) and his “speech” impress Grant.49 
Noble contrasts Douglass’s valorization of “listening and speaking” over showing “visual 
signs of physical suffering,” a strategy that she associates with Stowe (“Sympathetic” 54). 
Douglass seeks, Noble argues, to move away from “the magic of the real presence of distress”—
that is, the palpable distress of the slave—as a precondition for whites to sympathize with and act 
for slaves (Stowe qtd. in Noble “Sympathetic” 59). In “The Heroic Slave,” unwilling 
sympathizers are moved to respect the slave partly through being themselves put into a position 
of distress. Noble argues that “the development in whites of an antislavery position occurs 
slowly in this story, and in response to speech and action, not suffering” (“Sympathetic” 59). She 
means the slave’s suffering. I hold that suffering does come into play—the white man’s own.50  
Jeannine DeLombard, like Foreman, Noble, Robyn Wiegman, and Herman Beavers, 
argues that Douglass’s goal is to shake off “the drag of the body.”51 Only DeLombard and 
Wiegman recognize the futility of this enterprise.52 But the body—of the slave and of the 
abolitionist, as well—has a place in Douglass’s plan. In the antebellum United States, a 
privileged embodiment was only accessible to people of a certain social standing. Ralph Waldo 
                                                
49 In the next chapter, I consider at more length the link between voice and gesture in vocal 
performance. 
50 As the latter half of this chapter will show, Washington forces Grant into the same position 
that Douglass did to Auld in his letter. 
51 DeLombard is quoting Sidonie Smith (17). 
52 Cf. Wiegman: “The shift from voice to corporeal visibility in the early pages of the narrative—
and the movement back to dis-corporation provided by Tom Grant’s testimonial to Washington’s 
heroism and eloquent speech—demonstrates the paradoxes of representational presence that 
accompany the black slave into literary identity” (75) and DeLombard: “Rather than portraying 
Douglass as a transparent eyeball, through which to witness vicariously the violence of Southern 
slavery, or an unencumbered voice, from which to hear testimony about the ‘peculiar institution,’ 
Douglass’s white contemporaries persistently train their own gazes on his body, focusing on its 
‘physical proportion and stature’ and its ‘erect form’; in this context, Douglass’s ‘glistening eye’ 
and even his ‘deep-toned voice’ become recorporealized” (271). 
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Emerson, who wrote in Nature on the faculty of vision, imagines transcendence for these people 
as a form of spectatorship released from bodily concerns. Emerson is able to divide the universe 
into “Soul” and “Nature”—the “Me” and “NOT ME”—and, in effect, divide his mind from his 
body (and everything else) because his body is protected by the state. Emerson famously 
imagines himself in the woods, where, “[s]tanding on the bare ground,—my head bathed in the 
blithe air and uplifted into infinite space,—all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent 
eyeball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am 
part or parcel of God” (39). But rather than view him as a “[u]nique, unitary, unencumbered … 
self [that] escapes all forms of embodiment,” as Sidonie Smith has characterized the universal 
subject (6), we must recognize that embodiment is only an encumbrance when the self is not 
white, male, and propertied. To argue that Emerson is “released from the constraints of physical 
embodiment [as well as] from … the capitalist property and labor relations,” as DeLombard does 
(248), is to forget that Emerson’s position in race, gender, and class hierarchies allow him to 
transcend bodily concern. In fact, Emerson does not transcend these relations. He enjoys his 
already privileged position. Emerson is not “unimpeded” by corporeality, but to threats to his 
body (DeLombard 251). He recognizes as much. In those Northern woods, he “feel[s] that 
nothing can befall me in life,—no disgrace, no calamity (leaving me my eyes), which nature 
cannot repair” (39; emphasis added). In this moment, Emerson’s transcendence is made possible 
by his secure position. He can forget that he is part of the same field of force he sees because it 
operates in his favor without bothering to remind him of it.  
Douglass, on the other hand, “can never be transparent in the sense of being released 
from materiality or corporeality” (DeLombard 251-52) because his life as a person of color does 
not release him from the vicissitudes of embodiment. Emerson’s virtual disembodiment is as 
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“organic and therefore radically contingent” as Douglass’s embodied subjectivity (DeLombard 
256). The difference between them is that Emerson’s privileged embodiment creates the fantasy 
that, because it’s never made to feel its own vulnerability, it can partake of the power and 
authority of God. Douglass’s precarious embodiment incessantly reminds him that he is a body 
surrounded by others that may challenge, or care for, his own. Realizing that “the gaze is not the 
product of a stable position, a clearly defined and unchanging ‘place’ or subjectivity … it is a 
process of struggle for power,” Douglass sets out in his writing to show that the spectator’s 
position is not unassailable (Straub 18). His goal is to disprove Emerson’s assertion that “whilst 
the world is spectacle, something in himself is stable” (65). 
 
The burden of sympathy, then, rested on those who needed it most. Northern audiences 
could read about and listen to the experiences of Southern slaves and be unmoved from their 
privileged position. On the page or the platform, former or current slaves remained in their 
precarious one. Frederick Douglass endeavored to reverse these positions, to enact and expose 
the precarity of the spectator’s privilege. In “The Heroic Slave,” Douglass created a model of 
sympathy that focused on the experience of both spectator and spectacle. Before, sympathy 
resulted in a bodily experience for the sympathizer, but the sympathizer’s body was ignored in 
the process that led up to it. Now, the spectator’s bodily experience of the situation was what 
brought sympathy about. Douglass emphasizes the spectacle’s effect on the spectator’s body. If, 
according to Douglass, “to understand, some one has said a man must stand under,” then the 
spectator will understand the spectacle only once the former has stood under the latter’s 
influence (Bondage 161; his emphasis). 
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Douglass comments elsewhere that “[a] man, without force, is without the essential 
dignity of humanity. Human nature is so constituted, that it cannot honor a helpless man, 
although it can pity him; and even this it cannot do long, if the signs of power do not arise” 
(Bondage 140; his emphasis). In his own decisive struggle with the slave breaker Covey, 
Douglass recounted another moment in which a show of force detracted from an awareness of 
race: “The fighting madness had come upon me, and I found my strong fingers firmly attached to 
the throat of my cowardly tormentor; as heedless of consequences, at the moment, as though we 
stood as equals before the law. The very color of the man was forgotten” (283). In this situation, 
the color of both men—and both are men, as this is the scene in which Douglass narrates “how a 
slave was made a man”—is forgotten. Douglass forgets that the punishment for a black man who 
attacks a white man is higher than intraracial violence. In this moment, both are irrelevant. 
Douglass brought this willful irrelevance into his career as a newspaper editor, as well as in his 
fictional and autobiographical work. His strategy of forcing an unsympathizing white man into a 
sympathetic situation dates back to at least 1848. 
 
On the tenth anniversary of his self-emancipation, Douglass published a letter to his 
former master, Thomas Auld, in The North Star, the newspaper he had founded the previous year 
with the promise that “we shall stand in our paper as we have ever stood on the platform …Our 
views written shall accord with our views spoken” (3 Dec. 1847). The letter has received 
minimal critical attention, even though Douglass considered it important enough to include in the 
appendix to his second autobiography, My Bondage and My Freedom, alongside “What to the 
Slave is the Fourth of July?” and other speeches. In “To My Old Master,” Douglass employs the 
sympathetic appeal and the public letter itself to accomplish a change in positions between 
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himself and Auld. Douglass begins by switching places with his former master and ends by 
eliminating any difference in position at all. Douglass’ reversal was interpreted as a leveling 
gesture that threatened to overturn the nation’s racial and sexual orders. 
A footnote to the letter in My Bondage and My Freedom claims that “[i]t is not often that 
chattels address their owners. The following letter is unique, and probably the only specimen of 
the kind extant” (Autobiographies 412). Whatever claim to truth this had in 1848, it was not the 
case in 1855. At least three other well-known fugitives wrote letters to their former masters and 
had them published in the interim. Like Douglass’s, they were all originally composed far from 
the U.S. South. William Wells Brown’s and Ellen Craft’s letters were written in England, Henry 
Bibb’s in Canada. But their awareness of the risk of recapture did nothing to soften the tone of 
their letters. Douglass’s letter wasn’t the only one in the antebellum period to compare the 
former slave’s change of situation in relation to their former master.53 Brown urges his master to 
imagine himself in the slave’s position: “You are a husband:—I ask you then to treat the wives 
of your slaves as you would have your own companion dealt with. You are a father:—I ask you, 
therefore, to treat the children of your slaves as you would have your legitimate offspring 
treated.” The Rev. J. W. Loguen challenges his mistress to consider herself in relation to others: 
“Have you got to learn that human rights are mutual and reciprocal, and if you take my liberty 
and life, you forfeit your own liberty and life?” (Douglass et al). Douglass shares with these 
letters a critique of religion, a demand for sympathy and action, and the discourse of equal rights. 
His letter differs in the degree to which he is willing to be aggressive. To speak publicly while 
still a fugitive was a bold move, one each of these authors was already accustomed to. Douglass 
also risked playing into the popular prejudice that black masculinity was violent and sexual. 
                                                
53 Douglass’s wasn’t even the only one to invoke the Golden Rule: Bibb chastises his master and 
his church for failing to abide by the doctrine. 
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Douglass begins by foregrounding “[t]he long and intimate, though by no means friendly, 
relation which unhappily subsisted between” himself and Auld. This former relation was 
exemplified by the last time their two names were “coupled” in newsprint, “in an advertisement, 
accurately describing my person and offering a large sum for my arrest.” Douglass acknowledges 
that he is taking “a great liberty” in addressing Auld: “In thus dragging you again before the 
public, I am aware that I shall subject myself to no inconsiderable amount of censure.” He knew 
that he will “probably be charged with an unwarrantable, if not a wanton and reckless disregard 
of the rights and proprieties of private life.” Those who would take offense to Douglass’s letter 
tended to “entertain a much higher respect for rights which are merely conventional, than they do 
for rights which are personal and essential.” Regardless of the misdirected anger of those who, 
“while they have no scruples against robbing the laborer of the hard earned results of his patient 
industry, will be shocked by the extremely indelicate manner of bringing your name before the 
public,” Douglass pledges to “frankly state the ground upon which I justify myself in this 
instance, as well as on former occasions when I have thought proper to mention your name in 
public.”54 His immediate concern, then, is defending his right to write. 
All will agree that a man guilty of theft, robbery, or murder, has forfeited the right 
to concealment and private life; that the community have a right to subject such 
persons to the most complete exposure. However much they may desire 
retirement, and aim to conceal themselves and their movements from the popular 
gaze, the public have a right to ferret them out, and bring their conduct before the 
proper tribunals of the country for investigation. 
                                                
54 In fact, Douglass had spoken of Auld in numerous speeches before and after the publication of 
his Narrative in 1845. See Blassingame. 
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Douglass ends this paragraph by telling Auld that he will “indulge in language which may seem 
to others indirect and ambiguous, and yet be quite well understood by yourself.” Douglass’s list 
of crimes is an example of Douglass speaking in a language that would be more readily 
understood by his abolitionist peers. Theft, robbery, and murder were common charges that 
abolitionists leveled at slaveowners. The idea of private life being attacked was also a common 
one to abolitionists. Slaves did not have a right to private life. Douglass begins by comparing 
slaves to their owners. It is the latter that deserve the treatment that the former are too often 
exposed to. But Douglass’s current treatment of Auld differs from Auld’s past treatment of him 
in that it’s defensible. Whereas the justification for Douglass’s treatment was unjust—Douglass 
was guilty of “the alleged crime of intending to escape from [Auld’s] possession”—Auld’s 
treatment is justified. Douglass defends “the morality of the act”—he means of running away, 
but the same holds in writing a public letter: “I am myself; you are yourself; we are two distinct 
persons, equal persons. What you are, I am. You are a man, and so am I. God created both, and 
made us separate beings.” The equality that Douglass posits is substantiated here on the level of 
syntax. The discursive violence of Douglass’s “dragging” someone before the public recalls 
Auld’s physical violence: “You well know that I wear stripes on my back, inflicted by your 
direction; and that you, while we were brothers in the same church, caused this right hand, with 
which I am now penning this letter, to be closely tied to my left, and my person dragged, at the 
pistol’s mouth, fifteen miles, from the Bay Side to Easton, to be sold like a beast in the market, 
for the alleged crime of intending to escape from your possession.” Douglass’s hand, the subject 
of Auld’s violence, now inflicts violence on Auld. 
Douglass continues the change of place in a passage that most resembles the familiar 
abolitionist appeal. 
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How, let me ask, would you look upon me, were I, some dark night, in company 
with a band of hardened villains, to enter the precincts of your elegant dwelling, 
and seize the person of your own lovely daughter, Amanda, and carry her off from 
your family, friends, and all the loved ones of her youth—make her my slave—
compel her to work, and I take her wages—place her name on my ledger as 
property—disregard her personal rights—fetter the powers of her immortal soul 
by denying her the right and privilege of learning to read and write—feed her 
coarsely—clothe her scantily, and whip her on the naked back occasionally; more, 
and still more horrible, leave her unprotected—a degraded victim to the brutal lust 
of fiendish overseers, who would pollute, blight, and blast her fair soul—rob her 
of all dignity—destroy her virtue, and annihilate in her person all the graces that 
adorn the character of virtuous womanhood? I ask, how would you regard me, if 
such were my conduct? Oh! the vocabulary of the damned would not afford a 
word sufficiently infernal to express your idea of my God-provoking wickedness. 
Yet, sir, your treatment of my beloved sisters is in all essential points precisely 
like the case I have now supposed. Damning as would be such a deed on my part, 
it would be no more so than that which you have committed against me and my 
sisters. 
Generally these appeals are vague—the auditor’s identity is assumed, though no identifiable 
enslaved person is identified. The auditor is really only thinking what it would be like if he were 
enslaved, not if he were an enslaved black person living south of the Mason-Dixon line. Even the 
auditor usually remained anonymous—unnamed, ungendered, unclassed, unraced (even if the 
basis for the speaker’s appeal—what grants license to speak—is a shared identity, it’s not 
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nominated). So even though the images the speaker leads the auditor through are often detailed, 
the auditor’s identity in them are not.55 Douglass’s revision of this tactic, then, is to more fully 
place his auditor in the imagined situation. He does not ask what you would feel if something 
happened to your family, but what you, Thomas would feel if your daughter, Amanda were to 
experience this. What’s more, Douglass does not leave the agent of this change unnamed, nor 
does he give the impression that Auld is willing to imagine this change. He instead identifies 
himself as the agent both in creating this fantasy and acting as enslaver within it. Douglass’s 
invitation to sympathize with the slave is an aggressive one. It is not an invitation at all. 
Douglass invited certain charges in writing Auld in this way. Antiabolitionist writing was 
filled with fears about the violence ex-slaves would inflict on their masters, of the desire black 
men felt for white women that would be released were they to be freed.  Part of the power, or at 
least the threat, of Douglass’s letter derives from this. Yet Douglass tries to deflect much of the 
concern. Amanda is threatened by unmarked overseers, not Douglass himself. Though Douglass 
appears to make Amanda, and not Thomas, the center of the situation, Douglass is most 
concerned with making Auld feel the kind of helplessness that Douglass himself felt in regard to 
his family. Douglass makes sure to stress his sisters’ and his own status as victims. 
That Douglass’s assault remains in the imaginative realm could lead some to question 
how radical it could be. The form of the public letter does the real work here. Douglass trains our 
gazes on Auld. Auld is made to perform the role of the sufferer. Douglass ends the letter on the 
                                                
55 Eliza Follen asked her readers: “You have a daughter; you are a proud, tender, virtuous 
mother. She is your heart’s choicest treasure. You would bid the winds of Heaven to blow gently 
upon her; you guard her with the most sensitive care; she is as the flower of your existence. 
Imagine her exposed to ill usage, often cruelty, always to the lowest passions of humanity; her 
womanly feelings trampled upon,—if possible, obliterated; her pure affections laughed at and 
scorned; her person desecrated, and her whole nature brought down to the level of the vileness of 
a licentious man. I ask you whether, when you look upon your beloved daughter, you remember 
the poor slave-mother and her child?” (1). 
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new field of force: “You shall hear from me again unless you let me hear from you.” In fact, he 
does not send a letter, he sends a newspaper. Douglass includes a postscript: “I send a copy of 
the paper containing this letter, to save postage.”56 This is another illustration that he’s already 
put his plan to use Auld as a tool, to expose him, into practice. Auld has no way to challenge it. 
It’s already done. Auld now has to respond on Douglass’s terms. The paper also implies a wider 
audience—as does his mention of audience in the letter, the jury that will judge Auld. Douglass 
has witnesses, both to Auld’s crimes and his own threats. Auld had been “dragged” into public 
before he had any knowledge of it. 
 
A year later, Douglass published another letter. This was “a friendly epistle.” The tone of 
Douglass’s second letter, written on the eleventh anniversary of his self-emancipation, differs 
dramatically from the first. That it differs is made apparent in the salutation, “Dear sir.” Douglass 
believed that his exposure of Auld was successful. In the year between the two letters, Auld had 
emancipated all of his slaves and began to take care of Douglass’s grandmother.57 Auld, that is, 
had “ceased to be a slaveholder” and has begun to act “in a manner becoming a man and a 
Christian.” Douglass links Auld’s act to the “public exposure and denunciation” he had 
undergone. The case of Auld was counterintuitive to Douglass’s critics, who believed that 
exposure would lead a slaveholder to “clutch more firmly what [was] attempted to be wrested 
from him.” Auld had “risen superior to these unhallowed influences” of slavery that affected 
master and slave alike. Douglass requests that Auld “make your conversion to anti-slavery 
known to the world, by precept as well as by example. A publication of the facts relating to the 
                                                
56 The postscript is not reproduced in recent reprints. See, for example, Foner and Andrews. 
57 Douglass was most likely misinformed. He does not reveal his source for this information. See 
McFeely. 
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emancipation of your slaves, with the reasons that have led you to this humane act, would 
doubtless prove highly beneficial to the cause of freedom.” He asks, in other words, that Auld 
write a slaveholder’s narrative, and thus finish the exposure of himself that Douglass had begun. 
Before, Douglass made him an example; now, Auld would “make [his] conversion to anti-
slavery known to the world, by precept as well as by example.” If Douglass’s publication of 
Auld had had the effect of associating him with villainy, this new narrative would “place [Auld] 
in that high estimation of the public mind to which [his] generous conduct entitles [him].” 
Douglass points out that Auld’s case is special because “you have been publicly and peculiarly 
exposed before the world for being a slaveholder.” Douglass goes on: “It would be truly an 
interesting and glorious spectacle to see master and slave, hand in hand, laboring together for the 
overthrow of American slavery.” He continues the language of performance when he writes, “I 
shall not despair of yet having the pleasure of giving you the right hand of fellowship on the anti-
slavery platform.” He concludes, after repeating his “sincere gratitude at the magnanimous deed 
with which your name is now associated,” that Auld should “publicly identify yourself with the 
holy cause of freedom,” further changing the association Auld would have formerly had with 
Douglass. Whereas Auld’s name was once associated with Douglass the fugitive, it was now 
associated with this “magnanimous deed.” 
The first letter not only reflected a place change between slave and master, it removed 
any difference in position altogether. David Marshall argues that the goal of sympathy is to erase 
the conditions of spectatorship that it created. Douglass had done that. Douglass and Auld would 
now, the former hoped, “wor[k] side by side.” Though Douglass strongly urges Auld to “publicly 
identify [him]self with the holy cause of freedom,” he leaves it up to him to do so. He respects 
his choices, unlike their former modes of relation, which were coercive. Douglass ends the letter 
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“very respectfully yours.” Douglass had never recognized the right of one person to own another. 
Here, then, under very different circumstances, Douglass recognizes a more reciprocal relation. 
Douglass’s first letter had another effect. As he expected, it caused a considerable amount 
of controversy. Over the next six months, a battle raged in the columns of The North Star and 
The Liberator. Douglass’s combatant was John Jacobus Flournoy, whom one abolitionist called 
“either a fool or a monomaniac” (The Liberator 23 Feb. 1849). Flournoy, a farmer in Georgia, 
called himself an expulsionist. He was avowedly antislavery and racist: he thought all African 
Americans, not merely free ones in the North, should be sent ‘back’ to Africa immediately. So he 
thought that the American Colonization Society did not go far enough, and he thought the 
American Anti-Slavery Society was too preoccupied with doing away with racial prejudice. 
Two months after Douglass’s letter, Douglass published Flournoy’s response (with 
another rejoinder from one of Douglass’s allies) in The North Star. Flournoy admits that he is 
“lowering my dignity to write to a negro,” and yet does so anyway. “The people of the North,” 
he writes, “especially that portion which makes a tool of you, violate the constitution of their and 
our government, by not remanding you, black ninny, to Mr. Auld, and by turning that instrument, 
in a variety of ways, to their own convenience.” Douglass, not Auld, is the real tool here. 
Flournoy is shocked by the disregard that Douglass has for the consequences of his actions: 
“You abolitionists don’t care – you say, freedom anyhow, maugre consequences, and would have 
liberty given to the negroes, though utter ruin, or amalgamation, or even downright atheism, or 
continual wars, be the result.” Through a real or imagined change of place, Douglass sought to 
create a new political formation. Flournoy accuses him of attempting to create a new sexual 
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formation—an equality gained through interracial sex.58 Flournoy argues that equality cannot 
exist between black and white: The “greatest equality is founded on reciprocal obligations,” but 
“this reciprocity is according to the condition and capacities of the several races, as of 
individuals. One man is made the superior in bodily and mental faculties of another – one race or 
men better than another – each, therefore, should know, and by submitting to his sphere of 
duties, all work well for the good of all.” In writing Auld, in pulling him into the sympathetic 
situation, Douglass goes above his sphere. 
Douglass’s greatest presumption, Flournoy claims, is his comparison of his sisters to 
Auld’s daughter: “This is reasoning if they were equal, which is not the case.” Flournoy does not 
see Douglass’s sister and Auld’s daughter as equals, so he interprets Douglass’s letters as acts of 
usurpation. Flournoy takes it upon himself to correct Douglass, to put him back in his place. 
Flournoy insists that he and Douglass are not equal—on a biological or a discursive level—and 
yet he continues to speak to him, and so he undercuts his earlier statement that Douglass was not 
fit to address him.59 Regardless, Flournoy insists, Douglass could only “equalize” through “the 
spoils of amalgamation” (10 Nov. 1848). 
A rejoinder, published in the same issue of The North Star, observes that Flournoy’s 
“letter is wonderfully far from containing any argument” (J.D.). Flournoy mistakes the insult as 
an admission of incompetence. He later asks how his black correspondent knew his first letter 
“was not full of arguments? Could your obtuse faculties and dim perceptions never grasp hold of 
                                                
58 Amalgamation is Flournoy’s recurring theme. In his last letter to Douglass, Flournoy implies 
that “among your reasons for wishing to stay forever in the centre of white communities here, is 
none more extraordinary and all-absorbing than the secret or open hope or wish to get white 
wives!” (9 Mar. 1849). 
59 In his second letter, Flournoy admits that he should have clarified, that he does not mind 
sometimes writing to “a well-behaved and humble negro, slave or free,” but that he “has no 
disposition to lower my dignity by writing to a rebellious, turbulent, reckless negro” (5 Jan. 
1849). 
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what is obvious to all white men of mind, that you (even if attempting the work) could not 
controvert my points? Ah, Frederick, you have not yet been put where powerful arguments were 
unyieldingly in contention; you have not had yet, in any master mind, an opponent who would 
contest with you every inch of ground, and leave you finally subdued” (5 Jan. 1849). Although 
this fight is less familiar to us than Douglass’ clash with the slavebreaker Covey, this one is no 
less significant. 
Douglass tries to end the conversation in his response: “We tell him once for all, that we 
do not desire him to ‘misdignify’ himself by sending us any more letters – the game is not worth 
the candle. Negroes though we are, we cannot admit the moral or mental superiority of this Mr. 
Flournoy over us, if his present letter be a fair sample of his quality” (Frederick Douglass’ Paper 
5 Jan. 1849). The critique of Flournoy’s writing and, therefore, his supremacy continued in The 
Liberator: 
As for thy assumed superiority over Frederick Douglass, or the people of his color 
so far as I have had opportunity to observe, were any competent scholar to make a 
comparison between the beautiful and expressive language of his speeches, his 
dignified and gentlemanly manners, and the classical correctness of his writings, 
on the one side; and the ungrammatical, mutilated composition (be it English or 
American) of thy letter to him on the other; that scholar would have no difficulty 
in awarding that Frederick Douglass is infinitely thy superior in intelligence and 
polite literature. (23 Feb. 1849) 
Garrison appends a note saying that if this author “had known how unworthy of the least notice 
is the individual to whom he addresses himself, …. he would have spared his powder and shot. 
… he is not a disputant worth contending with.” 
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William Lloyd Garrison contended that his only “infidelity” was that he “believe[d] in 
the teaching of Jesus,” and so he “demand[ed] that my fellow-men be released from a bondage, 
at the thought of which, for myself, my very soul shudders” (qtd. in The Liberator 23 Sept. 
1853). Jane Swisshelm, who ran an antislavery newspaper of her own, felt that even more 
personal interests inspired Garrison and others: “Disinterested benevolence … has nothing at all 
to do with abolitionism,” she wrote. “I doubt very much if there is such a thing as disinterested 
benevolence” (230). “It is,” instead, “selfishness … that has thus far carried on the war with 
slavery and wrong in all times; and selfishness must break the chains of the American slave” 
(230). She discusses Garrison in particular: 
Where would William Lloyd Garrison have been to-day, if any combination of 
circumstances could have shut in his soul’s deep hatred of oppression, and 
prevented its finding utterance in burning words? He would have been dead and 
rotten. It is necessary to his own existence that he should work,—work for the 
slave; and in his work he gratifies all the strongest instincts of his nature, more 
completely than even the grossest sensualist can gratify his, by unlimited 
indulgence. (230-31; her emphasis) 
It may come as no surprise that white abolitionists were more concerned with themselves than 
they were with the enslaved, or that black abolitionists, through familiarity or flesh, were not. 
What is more remarkable, then, is the African American awareness, and exploitation, of the fact 
that in agitating against slavery, some abolitionists, maybe, were “just seeking a soft pillow that 
they may ‘sleep o’ nights’” (Swisshelm 233). 
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Chapter Four 
The Realization of African American Performance in Stowe’s The Christian Slave 
 
“Look!! Look!! at This!!!!” 
- David Walker 
“I am in earnest – I will not equivocate – I will not excuse – I will not retreat a single 
inch – AND I WILL BE HEARD.” 
- William Lloyd Garrison 
 
The primary texts of radical abolitionism demand a reader that has an eye for sound. 
David Walker and William Lloyd Garrison believed that before they could secure a fair hearing, 
they needed to be heard. And so they wrote with capital letters and exclamation points in order to 
capture the nation’s ear.60 But not without difficulty: A large part of the country wanted “the 
noise of abolition silenced!” (Liberator 8/16/1844). Abolitionists described decades of obstructed 
efforts in the same aural terms: Frederick Douglass lamented that people around the United 
States still “turned a deaf ear, and refused to listen to the friends of freedom. They turned a deaf 
ear to the groans of the oppressed slave” (Liberator 5/29/1846). Those who sought to “choke free 
words before they’re spoken” not only sought to silence dissent, but to assault the bodies of the 
dissenters (Liberator 9/28/1860). Legislative gag orders, suppressed mailing campaigns, and 
antiabolitionist rioting were not merely violations of the right to free speech. The circulation of 
David Walker’s Appeal and The Liberator depended on the mobility of black and white bodies: 
Walker sewed his text into the jackets of southbound sailors; Garrison employed subscription 
agents throughout the Northeast. If these people could not travel, these visual texts would not be 
                                                
60 See Dinius. My epigraphs are from Walker (63) and Garrison (72). 
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heard. More than sound was being abridged, though it was as sound that abolitionists figured 
these restrictions. 
When we read an abolitionist text we perceive a material process in which a sound is 
realized as an image that has the force of a statement.61 The texts that I examine in this chapter 
record the performances of Elizabeth Greenfield and Mary Webb, two African American women 
who toured the northern United States, Canada, and England during the 1850s. Like those of 
Walker and Garrison, the textual performances of Greenfield and Webb were interdependently 
visible and audible. Each of these performers exhibits what I call a resonant body. 62 This term 
emphasizes the influence a performer’s voice had over the way a reviewer saw her body. It also 
suggests the way that her voice resounds in descriptions of her body. For these women, to 
become textualized was not to become abstracted. Their embodiment was realized in print. The 
voices of these performers call attention to their corporeality. These calls are answered by 
representations of their bodies that show the traces of their vocalization. The sight and sound of 
the body in performance, in other words, is remediated as text. 
There is an audio/visual split within studies of race and slavery. This split is based on the 
common practice of work on race to privilege the visual. This practice, according to Josh Kun, 
originates in a “sensory hierarchy that keeps the eye above the ear and thus limits knowledge 
formation to visual vocabularies of interpretation and meaning and marginalizes sound and 
music in the study of race” (117). The result is studies that focus on either the aural or the visual 
                                                
61 I use the term “realization” in a slightly different sense than Martin Meisel’s, of “giving 
concrete perceptual form to a literary text,” its “re-creation and translation into a … more vivid, 
visual, physically present medium” (32; 30). 
62 Ronald Radano defines resonance as “a formulation of sound into text and back again as a 
social articulation or utterance” (23). 
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and, as a consequence, neglect the multisensory quality of performance.63 What is needed instead 
is an understanding of performance that recognizes what Fred Moten calls “the irreducible sound 
of necessarily visual performance” (1). Moten refers to the scene in Frederick Douglass’s 
Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass in which Douglass recounts his Aunt Hester’s 
beating by her master. Douglass remembers how her “warm, red blood (amid heart-rending 
shrieks from her, and horrid oaths from him) came dripping to the floor” (19). “Amid” combines 
her blood with the shrieks and the oaths—already bound together on the page by parentheses—
into a visible mass. The shrieks and oaths are realized as much as Hester’s blood is. The sounds 
that I investigate in this chapter, like Hester’s scream, insist on their materiality through the 
visual medium of printed description. 
 This chapter contributes to the study of early African American performance by 
exploring the way that performance archives itself and by investigating the work that that archive 
performs. It appreciates that “African American expressive culture and artistic production” form 
a tradition in which “sound and vision, the aural and the scriptural, have always been 
interlinked” (Kun 117). It acknowledges that African American texts are not static, but operate 
within what Ronald Radano describes as “a dynamic process in which orality moves through 
textuality and back around” (45). We can see this process at work in the press coverage of 
Greenfield’s and Webb’s performances. These reviews offer more than critiques. They are also 
effects of those performances. In them, sound is rendered visually as verbal description or 
pictorial illustration. Sound, however, is not reduced. It is reproduced. Jon Cruz prompts us to 
think of black music  “as a stage upon which other nonmusic—social, political, and cultural—
                                                
63 Recent work on (anti)slavery’s visual culture includes Wood and Chaney. Recent work on its 
aural culture includes Cruz and White and White. Scholars working within the discipline of 
performance studies have perhaps done the best job of negotiating the split. Notable among this 
work are Lott, Brooks, and Nathans. 
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struggles could be enacted” (11). These reproductions enact a struggle over how these women 
were to be represented. 
 
 Women were central to, even if they often worked on the margins of, the antislavery 
movement. But to be a woman in the public sphere in the antebellum period meant to be exposed 
to criticism, or worse. When Angelina Grimké urged women to agitate for the abolitionist cause, 
Catharine Beecher took it upon herself to warn her, or any woman considering taking a position 
on the issue, what she could expect: “If the female advocate chooses to come upon a stage, and 
expose her person, dress, and elocution to public criticism, it is right to express disgust at 
whatever is offensive and indecorous, as it is to criticize the book of an author, or the dancing of 
an actress, or any thing else that is presented to public observation” (121). As Faye Dudden has 
established, “the continuing problem of a woman in public, on the street and in the workplace, is 
the same as the problem of a woman on the stage: she must be there in the body. To be present in 
the body carries with it the inherent risk of being taken as a sexual object against one’s will” (3). 
Some in the United States at the time viewed a woman’s speech act as a sex act. One 
clergyman compared Grimké to a Quaker woman who had walked “through the streets of Salem, 
naked as she was born.” Deborah Garfield notes how a “charged or sexually explicit lecture, no 
matter how scrupulously reasoned, was too frequently refigured by detractors into the visual 
metaphor of striptease, as if the female voice, confounding sound and flesh, were the exposed 
body itself” (102; emphasis in the original). In 1838, antiabolitionist rioters in Philadelphia broke 
up a meeting Grimké had addressed. One newspaper sympathetic to the rioters included in its 
coverage an illustration of white women acting ‘inappropriately’ with black men outside the 
meeting. Women speaking to promiscuous assemblies would inevitably lead, it was feared, to 
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promiscuous sexual behavior with the men for whose rights they advocated (Lemire 88). Given 
the way outspoken women were treated, it’s no wonder that Harriet Beecher Stowe defended her 
authorship by invoking the need to “speak for the oppressed—who cannot speak for themselves.” 
She “‘preach[ed] on paper’ rather than ‘viva voce’” (qtd. in Hedrick 378-38).64 
 Women of color were, as Hazel Carby has documented, “persistent[ly] associat[ed] with 
illicit sexuality” (32). The sound of Sojourner Truth’s voice made her audience think about sex, 
though they weren’t sure which one. Once in 1858, a male audience member “‘demanded that 
Sojourner submit her breast to the inspection of some of the ladies present’ so that the question 
of ‘her sex’ might be ‘removed by their testimony.’” When Truth asked him “why they suspected 
her to be a man,” he answered, “Your voice is not the voice of a woman, it is the voice of a man, 
and we believe you are a man” (qtd. in Brooks Bodies 159-59). Even in 1870, Frances Harper 
wrote a friend that “you would laugh if you were to hear some of the remarks which my lectures 
call forth: ‘She is a man,’ again ‘She is not colored, she is painted.’” “In this comment,” Carla 
Peterson explains, “the black woman speaker is predictably masculinized, and she is also 
racialized as ‘painted.’ Yet the term ‘painted’ also resexualizes her, and dangerously so, as an 
actress, and perhaps even a prostitute” (qtd. in Peterson “Doers” 21-22). 
Despite, or perhaps because, of antebellum America’s overdetermined perception of the 
‘grotesque’ black female body, there was an inconsistency in the way the culture represented it. 
All black bodies, according to Peterson, possess an “empowering oddness” (“Foreword” xi-xii). 
Truth chooses to “flaunt the eccentric black female body before [her] audiences and readers and 
celebrate its beauty.” Truth’s body “represents a determination to define the black female body” 
on its own terms (Peterson “Foreword” xii-xiiv). That’s why Truth narrated her body’s history as 
                                                
64 During her tour of the United Kingdom, though she appeared in public, Stowe never spoke. 
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she displayed it. As Brooks remarks, Truth “revalues her exploited flesh and instills it with an 
alternate textual meaning” (Bodies 159).  
Harper, Peterson argues, attempts “to render the body invisible or present the black 
subject as a disembodied voice” by “emphasizing the quietness of her body, the chastity of her 
language, and the purity of her voice.” If this were true, Harper must have been unsuccessful, as 
no audience “could forget that language emanates from the body and that the black body is 
inescapably present” in its performances (“Foreword” xiii; “Doers” 122; “Foreword” xiii.). If 
these women attempted, instead, to “normalize” their bodies by “following the conventions of 
the dominant literary culture,” they would then be limited to a location “within an idealized 
middle-class domestic household” (Peterson “Foreword” xiii). By “imbuing [their bodies] with 
moral value,” Peterson continues, these women made their bodies “object[s] worthy of the 
reader’s compassion.” This assumes that these women were seeking compassionate readers in 
private and not, as I argue, captivated audiences in public. In place of the notion of an impossibly 
disembodied performance, Gay Gibson Cima claims that though these women appeared in 
person, they “did not always call attention to their race or gender” (202). These performers did 
not need to call attention to their race or gender. Their audiences did it for them. Their bodies 
were “never divorced from perception and interpretation” (Peterson “Foreword” ix). 
Peterson’s argument, as Brooks has summarized it, establishes a “dichotomy between 
being visible and abject and being ‘pure’ and disembodied” (“‘Deeds’” 48). Peterson’s is 
something of an audio/visual account of the performing body. Like that opposition, this proves to 
be a false one. Sight and sound have always been interrelated in oratory. When Caleb Bingham, 
author of The Columbian Orator (made famous by Douglass’s Narrative), refers to “the whole art 
of pronunciation,” he means the orator’s “voice and gestures.” Although Bingham cannot say 
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“whether voice or gesture has the greatest influence upon us,” he does recognize that “the sight is 
the quickest of our senses.” Even though “persons commonly form some opinion of a speaker 
from their first view of him, which prejudices them either in his favour or otherwise, as to what 
he says afterwards,” he maintains that as “the voice should be suited to the impressions it 
receives from the mind, so the several motions of the body ought to be accustomed to the various 
tones and inflections of the voice” (9; emphasis added; 15; 19; 15). People are prejudiced toward 
what a speaker says by how she looks, though the speaker should concern herself first with her 
voice, and with her appearance second. 
A performer’s visible actions could make a statement. These women signified their 
respectability, partly, through the visual. One’s style of dress and control of one’s person 
substantiated claims to respectability as much as one’s voice or words did. Oratory, after all, 
introduced its students to “a decent and graceful management of their bodies” (Bingham 9). The 
performance of respectability relied upon the visibility—and availability—of these bodily signs. 
Respectability meant having the right look, not no look at all. Ellen Craft’s protest at the Great 
Exhibition of 1851 in London relied on her appearance for its effect. In response to the 
exhibition’s sanitized version of slavery presented in Hiram Powers’ statue, “The Greek Slave,” 
The London Punch printed a more provocative version in “The Virginia Slave.” William Wells 
Brown placed a copy of the latter next to the former for all to compare. But neither proffered an 
acceptable image of the African American woman, so Craft supplied her own—herself. Craft 
walked through the Crystal Palace without saying a word, performing, as Tavia Nyong’o 
comments, “black femininity as ladyhood” (113). Her physical presence at the fair drove the 
protest, which was, after all, a silent one. The performance styles of Truth, Harper, and Craft 
differed, but they were alike in that they resulted in more attention being placed on the body. 
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Each managed, not one denied, the materiality of her body. And by positioning their resonant 
bodies and voices in such a way, they influenced the way their audiences perceived, and thus 
represented, them. 
There was no uniform way that Americans in this period perceived African American 
performers. As Cruz remarks, how people heard black music was changing at the time Elizabeth 
Greenfield and Mary Webb were performing: “Prior to the mid-nineteenth century black music 
appears to have been heard by captors and overseers as noise—that is, as strange, unfathomable, 
and incomprehensible. However, with the rise of the abolitionist movement, black song making 
became considered increasingly as a font of black meanings” (43; emphasis in the original). Cruz 
is discussing the reception of black musical forms—namely, the spiritual. Though Greenfield and 
Webb performed white forms—opera and blackface minstrelsy—the identity and position of the 
auditor still determined how the auditor heard them.65 An abolitionist heard a political message 
in Greenfield’s and Webb’s songs; an antiabolitionist heard noise. How one heard, then, had 
more to do with who heard it and where and when one did than with what one heard.  
Music, as Dale Cockrell asserts, is “a metaphor for the official social code” and noise is 
“a challenge to law’s authority” (80). During the nineteenth century, both were becoming 
codified. Nick Yablon writes that during the time Greenfield and Webb were performing, what 
constituted music or noise was being redefined in spatial terms: “If certain sounds were to be 
characterized as ‘music’ insofar as they could be contained within the enclosed spaces of the 
auditorium, concert hall, or parlor, then others that could not be confined in space and which 
                                                
65 It is important to note the interracial origins of black and white musical traditions. What 
Radano states about the spiritual is true for the minstrel song as well: “[T]he qualities that define 
black music grow out of a cultural ground that is more common than many may realize, and this 
commonality is all the more so in musical circumstances, where practices literally exist in the air 
and are thus accessed more easily than other forms of cultural expression” (xiii). 
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instead circulated freely across the city were coming to be understood as noise. In the same way 
that ‘dirt’ would be conceived by Mary Douglas as ‘matter out of place,’ noise was beginning to 
be conceived as sound ‘out of place.’” (360). I would add that we cannot think of spaces without 
thinking of the people who are and are not welcome in them. Certain performers, regardless of 
what they performed, would not find a place in certain spaces, or would only do so as an 
exception. Certain kinds of performance by anyone would not be welcome at all. 
Some but not all of the people recording their responses to Greenfield and Webb were 
music critics. One of these critics reflected on the generic violence of music criticism: “In music, 
especially, criticism is very personal and precise. It mentions names broadly, and examines each 
note, down to the minutest shadows of sound. Literally, it throttles its victim. It takes him by the 
throat, and dissects his organs of speech; applies a stethescope [sic] to his lungs, and a 
Procrustean measurement to the general conduct of the person”(qtd. in La Brew 82). The critic 
destroys, as it deconstructs, the voice. The body is measured and maimed. The voice is by no 
means immaterial. It is part of a vulnerable body whose parts can be taken apart. Professional 
critics move immediately from an awareness of sound to an awareness of the body that produced 
it. Nonprofessionals have this realization as well. 
 
 Elizabeth Greenfield was probably born in the 1820s in Mississippi, reputedly to an 
African father and an Native American mother. When her owner joined the Society of Friends, 
emancipated her slaves and moved to Philadelphia, Elizabeth went with her. The self-taught 
“Black Swan” showed musical talent an early age, and sang in church and in the homes of family 
friends. She made her debut as a concert singer in Buffalo, New York in 1851. Greenfield was 
favorably compared to some of the most celebrated singers of the antebellum period, including 
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Abby Hutchinson of the Hutchinson Family Singers and Jenny Lind, the “Swedish Nightingale.” 
Greenfield typically sang operatic works by such composers as Donizetti, Bellini, and Verdi, 
though she was also known to sing popular songs like “Home, Sweet Home” and “Old Folks at 
Home.” She would go on to tour the northern United States, Canada, and England. With Stowe’s 
help, she gained access to the British aristocracy, eventually giving a command performance for 
Queen Victoria in 1854. 
Reviewers were fascinated with her voice, which by some estimates covered a four-
octave range. The only way they were able to describe it was by guessing that she had more than 
natural endowments. One critic remarked, “she possesses a most remarkable organ,” and so was 
impressed by her range that he said she must have, “in fact, two voices” (Spirit of the Times 
3/26/1853; emphasis in the original). Samuel Ringgold Ward was present at one of her London 
concerts, and spoke of another audience member’s reaction to her range: “Sir David Brewster 
said to me, ‘she has two throats’—alluding to the perfect ease with which she passed from the 
highest to the lowest notes” (304).66 These auditors were not alone in seeing Greenfield’s 
peculiar talent as somehow more, or less, than natural. Another found her range “more wonderful 
than truly natural,” though he concluded that she “is deficient in every requisite for a good 
vocalist” (London Musical World 7/16/1853). Most reviewers tempered their praise by noting 
her lack of training. Still, reviewers did not agree on her voice’s development. One reported that 
she was “even far less cultivated than we expected to find her; she having yet to learn to deliver 
her voice, and her scale passages being given without the slightest articulation of successive 
notes, but with a continuous sound, such as is produced by running the finger up a violin string” 
(New York Mirror 4/1/1853). Stowe reported how “between the parts Sir George [Smart] took 
                                                
66 Queen Victoria, for one, thought “[t]he voices do not blend, which is a great disadvantage” 
(qtd. in La Brew 121). 
 119 
 
her to the piano, and tried her voice by skips, striking notes here and there at random, without 
connection, from D in alt [sic] to A first space in bass clef: she followed with unerring precision, 
striking the sound nearly at the same instant his finger touched the key. This brought out a burst 
of applause.” Stowe swore that “had she culture equal to her voice and ear, no singer of any 
country could have surpassed her,” but few were as complimentary (Sunny 2:104; 2:109; 
emphasis in the original). 
Peterson observes that “reviews in the white press often had difficulty reconciling” 
Greenfield’s voice with her blackness and so paid closer attention to the former rather than the 
latter. One would then expect for her body to get little attention, but the opposite was the case. 
Most did comment on her body. Upon hearing her exert the lower registers of her range, one 
reviewer was put in mind of a tangible corporeal oddity: “The idea of a woman’s voice is a 
feminine tone; anything below that is disgusting: it is as bad as a bride with a beard on her chin 
and an oath in her mouth. … We hear a great deal about Woman’s sphere. That sphere exists in 
Music, and it is the soprano region of the voice” (New York Tribune 4/2/1853). The reviewer for 
Frederick Douglass’ Paper had anticipated this kind of criticism and derided it: “This singular 
performance must have shocked (if there were any such present) those nervous and exceedingly 
timid old gentlemen, who, about these times of woman’s conventions, are quite alarmed lest 
woman should usurp dominion over man” (12/18/1851). 
Most were able to couch their negative perceptions of Greenfield’s voice in seemingly 
neutral ways, though the repeated observation that she lacked cultivation could have been a 
euphemistic way to put down her race. Hardly any, however, had a problem discussing what they 
saw as the grotesqueness of her body. One reviewer compared her to “a sort of biped 
hippopotamus” (New York Herald 4/1/1853). Rosalyn Story finds that a “Cincinnati Enquirer 
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journalist called her the ‘African Crow.’ Another writer estimated her weight at between 275 and 
300 pounds, noting ‘her voice is more refined than her person.’ … Another reporter went to 
inordinate lengths to describe her physiognomy” (23). 
Others were sympathetic in comparison. Stowe’s faint praise that Greenfield was “not 
handsome, but looked very well” on one occasion was not uncommon (Sunny 2:103). Story 
documents “one woman [who] took the liberty of advising the singer on the proper dress for a 
stage artist”: “I have a few suggestions to make, respecting your dress. You were dressed with 
great modesty and with much simplicity; still there are some things it would be well for you to 
lay aside.” The woman told Greenfield to only wear flowers in her hair, to dress in black silk 
with “muslin under sleeves and white kid gloves—always.” The woman concluded, “I know how 
important it is that, in the midst of all the prejudice against those of your colour, that your 
appearance should be strikingly genteel” (25; emphasis added).67 Greenfield’s understated 
appearance should be very much noticeable. Stowe observed similarly conspicuous gentility 
when she wrote that “Miss Greenfield bears her success with much quietness and good sense” 
(Sunny 1:320; emphasis added). This comment implies, of course, that there was something 
powerful being contained behind her appearance. 
Regardless of the effort at respectability, certain reviewers still found reason to ridicule 
Greenfield. One of these waited till the end of the review to play the joke: Greenfield “was 
becomingly attired in black silk, relieved by a little white lace work, and her dark, bare arms 
tapered down to very fair sized white kidded hands, which were as conspicuous as snowballs 
upon a coal bed, and they might well appal [sic] any of her pugnaciously disposed white 
‘bredren’” (Newark Daily Advertiser 1/18/1855). Greenfield and Webb had to deal with such 
                                                
67 Greenfield’s correspondent was the daughter of Gerrit Smith. 
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racist and sexist depictions, a legacy of minstrel show characterization. Inserted within one 
reviewer’s description of her appearance is an allusion to a minstrel song: “Her wooly hair was 
done in the Jenny Lind style; her only ornament was a bunch of white flowers, which graced the 
‘place where the wool ought to grow’” (New York Mirror 4/1/1853). Vera Brodsky Lawrence 
identifies the song as “Old Uncle Ned,” a Foster original about a now deceased black man who, 
before he went “whar de good Niggas go,” lost his teeth and the use of his eyes (2:410 n.108). 
The allusion is not, then, only meant to indicate the placement of an accessory, but to compare a 
live African American person to a dead one. Such casually racist reviews of Greenfield were 
common, though more brutal than banal. 
If her time in England did not keep some from criticizing her appearance, it at least 
helped Greenfield get more positive feedback on her singing. Though Arthur La Brew notes that 
“comment about her voice was pointed” after she returned, it was much more likely to be 
favorable (116). James Trotter records that a paper which had given her especially harsh 
criticism before her time abroad had come around: “‘The Swan’ sings now in true artistic style, 
and the wonderful powers of her voice have been developed by good training” (87). That same 
paper reprinted another reviewer’s judgment that her “very extensive voice … has been much 
improved by the instruction of Sir George Smart” (New York Herald 10/16/1854). Others gave 
credit to her training: Her voice “is full and melodious, and at the same time evinces a thorough 
musical education” (Daily Pennsylvanian 1/10/1855). Another critic at the same concert admired 
her performance as much as he did his own ability to appreciate it: “Sweet in its tone, and 
delicious in cadence, she charms the ear of the most refined musical critic” (Pennsylvania Daily 
News 1/10/1855). 
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Greenfield’s most controversial performance took place at New York City’s Metropolitan 
Hall in 1853. No African Americans were allowed to attend the concert. Greenfield was the only 
person of color present.68 Fearful of prohibited black patrons and angry white supremacists, the 
manager requested that police be present. Reviews of the concert numbered over one hundred 
officers in uniform or plainclothes. “A huge American flag, probably intended to subdue 
potential troublemakers, dominated the stage; and, perhaps for the same reason, ‘the footlights 
were not lit, and duskiness prevailed the platform’” (qtd. in Lawrence 2: 409).69 How different, 
then, was the New York City concert that James McCune Smith attended two years later, after 
Greenfield had returned from England. The Broadway Tabernacle was filled with “upwards of 
two thousand persons … of whom at least six hundred were colored!” “Never was the 
Tabernacle so thoroughly speckled with mixed complexions,” Smith told his readers. This 
proved to be a sympathetic audience. These heard meaning in Greenfield’s music. One audience 
member was so overwhelmed with admiration that he “snatched an opera glass from the lady 
next to him, raised it to his lips and shouted, ‘Hurra!’” (Frederick Douglass’ Paper 3/9/1855). 
Perhaps indicating that he liked what he saw as much as what as he heard, the man expressed his 
vocal support with the aid of a visual instrument. 
Smith’s review suggests what about the newly cultivated Greenfield resisted refinement. 
He saw the political stakes in her performance: When Greenfield “appears on the platform, 
before an American audience, and her pure and perfect notes gush forth ‘Sweet as seraph’s 
song,’ there trails beneath their ravishing melody the irresistible ‘AM I NOT A WOMAN AND 
                                                
68 The African American press protested Greenfield’s decision to go on with the show. A number 
of well-known figures, including William Cooper Nell and Martin Delany, spoke on the issue. 
Frederick Douglass’ Paper, March 18, 1852; Frederick Douglass’ Paper, April 8, 1853; Frederick 
Douglass’ Paper, April 22, 1853. 
69 Despite the tense atmosphere, Lawrence notes that “the audience was determined to treat the 
occasion as a kind of super minstrel show” (2: 413 n.113). 
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A SISTER?’” When Smith heard Greenfield sing, that is, he saw the famous antislavery icon of 
the kneeling female slave. Perhaps this is what Smith imagined when he “urge[d] our colored 
friends to go and hear the Black Swan: apart from the rich musical treat they will have an 
opportunity of looking into their own hearts” (Frederick Douglass’ Paper 3/9/1855).  
Smith closed his review by making a very different comparison: One “must grow up to 
the comprehension of Miss Greenfield and then he may criticize,” Smith realized. “Even 
Wendell Phillips, after seventeen years’ service in the ranks of Garrisonism, could only ‘bless the 
pistol’ which took effect at Christiana: the great soul who fired it off was beyond the reach of his 
intellection” (Frederick Douglass’ Paper 3/9/1855). Smith’s reference is to the Christiana Riot of 
1850, “in which the Maryland slave owner Edward Gorsuch led a posse of men to Christiana, 
Pennsylvania, to reclaim his fugitives. The fugitives resisted capture, and in the battle that 
ensued, Gorsuch and three blacks were killed and Gorsuch’s son was seriously wounded” (138 
n.162). It might seem odd to compare a concert singer to an armed revolt against an unjust law 
(the Fugitive Slave Act), but the comparison is apt. Smith felt that both acts were political 
gestures, even if they were not immediately understood to be so.70 
In London, Greenfield sang a new song written for her by Stephen Glover. It was a duet 
in which Greenfield took turns singing in the ‘male’ and ‘female’ registers. Though the song’s 
lyrics do not survive, its title, “I Am Free,” is telling. Greenfield’s “I” is male and female, a 
black singer of white music. It’s the song of one who had met “Prejudice face to face and 
crush[ed] it” (Frederick Douglass’ Paper 3/9/1855). 
                                                
70 Philip Alexander Bell also understood Elizabeth Greenfield in such militant terms. He 
concludes his review of her performance by stating that “art knows no distinction of color, 
science recognizes no prejudice, education and wealth are the ladders by which we must rise, the 
weapons with which we can assail and conquer the demons, slavery and prejudice” (Frederick 
Douglass’ Paper, 3/16/1855). 
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Mary Webb, the daughter of a self-emancipated woman of color and a Spanish 
gentleman, was born in Massachusetts. Trained in elocution, she came to Stowe’s attention after 
she delivered a reading of drama and poetry in Philadelphia in the spring of 1855. Stowe adapted 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin to be read by Webb in the winter of that year.71 After touring Northern cities 
giving her readings of The Christian Slave, Webb traveled to Great Britain in 1856. Like 
Greenfield, Webb profited from her relationship with Stowe. Webb earned enough money to 
support herself and her husband, Frank, as he wrote his only novel, The Garies and Their 
Friends. Jayna Brown writes that an African American man did not play the part of Uncle Tom 
until around 1878 and that an African American woman did not play the part of Topsy until 
around 1914 (64). “The Black Siddons,” named after her British counterpart, Sarah, performed 
both roles 20 and 60 years before that, respectively. 
During her performances, Webb stood at a podium and read out the play to the audience. 
She stood still and used no props, so she gained most of her effects from her voice’s “great 
powers of modulation”—though this did not stop reviewers from commenting on her appearance 
(New York Times 12/18/1855). Webb performed at abolitionist meeting places and homes. This 
more manageable scale made a more visual style of performance unnecessary, as well as 
undesirable. One reviewer found that Webb “possessed considerable and rather peculiar dramatic 
power,” even though her performance consisted in little else than “very little gesticulation, … 
[and] judicious modulations of the voice, combined with earnest and effective delivery” 
(Illustrated London News 8/2/1856). Webb’s reliance on her voice, rather than on gesture, for 
                                                
71 Eric Gardner has published a modern edition of the play. Harriet Beecher Stowe, “The 
Christian Slave,” in Major Voices: The Drama of Slavery ed. Eric Gardner (New Milford: Toby, 
2005). 
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her performances placed her in an aural tradition of acting that had already begun to be 
supplanted by a greater stress on visuality (Dudden 5-6). Without the distraction of histrionic 
acting, panorama, tableau, and other visual effects, Webb’s performance became a spectacle of 
the body.72 
In a biographical sketch that prefaced the published play, Frank details Mary’s early life, 
her education, and her initial successes as a dramatic reader. Speaking of the effect Webb had on 
one of her first audiences, Frank reported that “in their enthusiasm and delight the audience lost 
the mulatto in the artiste; genius had become the conqueror of prejudice.”73 Rather than describe 
how her first audiences actually reacted, Frank is trying to model for her current and future 
audiences how they should respond. Indeed, as Eric Gardner attests, “all of the print promotion 
and review material notes Webb’s race; often, her color is emphasized significantly” (105). The 
attention that reviewers paid to Webb’s skin color fell within the comments they made about her 
bodily and vocal comportment more generally. 
A number of reviewers complained about the muted quality of Webb’s performance. One 
reviewer, though generally praiseworthy of Webb, indicated that “the only portion [of the 
reading] to which we could take exception was the rendering of the language of Cassy, which we 
thought would have been deepened in its tragic power, if given in a more energetic and 
impassioned manner” (Liberator 12/14/1855). After watching the first half of the play, which 
encompassed Tom’s time on the Shelby and St. Clare plantations, another reviewer concluded 
that “all that could be said was that Mrs. Webb had a remarkably sweet and flexible voice, 
                                                
72 Sarah Meer writes that The Christian Slave is a spectacle of race, but I would also add that it is 
a spectacle of gender and class as well (188). 
73 Frank Webb, “Biographical Sketch,” in The Christian Slave, 3rd ed. (London: Phillips, 
Samson, and Low, 1856), ii-iii. One reviewer of Greenfield agreed that “the individual was lost 
sight of in the prima donna” (Frederick Douglass’ Paper, April 27, 1855; emphasis in the 
original). 
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apparently without much power; that she displayed considerable feeling in the rendering of 
particular passages; and that she was careful on the side of restraint rather than exuberance” 
(Illustrated London News 8/2/1856). Rather than rendering her invisible, Webb’s control of her 
body called attention to itself. One can speculate that Webb’s occasional restraint was more a 
matter of policy than a lack of ability: One reviewer had complained that this “delicate” 
woman’s performance “would have been a very fine reading for a drawing room, but was too 
tame for a public audience” (Provincial Freeman 5/12/1855). More likely than not, the drawing 
room—a domestic space—was exactly the setting that Stowe intended for her drama. 
Webb was capable of acting with force. In the final act, which details Tom’s time at the 
Legree plantation, one reviewer noted that, “combined with earnest and effective delivery, she 
gave great effect to the last dark, powerful scenes of the drama.” The reviewer praises Webb’s 
portraits of Cassy and Tom in particular, writing that her greatest success was with the latter: 
“The hoarse negro voice, the solemn tones … were very striking” (Illustrated London News 
8/2/1856). Indeed, many reviewers commented on the skill with which Webb imitated the voices 
of the different characters. One reviewer commended how she “delineat[ed] with graphic 
truthfulness all the varied intonations of the many characters introduced” (New York Times 
12/18/1855; emphasis added). The reviewer registers the effect of her voice in visual terms. 
Another reviewer admitted that she “has dramatic talent. She has a good musical ear, and 
intonates through the range of extensive and sympathetic voice according to the characters 
evolved in the text, and has evidently taken much pains to qualify herself for her task. … Her 
imitation of Topsey [sic] was particularly good.” Another pronounced the reading “capital, the 
different tones of the different characters so well sustained throughout, that with the eyes closed 
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one would have been sure that different readers were engaged upon the parts” (National Anti-
Slavery Standard 12/22/1855). 
In the course of The Christian Slave, Webb sings a song in Latin (as St. Clare) and 
another in Spanish (as Cassy), but reviewers were most impressed by “the singing of the hymns” 
(as Tom), which “was remarkably effective. The peculiar negro intonation, the struggle after 
correctness of melody, the solemn meaning which the singer threw into the words, gave great 
prominence to this portion of the readings. It was a mixture of solemnity and pathos quite 
indescribable.” The same reviewer that had claimed that “there was nothing [in the first half of 
the play] to excite the sympathies of the hearer very violently; and, had the readings terminated 
[t]here, the reader would have made a pleasant impression and no more” found that “it was 
evident that Mrs. Webb had, in the latter part of the entertainment, regained a portion of that 
confidence which she had lost at the commencement” (Illustrated London News 8/2/1856). 
Other reviewers commented on Webb’s singing. A review reprinted in The Provincial 
Freeman, a black newspaper published in Canada, claimed that her “‘Negro Eccentricities’ … 
were so near perfection that our mind was carried back to our native State, where we had heard 
and seen the genuine ‘darkies’ of the South act naturally, that which Mrs. Webb had acquired by 
practice and study.” This aural illusion was so well done that this reviewer “could fairly see the 
characters represented by her” (Provincial Freeman 5/12/1855). Commenting on this review, 
Nyong’o observes how, “in a reversal of expectations, a black newspaper considered Webb’s 
performances of black dialect and black particularity a practiced skill rather than the testimony of 
her authentic self” (91). The reviewer’s ironic message, of course, is that, on their own, the acts 
of the “darkie” are as natural as Webb’s reproduction of them—that is, they are both decidedly 
unnatural. 
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 Webb’s performance does more than expose black particularity. One reviewer marveled 
at the “complete mastery” she had over her voice, “which enables her to individualise [sic] the 
characters which she reads.” (The reviewer adds that her Tom and Ophelia were “marked 
instances of this.”) In a comment that recalls Greenfield’s doubled vocal apparatus, this reviewer 
thought Webb’s embodiment of the disparate roles so complete that “the characters speak indeed 
through [her] mouth” (London Morning Chronicle 7/29/1856). This praise for Webb’s 
remarkable skill at impersonating different characters resembles another that appeared earlier in 
the Cleveland Daily Plain Dealer: Webb’s “rendering of the parts of ‘Uncle Tom,’ ‘Little Eva,’ 
‘Aunt Chloe,’ ‘Miss Ophelia,’ ‘Marie,’ and above all ‘Topsy’ were as nearly natural as it is 
possible for an imitator to give them” (qtd. in Clark 346). 
 This reviewer realizes that Webb is acting the parts of characters of different races, 
genders, and classes. Though this reviewer does not admit that the types themselves are 
inauthentic, nevertheless, his comments say something about the performativity of each type. 
Nyong’o argues that Webb reveals black particularity to be “a practiced skill.” I would extend 
his insight further and argue that she proves white particularity to be the same. Elocution tries to 
give the impression that it is unmarked speech. Dwight Conquergood defines elocution as “the 
performativity of whiteness naturalized,” a form of linguistic enclosure that whites of a certain 
class use to differentiate themselves from the masses (“Rethinking” 326). If the voice of ‘white’ 
eloquence is learned, so too is the voice of ‘black’ dialect. Nyong’o writes that Craft’s 
“respectable performances drew upon their minstrel antitype”—“The Virginia Slave”—for its 
effect. Webb, in that case, performed type and antitype (113).74 
                                                
74 We can think of Greenfield and Webb as performing a version of what Joseph Roach calls 
“whiteface minstrelsy,” which ridiculed the idea held by white people that race or gender could 
ever be categorized.  
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In 1853, one New York City paper had planned to print a story about Elizabeth 
Greenfield’s Metropolitan Hall concert. A portrait of Greenfield was set to run alongside the text. 
The story and the illustration were never published. A librarian at the New York Historical 
Society presumes that “the negative public reaction caused The Illustrated News to cut both the 
illustration and description.”75  
 
Figure 3. “The Black Swan.” The Illustrated News. April 12, 1853. 
 
In 1855, Smith’s review of the Broadway Tabernacle concert may have been one of the few: 
“none of these events seems to have elicited a review in the New York press” (Lawrence 2:653). 
                                                
75 Edward O’Reilly, “Black History Month – 19th Century,” New York Historical Society 
Library Collections Blog, https://www.nyhistory.org/library/blog/?p=744. 
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In fact, “the 1855 tour was the last that Elizabeth was to give in New York. She would later 
appear in a benefit recital but did not include New York City as necessary during her other tours” 
(La Brew 148). Smith noted in his review that mainstream critics were “dumb in relation to the 
Black Swan.” The difference between 1853 and 1855 is the difference between critical “silence,” 
as Smith describes it, and silenced criticism (Frederick Douglass’ Paper 3/9/1855). In canceling 
their coverage, The Illustrated News suppressed an image of the woman whose voice they would 
have called, had they printed the story, one “that must be regarded by the musical world as a 
phenomenon” (Illustrated News 4/2/1853; emphasis added). Greenfield’s voice was phenomenal 
because it could be seen. 
There was no such controversy at Greenfield’s performance later in 1853 at the Stafford 
House, the London home of the Duchess of Sutherland, a friend to the antislavery cause.  
 
Figure 4. “The Stafford House.” The Illustrated London News. July 30, 1853. 
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Columns, statues, vases, and over one hundred people crowd the room. There is a chandelier, 
which is reflected in a mirror behind it. Another tall mirror hangs on the left wall, opposite a 
large window on the right. Facing the crowd on a platform are five people sitting—the couple on 
the left may be Stowe and her husband, Calvin. Of all these people the only recognizable one is 
Greenfield, who stands next to her accompanist to the right of center. Greenfield is conspicuous, 
but in an unassuming way, as her correspondent advised and Stowe noted.    
This is supposed to look like a regular concert. It is standing room only—a man in the 
right foreground offers his seat to a woman. The performance, perhaps, is about to begin: two 
people in the front of Greenfield and slightly to the viewer’s right are finding their seats; a man 
and a woman in the left foreground chat. The rest are turned in expectation toward Greenfield. 
The audience dominates the review and would appear to do the same in the image. The text lists 
over forty attendees. The image documents many more. We are directly behind the audience. 
And yet Greenfield takes over the field of vision. She stands a little above the audience. Her 
darker color stands in slight contrast to the rest of the image. Most of audience members look 
toward Greenfield, and so our attention is drawn along with theirs. 
 Three years later, Mary Webb performed at the Stafford House, though it would be 
difficult to tell from the image printed in the same newspaper that had reviewed Greenfield’s 
concert. 
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Figure 5. “The Black Siddons.” The Illustrated London News. August 2, 1856. 
 
Apart from Webb, we see three audience members, a lectern, a railing of some kind. Behind her 
is a tropical plant as well as some flowers: “Even as she capitalized … on her status as an exotic 
other,” Gardner tells us, Webb “consistently and simultaneously positioned herself within the 
definitions of a ‘lady’” (108). Webb gazes out over the attentive audience. Her dress is dark with 
light accents. Her hair is up in the back with curls falling from her temples. Subtle, but still 
noticeable, are the contrasting colors of her black face and white hands, which, hidden from the 
audience by the lectern, touch the black ink and white paper of the script. One reviewer opined 
that “the name black Siddons is a misnomer” (Provincial Freeman 5/12/1855; emphasis in the 
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original). Another swore that it was “absurd” to call her black on the basis of her light 
complexion (Liberator 5/4/1855). The caption informs us that Webb is “a coloured native of 
Philadelphia.” Like the white audience, this detail is supposed to assure us of her racial status, 
but it only adds to the confusion. The woman in the audience’s hands are as white as Webb’s. 
How do you represent in black and white a woman who is neither? I refer more to the 
results of Webb’s performance of ‘black’ and ‘white’ speech than to her mixed racial heritage. If 
Webb is wearing gloves—as Greenfield was told always to do—it’s impossible to tell. But that’s 
the point. It’s an imperceptible performance. Either way, the contrast with her face should make 
us wonder what our eyes are hearing. Susan Clark claims that Webb “performed without the 
minstrel signifiers of burnt cork, wild hair, and tattered clothing,” but she leaves one signifier 
out: dialect (346). In fact, “blackface was really the secondary signifier. … The noise—the ear—
that which always accompanies ritual representations of blackness, is a much richer indicator of 
the presence of inversion rituals than mere blackface” (Cockrell 141). Webb’s skin tone has been 
colored by her tone of voice. Blackvoice has made her look black. Webb’s ‘black’ speech is 
realized here as black skin. Bingham argued that it was not “in the power of any one to alter the 
natural make of his countenance” (16). Performance grants one such a power. Webb’s face may 
be a fake but, as Bingham knew, something that is “wholly counterfeit” can have “the same 
effect as if it were founded in truth” (7). 
I began the chapter with Walker’s and Garrison’s abolitionist texts. I have treated the 
reviews of Greenfield and Webb as allied documents, even though abolitionists, for the most 
part, did not author the reviews.76 Through their performances, Greenfield and Webb 
appropriated the reviews for antiracist ends. Through its realizations, the resonant body resisted 
                                                
76 The next chapter will turn to another allied document that was not written by an abolitionist: 
Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation. 
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the antebellum public’s ideas about black femininity. The performing bodies of Greenfield and 
Webb challenged the culture’s strategies for representing them. Greenfield and Webb 
demonstrated that one could be “transgressive” while giving the impression that one was 
“conventional.”77 Their performances proved that a quiet body is not necessarily quietist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
77 Brooks uses both terms to describe Greenfield (Bodies 312-13). 
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Chapter Five 
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation in Print and Performance 
 
 On January 1, 1863, the United States Government Printing Office published a two-page, 
7 ¼ inch by 4 ¾ inch broadsheet with the superscription: 
Emancipation Proclamation. 
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
A PROCLAMATION. 
The printer added the two-word title by which we know the act today. The official copy, like all 
of the other fifty proclamations Abraham Lincoln made during his presidency, was superscribed: 
“BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. A PROCLAMATION.”78 
But this, the most important of the sixteen he would make that year, or any other year of his 
presidency, got special treatment. The only new word the printer introduced, a word that does not 
appear anywhere in the text, is the first: Emancipation.79 The word summarizes the force of the 
act. The title attests to the fame the only one hundred day old act already had. (Notices in 
newspapers and military reports would call it the President’s Proclamation.) The name was new, 
but readers would have immediately recognized it. The indefinite “A PROCLAMATION” would 
have seemed redundant following “Emancipation Proclamation,” but that was the point. 
“Emancipation Proclamation” omits the definite article, but this, Lincoln’s sixteenth, was the 
proclamation as far as anyone was concerned. The document announces which it is before it 
                                                
78 In its placement and in its size, “BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” is 
given secondary importance. A colon connects it to “A PROCLAMATION,” instead of the 
customary period, which had the effect of giving each phrase independent weight. 
79 In an undated note on the draft of the proclamation, Lincoln calls it the “Emancipation 
Proclamation” (V: 337). All of Lincoln’s writings in this chapter derive from The Collected 
Writings of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1953). Subsequent citations, in reference to volume and page number, will be made 
parenthetically.  
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announces what it is. The definite and the indefinite articles, the repetition of “proclamation,” 
make it seem as if it preceded, indeed, makes it precede, itself. 
Abraham Lincoln called the Emancipation Proclamation “the central act of [his] 
Administration” (qtd. in Holzer 2006 ix). This chapter treats the Proclamation not as a single act, 
but as a series of performances that occurred at different times and places in Civil War America. 
Part Two of the dissertation ends with an example of textual and performance production that 
recalls that with which the dissertation began: David Walker’s Appeal. The performances of the 
Proclamation included such diverse acts as Lincoln’s reading of the preliminary draft to his 
Cabinet in Washington, the recitation of the published text in celebrations across the United 
States, and its announcement by Union soldiers to slaves in the Confederacy. In addition to 
considering the context in which the Proclamation was composed, this chapter proposes that we 
consider the context in which it circulated. By doing this, we can broaden our understanding of a 
cultural event in which many Americans participated. In looking at its cultural impact, we can 
gain a better appreciation of the Proclamation’s significance and see, as Frederick Douglass saw, 
“in its spirit a life and power far beyond its letter” (Autobiographies 792). 
Of all of Lincoln’s writings, the Emancipation Proclamation has received the least 
amount of critical attention. Scholars of American history and literature both concentrate on the 
Gettysburg Address and the Second Inaugural Address—those that inscribe the walls of the 
Lincoln Memorial. Each of them has been the subject of book-length study.80 Even more general 
studies of Lincoln’s writing fail to discuss the Proclamation at any length.81 Though there have 
been studies of the Proclamation, they are generally limited to reviewing the political and 
                                                
80 Wills and White 2002. 
81 White 2005, Wilson, Kaplan. 
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military issues that led to its adoption or to discussing the limited role it played in actually 
freeing the slaves.82 
The criticism of the Proclamation is well known. It lacks the high rhetoric of the 
Memorial speeches. The most moving passage is not his own.83 Samuel P. Chase, Lincoln’s 
Secretary of the Treasury, contributed the final line: “And upon this act, sincerely believed to be 
an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate 
judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God” (VI: 28-30). This sentiment is 
qualified by the assertion that the act is “warranted by the Constitution” and done “upon military 
necessity.” The sentence’s syntax, which places these phrases into dependent clauses, conceals 
the fact that they were the basis for, if not the motivation behind, the Proclamation. It was an act 
of policy—with all the negative connotations of that word—before it was an act of justice.84 
The Proclamation is a separate genre of presidential writing than the Address. Its name 
aside, it doesn’t exactly count as a speech at all. The Address is delivered at a particular time and 
place, like November 19, 1863 in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The better comparison would be to 
the Annual Message to Congress. Article II, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution states that the 
President “shall from time to time give to Congress information of the State of the Union and 
recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.” The 
Constitution does not specify when or how the message is to be communicated. In December 
1862, Lincoln called what he wrote “a paper addressed to the Congress of the nation by the Chief 
                                                
82 Franklin and Guelzo. 
83 Though this hasn’t hurt the First Inaugural Address, whose best passage was suggested by 
William H. Seward. 
84 And it didn’t even work. Douglass, like many others, criticized the limitations of the act: “It 
only abolished slavery where it did not exist, and left it intact where it did exist” 
(Autobiographies 792). 
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Magistrate of the nation” (V:536).85 The Emancipation Proclamation’s subscription certifies that 
it was “done at the City of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one 
thousand eight hundred and sixty three, and of the Independence of the United States of America 
the eighty-seventh,” but this seems more formal than factual. The Gettysburg Address begins by 
affirming its time and place: “Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this 
continent a new nation” (VII:23). The whole speech is taken up with setting. It seems so short 
because most of it reads like a prologue. Lincoln says “here” eight times. The fourth- and 
second-to-last exemplify the force of the repetition: “It is for us the living rather to be dedicated 
here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is 
rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us.” If the repetition of 
“here” threatened to take away from its power, its inversion with “dedicated,” and the resulting 
split infinitive, push it back into the forefront of our minds. Similarly, Lincoln says “that” 
thirteen times, of which five are adjectives and eight are conjunctions. The fifth and sixth bring 
both together: “We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those 
who here gave their lives that that nation might live.” The awkward juxtaposition serves to lend 
to the instrumentality of the conjunction the significance of the adjective, so that all of the thats  
reinforce the address’ deictic charge. 
The deliveries of the Addresses have been documented. There are photographs of Lincoln 
at Gettysburg and at Washington, barely visible amidst the crowds that surrounded him. The 
photographs suggest how grand the occasion was and how insignificant the actors. Though 
Francis Bicknell Carpenter would portray Lincoln’s first reading of the Proclamation to the 
Cabinet two years after the fact, its strict composition makes it seem lifeless.  
                                                
85 The State of the Union as it is now delivered emerged over the course of the twentieth century. 
No President from Jefferson to Taft delivered it in person. 
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Figure 6. Francis Bicknell Carpenter. First Reading of the Emancipation Proclamation of 
President Lincoln. 1864. 
 
Carpenter based his portraits of each man on photographs of them. To get the clearest images, 
the men had to sit still. The vibrancy of the photographs is lacking. The apparently realistic 
painting is actually unreal. The men are ordered according to their positions on emancipation. 
The “accessories” are significant.86 Everything means something. Nothing is out of place. The 
newspaper on the ground, the New York Tribune, criticized Lincoln for his inertia. The books 
that support the empty chair, Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution and William 
Whiting’s War The War Powers of the President, provided justifications for Lincoln’s action—as 
did, arguably, the Constitution, a parchment copy of which is on the table next to Lincoln. So too 
did the legislation collected in the two volumes of the Congressional Globe that support the 
                                                
86 This is the term Frederic Beecher Perkins, Stowe’s nephew, uses to describe the items in The 
Picture and the Men, the volume he compiled about the painting. 
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table. The two maps, of Slavery in the South and the War in Virginia, give context for the cause 
of the act and indicate where it would have an effect.87 The key to the painting in The Picture and 
the Men guides our interpretation of the act it’s meant to represent. Its necessity—the maps may 
be identifiable, but the books are not—demonstrates the propaganda value that the 
commemoration offered.88 Lincoln did similar work in composing the Proclamation, but he 
attempted to render it invisible. 
 
The Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation was not without precedent. Over the first 
year and a half of the war, officers in the field and legislators in the capital acted on the issue of 
emancipation, often without the authorization of the President. From General Benjamin F. Butler 
to Senator Lyman Trumbull, military and government officials advocated prosecuting the war as 
a war of liberation. In doing this, they were responding to the reality on the ground: Fugitives 
from slavery and soldiers for the Union were constantly coming into contact with each other, and 
at each meeting the same questions arose: Should the enslaved be returned to their masters? If 
not, could the government hold them as property? Butler knew that the fate of the three men who 
had fled to Fort Monroe was “but an individual instance in a course of policy which may be 
required to be pursued with regard to this species of property,” so he requested direction from 
Winfield Scott, the Commanding General of the United States Army (1:2 752). Butler defended 
his refusal to hand over the men in two ways: He argued that the Fugitive Slave Act “did not 
                                                
87 The former was made before the war, the latter during it. See Schulten. 
88 Alexander Hay Ritchie’s engraving, which made all of the details clearer, continued this work 
on a much wide scale. 
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affect a foreign country which Virginia claimed to be.” He could have stopped there. Instead, he 
stated his intention to “hold these Negroes as contraband of war” (qtd. in Goodheart 313-14).89  
The contraband argument dominated military and government action on emancipation. 
General John C. Frémont invoked marital law in Missouri in August 1861 to justify the 
confiscation of slaves. He was actually executing his own interpretation of the First Confiscation 
Act, which Congress had passed weeks before (Chaffin 464). General David Hunter also invoked 
martial law in Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina in May 1862. That, without the addition of 
confiscation, was enough for him to declare the enslaved people of those states “forever free.”90 
The argument would receive its fullest expression in the Second Confiscation Act, which Lincoln 
would sign in the days leading up to his writing the draft of the Emancipation Proclamation. The 
official title of that act was “An Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treason and Rebellion, 
to Seize and Confiscate Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes.” It’s about the confiscation 
of property, not the emancipation of slaves, though that would certainly qualify as another 
purpose. Lincoln relied on precedent to authorize the unprecedented work he was trying to 
accomplish. He employed language that would let him effect emancipation while asserting that it 
was not only “fit and necessary,” but that it was also just.  
                                                
89 Sean Wilentz has it as “contrabands.” The difference is significant. As Davis recognizes, 
enslaved people were usually discussed as a group, lacking individuality (86). Some of Lincoln’s 
language—used elsewhere to talk about individual states and their relation to one another—
undoes this work. Wilentz observes that “by treating the confiscated slaves not as chattel 
property but as persons ‘held to labor,’ the [Second Confiscation Act] implicitly endorsed the 
argument, long advanced by Republican political leaders, that there could be no legitimate 
property in human beings.” What he doesn’t observe is the use of the language of labor and 
service in the Fugitive Slave Acts of the Constitution and the Compromise of 1850. Senator 
Trumbull’s reference to “the persons they hold in slavery,” which Wilentz quotes, agrees with 
his argument. “Labor” and “service” were used as euphemisms for slavery in those earlier 
documents. Trumbull refused to equivocate. 
90 “Slavery and martial law in a free country,” he reasoned, were “altogether incompatible (qtd. 
in Miller 99). 
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In the preliminary proclamation, Lincoln declares that “the executive government of the 
United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the 
freedom of such persons” (V:433-36). In the final proclamation, he declares that “the Executive 
government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will 
recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons” (VI:28-30). The “such persons” of the 
preliminary proclamation were now the “said persons” of the final proclamation. The final 
proclamation makes a concerted effort to build on the previous versions of the proclamation (and 
the congressional acts that preceded them). This shift in adjectives typifies Lincoln’s way of 
building up his authority. He does this in material ways, like in cutting and pasting in parts of the 
document that immediately preceded the version he was working on, and in linguistic ways, from 
“such” to “said.” Lincoln makes a point in the preliminary proclamation that he's talking about 
“people held as slaves” and not “all slaves,” as the Second Confiscation Act does. “Said 
persons,” referring to “such persons,” is doing standard legalese work, while also affirming the 
personhood of the enslaved. 
Section 6 of the Second Confiscation Act stated that the act would take effect “within 
sixty days after public warning and proclamation [was] duly given and made by the President of 
the United States” (qtd. in Holzer et al. 139). The draft proclamation that Lincoln read to this 
cabinet in July 1862 was to execute the act. He wrote that he was acting “in pursuance” of that 
section. He adopted, without attribution, the language of the act itself: He addressed those 
“participating in, aiding, countenancing, or abetting the existing rebellion” (V:336-37).91 
Quotation with or without attribution was an important part of Lincoln’s textual practice.92 He 
                                                
91 The Act addresses those who “aid, countenance, and abet.” 
92 Quotation may not even be the best way to think about it. It would be difficult to determine, 
for example, who coined the phrase “forever free.” Hunter used it in this proclamation of May of 
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did both in the Emancipation Proclamation. In the manuscript of the final proclamation, he wrote 
quotation marks around the part of the preliminary proclamation that he had cut and pasted in.93  
 
 
Figure 7. Abraham Lincoln. Manuscript of the Final Emancipation Proclamation. 1862. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
that year. It also appeared in the Second Confiscation Act, passed three days before Lincoln 
wrote the draft. But the bill (S.B. 78), introduced the previous December, contained the language 
“the persons from whom it is said to be due, commonly called slaves, shall, ipso facto, on the 
commission of the act of forfeiture by the party having claim to the service or labor as aforesaid, 
be discharged therefrom, and become forever thereafter free persons.” 
93 The circulation of the proclamations involved the opposite: Others would use Lincoln’s 
language as if it was their own. 
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The rest of the draft is mostly spent revisiting old policy. He “again” proposes 
compensation for the “gradual abolishment of slavery.” He repeated that the object of the war, 
“as it has been, will be” reunion. His new policy comes at the end. On January 1, 1863, “all 
persons held as slaves” by disloyal Americans in territory unoccupied by union troops “shall 
then, thenceforward, and forever, be free.” Lincoln based the Proclamation on his own authority 
as Commander-in-Chief and on the Congress’s power to make war (Carnahan 108). But he, like 
Frémont, went farther than Congress had done (Pinsker 81). 
The structure of the preliminary proclamation differs considerably from that of the draft. 
Lincoln comes first and he makes no mention of the sixth section of the Second Confiscation 
Act. Though, as before, Lincoln adopts the language of others—including, now, himself, we 
don’t see him working through his thoughts, as we did with the draft. Though he doesn’t say so 
explicitly, he continues to cite precedent to defend his actions. Over half of the preliminary 
proclamation is taken up with calling our attention to legislation. As in the draft, Lincoln uses the 
language of a congressional act. The difference is that he eventually cites those acts in the latter 
half of the proclamation, after he’s announced his policies. But he only adopts the language that 
supports his views. He does not work through the issues of legal personhood and legal language 
like Congress had. Though those in Congress who were for the Confiscation Acts were against 
the constitutional protections of slavery, they were obliged to comply with its terms. Lincoln 
skipped this step. 
The two sections of the Second Confiscation Act that Lincoln cited codified the 
opposition to slavery that Butler, Frémont, and Hunter had acted on in the field.94 Section 9 
                                                
94 Anastalplo argues that Lincoln’s omission of the Second Confiscation Act’s twelve other 
sections was a repudiation of them. He had, after all, quoted the entire “Act to make an 
Additional Article of War” (213). Lincoln’s use of the other sections in the Proclamation and in 
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allowed the confiscation of property, including slaves. Section 10 disobliged soldiers and 
civilians from returning fugitive slaves to their masters. Each used the language of preexisting 
statues. Section 9 referred to the people in terms of property—“slaves” appear three times. 
Section 10 referred to them in terms of service and labor—“fugitive” appears two times. Both 
sections model for Lincoln the movement away from the constitutional language that had 
sanctioned slavery. Section 9 ends by declaring that confiscated slaves “shall be deemed captives 
of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude and not again held as slaves.” Treating slaves 
as “captives of war” originated in the Second Seminole War, when slaves that had joined Indian 
bands were considered “prisoners of war” (Carnahan 112). Even though it justified seizing slaves 
as property, it treated them as captives.95 The equation of captivity with freedom is troubling. But 
“captive” refers to a person, at least, which “contraband” does not. A similar, if subtle, shift takes 
place in the promise that all those slaves “shall be … not held again as slaves.” “As” makes 
slavery a condition, not an identity.  
Section 10 ends by ordering that “no person engaged in the military or naval service of 
the United States shall, under any pretence whatever, assume to decide on the validity of the 
claim of any person to the service or labor of any other person.” The title of slaves and masters 
are dismissed. Both are transformed into people in relation to each other. The language of these 
sections of the Second Confiscation Act enacts the liberation they describe. Once the slaves 
“escap[e],” or are “captured,” “deserted,” or “found,” they are free. Once the fugitive has 
escaped, he is just like “any other person.” The other sections that refer to the freed people, 
                                                                                                                                                       
other policies shows that this wasn’t the case. If anything, Lincoln’s leaving out compensation 
and colonization in the final proclamation was a repudiation of himself. 
95 The legislative branch determined what kinds of property could be forfeited, though the 
judicial branch could interfere on constitutional grounds. It was up to the military to decide who 
could be taken prisoner (Carnahan 112). 
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sections 10 and 11, that authorize enlistment and colonization refer to them as “persons of 
African descent” and “persons of the African race.”96 The word “slave” does not appear again. 
Lincoln begins the preliminary proclamation with old policy again. He repeats his 
intention to propose compensated emancipation and colonization.97 Then comes the new one:  
On the first day of January in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred 
and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a 
State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States shall 
be then, thenceforward, and forever free. 
Lincoln does not call them slaves; he uses the language that Congress had worked out. “All 
persons held as slaves” recalls, though it comes before it in the Proclamation, section 9 of the 
Second Confiscation Act. Immediately following the proposal, Lincoln calls attention to past 
legislation.98 The effect of reading Lincoln’s unattributed quotations before reading their source 
gives the impression of a perpetual consensus that can be best represented in the historical 
present of “forever free.” The embossed, signed document, as well as the printed versions of it, 
registers on a material level the detemporalization that the language generates. Different people 
composed the manuscript of the preliminary proclamation at different times. Lincoln copied out 
the text in his own hand, cutting and pasting in the congressional acts as he went. He explained 
                                                
96 The D.C. Emancipation Act of April 1862 referred to “all persons held to service or labor … 
by reason of African descent.”  
97 Both policies were part of emancipation in the District of Columbia. Lincoln would continue 
to advocate both of them months after the preliminary proclamation, in December’s Message to 
Congress. The D.C. plan provided for immediate emancipation. The preliminary proclamation 
allowed for either one. 
98 Anastalplo observes that the preliminary proclamation succeeds because it “shift[s] attention to 
the expected measure (on January 1) from the extraordinary measure (of September 22)” (211). 
While it does look forward, it’s also constantly looking back. 
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in a letter to the woman in charge of the auction he donated it to that he did so to “save writing” 
(VI: 539). It also saved him time.99 
Lincoln originally wrote that the government would “recognize the freedom” of the freed 
people. Seward suggested changing it to “recognize and maintain” (Guelzo 155). Lincoln later 
said that he “had already fully considered the import of that expression in this connection, but I 
had not introduced it, because it was not my way to promise what I was not entirely sure I could 
perform, and I was not prepared to say that I thought we were exactly able to ‘maintain’ this” 
(qtd. in Wilson 132). What counted as the maintenance of freedom was unclear. Some thought it 
meant that Union troops would support a slave insurrection. Lincoln would introduce language in 
the final proclamation to counteract this fear—he “appeal[ed] to the people so declared to be 
free, to abstain from all disorder, tumult, and violence, unless in necessary self defense.”  Still, it 
wasn’t enough for some. Secretaries Bates, Seward, Blair, and Chase “all urged him to strike it 
out completely” (Guelzo 178). Jefferson Davis thought self-defense still permitted insurrection. 
The slaves, he said, “are encouraged to a general assassination of their masters by the insidious 
recommendation” (qtd. in Franklin 125). European leaders feared the same (Carnahan 127). 
Lincoln’s reticence to promise more than he could guarantee is most evident in the line that 
Seward and Chase recommended be struck from the preliminary proclamation. He had written 
that freedom would be recognized “during the continuance in office of the present incumbent” 
(qtd. in Wilson 132). Lincoln didn’t only fear the Supreme Court, but his political opponents as 
well (Guelzo 180-81). Lincoln’s eventual challenger, General George B. McClellan, had 
opposed publicizing the proclamation to the Army of the Potomac. Only after being pressed by 
his friends did he do so (McClellan 471-72). In his addendum to the Proclamation, he intimated 
                                                
99 The text of the embossed, signed proclamation was copied out, Lincoln writes, “by whom I 
know not,” which suggests the anonymous way it will circulate. 
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that those who disagreed with the policy should bring it up at the ballot box (McClellan 493-94). 
And the Republicans did lose seats in both houses of Congress in 1862’s midterm elections. 
Many have commented on Lincoln’s removal of “forever” from the final proclamation, 
but as significant are the other shifts in that sentence. The preliminary proclamation declared that 
the enslaved “shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free.” It spoke of emancipation in the 
future tense (Guelzo 179). The final proclamation proclaims that they “are, and henceforward 
shall be free.” The loss of one of the only poetic phrases in the proclamation—the alliterative, 
iambic “forever free”—is made up for by the steady rhythm of “shall be free.” And “forever 
free” isn’t gone either. It’s still in the part of the preliminary proclamation that Lincoln quotes. 
 The preliminary proclamation is obsessed with time, just as the final proclamation would 
be obsessed with space. Lincoln waited to release the Proclamation until the timing would be 
right. Seward told him that if he released it in July, it “may be viewed as the last measure of an 
exhausted government, a cry for help” (qtd. in Guelzo 123). And so Lincoln waited two months. 
The Proclamation envisioned emancipation happening all at once or over time, in stages.100 It 
would depend on the success of individual fugitives and the outcome of battles. The process of 
emancipation would be prey to the same contingencies as the proclamation of it.101 The 
Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation is full of dates (March 13, 1862, July 17, 1862, 
September 22, 1862). It measures time in centuries (“the year of our Lord, one thousand eight 
hundred and sixty two) and decades (“and of the Independence of the United States, the eighty 
seventh”). The day the Proclamation was to take effect was listed as “the first day of January, in 
                                                
100 The compensated emancipation plan he put forth in December would have allowed the states 
thirty-seven years, until 1900, to abolish the institution. 
101 In this respect, the Second Confiscation Act’s emphasis on occupied territory, instead of the 
Proclamation’s emphasis on unoccupied territory, seems more realistic. It would have 
emancipated those who took “refuge within the lines of the army” or came “under the control of 
the government of the United States.” 
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the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three,” like the birth of Christ. This 
wasn’t done to trump Congress or celebrate himself, but to sanctify the act.102  
 If the Government Printing Office had emphasized the Proclamation, the final 
proclamation serves to emphasize the President. Its superscription was identical to Lincoln’s 
previous sixteen proclamations: “BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. / A 
PROCLAMATION.” The proclamation itself begins: “Whereas, on the twentysecond day of 
September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty two, a proclamation 
was issued by the President of the United States.” After citing the two relevant passages from the 
preliminary proclamation, he continues, “Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln.” Though this isn’t 
the only time that Lincoln refers to himself in the third person in a proclamation, those others 
references were usually in reference to congressional acts that called on him to act as President. 
Here he’s speaking about his own actions. It, along with Lincoln’s citation of himself, adds to the 
sense that he is not acting on his own (Anastalplo 217).103 
 Lincoln assembled the final proclamation in the same way that he did the preliminary 
one. He wrote it out, pasting in clippings from the preliminary proclamation as he went along. 
He included the Cabinet’s suggested revisions, including the passage by Chase.104 He waited to 
complete the list of occupied counties so it could be as accurate as possible (Guelzo 178). The 
document was then sent to be embossed at the State Department. When he was about to sign it, 
Lincoln noticed that the copyist had written the wrong subscription: “In testimony whereof, I 
have hereunto set my name and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.” This phase 
was meant for proclamations of treaties ratified by Congress. Lincoln ordered that a new copy be 
                                                
102 Anastalplo disagrees (216). 
103 It also anticipates the blending of voices that will happen in the circulation. 
104 Guelzo writes that this passage “makes the Proclamation virtually a second Declaration” 
(180-81). 
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made with the correct subscription: “In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused 
the seal of the United States to be affixed” (Guelzo 181). The phraseology for each act was 
predetermined, but it’s significant that the proper one refers not only to the signature, but to the 
hand that signs it.105 “Witness” suggested a presence that “testimony” lacked. Lincoln had 
intended to sign the Proclamation before the annual New Year’s Day reception had begun. Then 
he noticed the mistake, so it would have to wait until after. This not only delayed the 
announcement of the Proclamation—which caused considerable anxiety in those waiting to 
celebrate it, especially as it wasn’t certain that Lincoln would go through with it—but it affected 
how it was signed (and not just when). Lincoln’s hand was weak after shaking hands for so many 
hours. He hesitated before signing, because he was concerned that the weakness of his hand, 
which might be visible in his signature, may be taken as a sign of the weakness of his resolve. He 
was noted to have said, “Now, this signature will be closely examined, and if they find my hand 
to have trembled, they will say ‘he had some compunctions.’ But, any way, it is going to be 
done!” (qtd. in David 407). The significance lies in what “it” was. If “it” meant the Proclamation, 
then it was done. If “it” meant emancipation, then it was going to be. The success of the 
Emancipation Proclamation would ultimately depend on the strength of federal forces and slave 
resistance, not one man’s hand. 
 
 The Emancipation Proclamation was a war measure and, as such, was publicized by the 
military. Most writing on the circulation focuses on its reception in the North. Scholars write 
about its appearance in newspapers, its transmission along the telegraph, the celebrations and 
protests that met it. They speak of the reaction in Europe and of the response of the Confederate 
                                                
105 Even though the hand that wrote the subscription was not Lincoln’s own. It was the copyist’s. 
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Government. But the reception of the Proclamation among the enslaved is not as well known. 
The most common way it circulated were the “networks of communication able to stretch into 
remote areas of the rural South,” often called at the time the “slave telegraph” (Hahn 2009 
103).106 A black song sung to the tune of “John Brown’s Body” that was recorded after the war 
naturalized this process: 
  We heard the Proclamation, master hush it as he will.  
The bird he sing it to us, hoppin’ on the cotton hill.  
And the possum up the gum tree, he couldn’t keep it still,  
As he went climbing on. (qtd. in Marszalak 114) 
Still, it was the military’s responsibility to circulate it as widely and as quickly as possible 
(Franklin 127). And though the effort benefitted as much from the industrial might of the North 
as any other part of the war, it remained dependent on the kind of word-of-mouth, face-to-face 
interactions that we associate with the slave telegraph, rather than the electric telegraph. 
The Proclamation, in composition and in circulation, relied on a series of substitutions.107 
Lincoln, as President, gave the Emancipation Proclamation his authority. But the task of carrying 
it out—and, literally, carrying it—would be performed by others. The drafts of each 
proclamation were written out by copyists, each of whom wrote “I, Abraham Lincoln … have 
hereunto set my hand” and were telling the truth. Lincoln described his actions as being done “by 
                                                
106 Medford has more on how the slaves came to know about the proclamation (50-51). 
107 Joseph Roach’s “surrogation” deals with “memory, performance, and substitution” (2). It 
refers to a process through which “culture reproduces and re-creates itself,” a process often 
centered on the substitution of someone, or something, that has died, or been lost. Though 
Roach’s “surrogation,” like Richard Schechner’s “restored behavior,” informs my general 
understanding of performance, it does not apply here. The performances of the Emancipation 
Proclamation I examine do not count as “twice-behaved behavior” because the Proclamation was 
never once-behaved (37-37). Though these performances circulate, they do not hearken back to 
any one performance. Though they all perform the same text, they have no original to repeat or 
replace. Even Carpenter’s painting is a reenactment without a referent. 
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the President of the United States.” His words were his own—and those of secretaries, generals, 
and senators. The Proclamation did not announce how its policies would be put into effect. Later 
in 1863, Lincoln would release his Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, which did 
contain instructions on how it was to be executed. Rebels would receive a full pardon on the 
condition that they “take and subscribe an oath, and thenceforward keep and maintain said oath 
inviolate; and which oath shall be registered for permanent preservation” (VII: 54). The oath 
would be spoken and written. There were no restrictions on where or when it could be carried 
out. It, or something of the same “tenor and effect,” would suffice. The Emancipation 
Proclamation worked in the same way. Writing after the release of the preliminary proclamation, 
Emerson feared that it would end up being no more than a “paper proclamation” (132). An 
advertisement for a print of an imagined scene of reading of the Proclamation told that it 
represented “the only way in which the glorious news could reach the downtrodden and 
oppressed slaves, viz: through the faithful soldier, without whom the Proclamation would ever 
have remained a dead letter.”  
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Figure 8. Henry W. Herrick. Reading the Emancipation Proclamation. 1863. 
 
The booklet that accompanied the engraving enacted a substitution of its own. As well as 
offering a “description of the engraving,” it supplied the text of the Proclamation as well. The 
viewer of the engraving is, like the soldier, the reader of the text. The publisher assured the 
purchaser that “the sight of this engraving will always produce happy reflections in the minds of 
every Christian and philanthropist” (Kellogg 400).108 A disembodied Lincoln supports the scene. 
The torch that the son holds illuminates the paper—though it appears as if the paper itself 
radiated light—and casts shadows on the face of the soldier. The rest of the family acts out 
                                                
108 Holzer writes that the engraving’s “creators expected the principal audience to be not newly 
liberated slaves but philanthropic white abolitionists” (110-11). They would be happy because it 
reminded them of the work they had done for emancipation. They are part of what the print 
called the “party.” 
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different responses to the news: joy, gratitude, fear. The identity of the soldier is not given. He 
may be white or black.109 The Proclamation was for both. 
 The War Department issued both the preliminary proclamation (General Orders, No. 139) 
and the final proclamation (General Orders, No. 1). Of the latter, approximately 15,000 copies 
were printed (Eberstadt 21). The heads of each military department were also responsible for 
publishing it. But by far, the largest enterprise to circulate the proclamation was by John Murray 
Forbes, a Boston businessman and a Republican.110 In her edition of her father’s letters, 
Murray’s daughter writes that,  
with the view of placing the Proclamation of Emancipation in the hands of the 
Negroes themselves, my father had 1,000,000 copies printed on small slips, one 
and a half inches square, put into packages of fifty each, and distributed among 
the Northern soldiers at the front, who scattered them among the blacks, while on 
the march. (348) 
Forbes had received the support of Governor John A. Andrew to distribute the 3 3/8 inch by 2 
1/4 inch proclamation amongst Massachusetts regiments, who, in 1863, were serving in the 
Departments of Virginia, North Carolina, the Cumberland, and the Gulf (Eberstadt 22; 
Higginson Massachusetts).111 Murray’s proclamation is significant not only for its possible 
reach, but for what it can tell us about the way it circulated.  
 
 
                                                
109 Vorenberg thinks he is an African American (126). 
110 For more on Forbes, see Lawson and Smith. 
111 Murray had run the idea by Senator Charles Sumner as well. Sumner “like[d] much the idea 
of distributing the Proclamation through the army” (349). Sumner thought Murray should go 
further: “Why not send to all the hospitals, camps, posts? The more the better.” 
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 Murray’s intentions can be guessed at from the size of his title.  
 
 
Figure 9. Abraham Lincoln. Proclamation of Emancipation, by the President of the United 
States, January 1st, 1863. 1863. 
 
Emancipation is emphasized over proclamation, which is emphasized over the President. Under 
the heading of “SLAVERY THE CHIEF CORNER-STONE,” there is a quotation from a speech 
by Alexander H. Stephens, “Vice President of the so-called Confederate States, delivered March 
31, ’61.”112 The excerpt reads: “This stone (slavery,) which was rejected by the first builders, is 
become the chief stone of the corner in our new edifice.” This speech is perhaps the most famous 
                                                
112 Murray had consulted with Sumner about including this quote. Sumner saw “no objection” to 
doing so (349). 
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defense of the Confederate States of America and its Constitution.113 Stephens declares that that 
United States Constitution guaranteed “perfect equality” for all. The whole speech walks through 
the new Constitution, detailing what of the old was kept, changed, or left out. He spends more 
time on race and slavery than on any other issue. He judges the United States Constitution’s plan 
for the end of the foreign slave trade to be a sign that the Framers thought slavery was wrong 
and, moreover, temporary: “This idea, though not incorporated in the constitution, was the 
prevailing idea at that time.” Their ideas were “fundamentally wrong” because they “rested upon 
the assumption of the equality of the races.” The Confederate States of America would not make 
the same mistake:  
Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations 
are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the 
white man; that slavery subordination to the superior race is his natural and 
normal condition. This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the 
world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth. (717-29) 
The Confederacy would not be based on the idea of state sovereignty, but of white supremacy. 
 The Stephens quote is important because it proved that the Civil War was about slavery 
and should be for liberation. Lincoln’s idea was not new at all. Stephens took the position before 
he did. If the Confederate States of America were to be taken down, it made sense to strike at 
their base. Remove slavery, Murray reasoned, and the structure would fall. Emancipation gained 
popular support over the course of the war, but it was still controversial.114 The inclusion of the 
                                                
113 Jaffa writes about the speech at length. 
114 Brasher argues that General McClellan’s failed 1862 Peninsula Campaign led the way to the 
North’s acceptance of emancipation. 
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Stephens quote makes the proclamation Union propaganda.115 If the broadside of the 
Proclamation that Murray published, which also included the Stephens quote, was meant for 
skeptical civilians, the pamphlet was meant for skeptical soldiers. Lincoln feared that 
McClellan’s troops would side with their commander. There is evidence that some soldiers did 
not approve.116 Though there were initially threats of desertion, support for the measure grew.117 
Even if a soldier were already supportive of the measure, the pamphlet would give him the tools 
to convince others of its justness. 
 A more telling clue to the pamphlet’s intended use is on its back cover. There are two 
paragraphs from “General Andrew Jackson’s Proclamation of September 21, 1814” to “the Free 
Colored Inhabitants of Louisiana.” Jackson had appealed to the gens de couleur libres to defend 
New Orleans against the British in the War of 1812: 
Through a mistaken policy, you have heretofore been deprived of a participation 
in the glorious struggle for national rights in which our country is engaged. This 
no longer shall exist. 
As sons of freedom, you are now called upon to defend our most inestimable 
blessing. As Americans, your country looks with confidence to her adopted 
children for a valorous support, as a faithful return for the advantages enjoyed 
under her mild and equitable enjoyment. As fathers, husbands, and brothers, you 
are summoned to rally around the standard of the Eagle, to defend all which is 
dear in existence. (58-59) 
                                                
115 1863 was also the year that Murray, along with other influential Bostonians, began the New 
England Loyal Publication Society, which wrote, reprinted, and recirculated pro-Republican 
newspaper editorials throughout the North and West. 
116 See McPherson 1997, Gallagher, and Manning. 
117 The great majority of the Army of the Potomac voted for Lincoln in 1864. 
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This address, meant to recruit free people of color in 1814, is now meant to recruit enslaved 
people of color in 1863. But its placement in the pamphlet, after the Proclamation, is the first 
recognition of their status as freed people. Read linearly, the pamphlet convinced the white 
soldier, who then freed and recruited the black slave. But it collapses time too, as did the 
Emancipation Proclamation. It also combines the tasks of liberation and recruitment. The latter 
would be taken on through a separate office. In a poster from one of those campaigns, the white 
recruiter is shown as the hero, even if its audience were black. They are now being called upon to 
defend the nation they were moments before kept out of. 
 The “mistaken policy” in both cases are not named. Then, it was the decision to not arm 
free blacks. Now, it was the decision to not work for their freedom.118 Nor are the “national 
rights” identified. Then, it was the rights of national sovereignty. Now, it was the rights of 
national existence. The “inestimable blessing” was always freedom, though in a truer sense in 
1863 than in 1814. The “advantages enjoyed” by the freed people were nonexistent. The spirit of 
the message was to recall a time when African Americans acted heroically. And, in the Civil 
War, as in the War of 1812, black men would fight for the United States, as well as for 
themselves. The irony that freedmen would be faithful children, thankful for advantages they had 
not enjoyed, comes out in the text and history of the rest of Jackson’s address. Jackson promised 
fair treatment and equal pay, “namely, one hundred and twenty-four dollars in money and one 
hundred and sixty acres in land,” much more than Genereal William Tecumseh Sherman would 
offer the freedmen of South Carolina and Georgia in 1865. The men fought well, well enough for 
Jackson to make a second proclamation praising his “fellow-citizens” and their love for their 
“native country” (119).  
                                                
118 Is it a “mistake” like, to Stephens, the Framers’ ideas on race were an “error”? Error is 
harsher. Mistake tries to deflect blame. 
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Recall the scene of Lincoln’s reading the Emancipation Proclamation as Carpenter 
sketched it. There are ten men represented: Lincoln and his seven cabinet members, in person, 
and Simon Cameron and Andrew Jackson, in portrait. Cameron had been Lincoln’s Secretary of 
War until he was replaced by Stanton in 1862. President Jackson held the country together 
during the Nullification Crisis of the 1830s. He was celebrated for asserting that “the Union must 
and shall be preserved.” But General Jackson had betrayed the free and enslaved men that had 
fought in the Battle of New Orleans. James Roberts, a veteran of the Revolutionary War and the 
War of 1812, published his narrative in 1858 when he was, by his estimate, 104 years old.119 He 
was, while serving under Generals Washington and Jackson, a slave. Jackson had promised to 
free Roberts and his fellows if they won the battle. The battle won, he sent them home to their 
masters. Roberts recounts the way he challenged Jackson. He pulled his gun on the Jackson, only 
to discover that it had been unloaded on the General’s orders (17). Jackson told his white 
soldiers, “Never arm another set of colored people. We have fooled them now, but never trust 
them again. They will not be fooled again with this example before them” (18). In the conclusion 
to his narrative, published a year after the Dred Scot decision denied black men citizenship and a 
year before John Brown led his unsuccessful raid on Harpers Ferry, Roberts wrote that he 
regretted his service. If black men had not rallied to America’s side, the British would have won, 
and they would be free: “Therefore, my earnest and departing request is, that should this country 
ever again engage in war with any nation, have nothing whatever to do with the war, although 
the fairest promises should be made to you. Do not forget the promise Jackson made us” (31-32). 
Neither Jackson’s nor Roberts’ warnings would be heeded. 
                                                
119 He dictated it to an unnamed, black amanuensis. Martin Delany also wrote about a man he 
knew in Pittsburgh, a free man of color that fought for Jackson and also felt betrayed by his 
broken promises. 
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There were 4,000,000 people enslaved in the United States in 1860. Seward estimated 
that the Proclamation had freed 200,000 slaves (Guelzo 214). It did not apply to 800,000 
(Medford 59). By April 1865, about 500,000 people had been freed. The institution of slavery 
would not be abolished until December of that year, with the ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 400,000 black men, most of them freedmen, would fight 
for the North in the Civil War. One out of every five would die.120 
David Brion Davis once described what he called the “emancipation moment” (69). 
Though he gave examples of many such moments that occurred throughout the U.S. South, he 
retained the singular construction. Anthony Kaye has since argued that “emancipation was not a 
single instant at all but a process” (206). Both are correct. The composition and circulation of the 
Emancipation Proclamation were enacted in multiple places and at multiple times. The furthest 
from Washington, and the latest after January 1, 1863, was in Galveston, Texas on June 19, 
1865. The proclamation that General Gordon Granger read out (General Orders, No. 3) was a 
paraphrase of Lincoln’s Proclamation. It began: “The people of Texas are informed that, in 
accordance with a proclamation from the Executive of the United States, all slaves are free” 
(Wiggins 62). The war that had brought about the act had been over for two months. The man 
that had signed it had been buried for one. 
 
Diana Taylor argues that the archive and the repertoire are two separate, 
incommensurable forms, and that the latter is a more effective mode for enacting dissent. 
Taylor’s argument has contributed to a habit in performance studies to not consider the role that 
material forms—specifically, textual ones—played in the performance repertoires of African 
                                                
120 See Cornish and McPherson 1982 for more on the U.S. Colored Troops. 
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American resisters. This dissertation has demonstrated that the material and the embodied were 
not distinct, that each, in fact, effected the other. This chapter has examined the production 
history of the Emancipation Proclamation: namely, what free and enslaved blacks in the 
Confederate States of America did to compose and circulate it. I argue that the Proclamation was 
produced by the fugitive movements of contraband slaves and soldiers. These movements were 
reflected in the text, which promoted more acts of resistance. These slaves, and these soldiers, 
forced Washington to act on the emancipation and the enlistment of black men. Once enlisted, 
these men became indispensable to the military’s efforts to liberate other enslaved people. The 
Proclamation, in summary, was the record and the instrument of their self-emancipation. 
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